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Introduction 
 
 
The work is intended to ask whether and – if so – how the European Union is 
able to communicate, to promote or simply showcase its system of environmental 
governance to the wider outside world.  
The core- puzzle questions running through this thesis are the following ones: 
1) Which have been the key success factors of the EU experience in 
environmental domestic policy? Are there institutional 
conditions/obstacles to replicate the European experience in other regional 
integration areas? 
2)  How does external EU environmental governance, broadly understood as 
the extension of EU environmental policy to non-EU contexts, take place? 
3) How do internal factors of EU environmental governance 
(coherence/expertise) play out in the external dimensions under study? 
4) Why the EU is currently struggling so hard in order to promote its 
leadership in climate change negotiations? Which are the political and 
institutional factors that currently limit the EU influence in leading the 
process towards a climate change global agreement in 2015? Despite the 
relatively limitation of its current environmental leadership, how can the 
EU best have positive influence? 
Presumably, such challenge for Europe requires a strong form of political 
leadership. The latter will be here conceptualized under two distinctive forms: (a) 
9 
 
environmental «leadership by example» and (b) environmental «leadership by 
diplomacy»
1
.  
The first one deals with the spontaneous passive influence of the EU 
environmental policy as public policy within the Union’s historical integration. 
Externally, it has progressively become an important reference point for its near 
and for its abroad.  
At the same time, the Union has also started to consider the EU environmental 
policy as part of foreign policy through the European External Action Service 
(EEAS). In doing this, the EU has delivered a vast gradation of policy tools such 
as the environmental conditionality clauses.   
The project structure of the work is composed of four parts. The first part of the 
research is intended to offer a theoretical framework related to the idea of 
international responsibility and political leadership in environmental field. What 
we consider as a key-point in this large debate is the interpretation and 
application of the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in 
climate change field, with particular regard to the way through which the EU has 
intended to interpret it at global level. 
 The second part of the work aims to acknowledge the EU experience for 
sustainable development as the most structurally de-nationalized example of 
multilevel constitutionalism and critically recognize the latter as the most 
effective historical laboratory for ensuring sustainable development today. 
Contemporary political-juridical literature largely confirms that the EU 
                                                          
1
 For the original theoretical conceptualization of «leadership by example» and 
«leadership by diplomacy», see Oberthür S., The role of the EU in global environmental 
and climate governance, in Telo’ M., The European Union and Global Governance, 
Ashgate, 2009. See also Oberthür S., The new climate policy in the European Union: 
internal legislation and climate diplomacy, VUB Press, 2009 
10 
 
environmental governance, despite some difficulties, has been an «uncontested 
success story»
2
. Even if it is a work in progress, the Union has created some of 
the most progressive environmental public policies of any State in the world, 
although it is not actually a State
3
.  
The third part of the research will investigate whether the EU can be 
borrowed in other regional integration areas. Here, within the framework of 
environmental leadership by example, the research will focus on two selected 
cases-study: the ASEAN and the MERCOSUR as emerging areas of regional 
integration. Such comparative exercise will imply the analysis of the key success 
factors of the EU and the institutional conditions/obstacles of circulation of it, 
moving from the European historical lesson, from its «leadership by example» 
and its capacity-building potentials. 
The fourth part of the work describes how the EU has struggled to emerge as 
green leader in International Relations with the ambition to act as global 
protagonist to govern climate change
4
. In order to avoid a situation in which the 
EU is a leader without followers, the Union has tuned an array of different tools 
to take on global climate change leadership. They include the practice and 
institutionalization of diffuse reciprocity
5
, issue-linkages
6
, the strengthening of 
                                                          
2
 See Krämer L., The EU: a regional model?, in Winter G., Multilevel Governance of 
Global Environmental Change, Perspectives from science, sociology and the law, 
Cambridge University Press, 2006 
3
 Jordan A., Introduction: European Union Environmental Policy-Actors, Institutions 
and Policy Processes in Jordan A., Environmental Policy in the European Union, 
Earthscan Ed., 2005 
4
 See Giddens A., The politics of Climate Change, Politybooks, 2009 
5
 See Telo’ M., State, Globalization and Multilateralism, Springer, 2012  
6
Axelrod R., Keohane R, Achieving cooperation under anarchy: strategies and 
institutions, World Politics, 1985. See   also Sebenius J., Negotiation Arithmetic: adding 
and subtracting issues and parties, International Organization, 1983  
11 
 
EEAS’s diplomatic efforts7, unilateral policy having extraterritorial effects (such 
as the introduction of measures that link access to the rich and attractive EU 
internal market to certain environmental standards). In this sense, the EU does 
wield a quite remarkable hard power because it encompasses the world’s largest 
internal market
8
. All these political-economic approaches are included into the 
concept of EU «environmental leadership by diplomacy» in multilateral fora 
such as the UNFCCCs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/international_issues/green_diplomacy_en.htm  
8
 Connelly J., Wurzel R., The European Union as a leader in international climate 
 change politics, Routledge, 2011 
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1. Theoretical perspectives: international regimes, theory of 
regionalism, global environmental politics. 
 
Our theoretical framework is mainly composed of three bodies of scientific 
literature: international regimes, regional integration theory and global 
environmental politics. They are three possible strands of political literature 
helpful in answering our puzzle-questions. They also outline open-ended aspects 
where more research will be needed. All of them represent precious 
complementary tools in order to understand the evolution of EU environmental 
governance and its external implications. 
 
International regimes. The theory of international regimes is one of the IR 
theories aimed at explaining the political phenomenon of international 
cooperation (which also include the studies on the role of international law in IR, 
transnationalism
9
, the theory of complex interdependence, etc.)
10
.  The core-
question lumping together all these theories is why do States decide to cooperate. 
Broadly speaking, their attitude to cooperation can differ because the evaluation 
of national interest can change over time and depend upon certain circumstances. 
What is sure is that – under given circumstances – cooperation turns out to be 
more profitable than competition or conflict. This assumption particularly fits for 
the management of global public goods, where the sum of individual rational 
                                                          
9
 For a theoretical introduction to Transnationalism, see Nye J., Keohane R., 
Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction, International 
Organization, 25, 3, 1971. See also DeBardeleben J., Hurrelmann A., Transnational 
Europe. Promise, Paradox, Limits, Palgrave Macmillan, 2011  
10
 See Telo’ M., Relations Internationales. Une perspective européenne, IEE, Editions 
de L’Université de Bruxelles, 2007 
14 
 
behaviors often leads to a collective irrational result
11
. This is exactly the case of 
global environment intended as public good. For its protection, multilateral 
cooperation is getting more and more essential against the disruptive effects of 
international anarchy and economic laissez-faire. In this sense, multilateral 
cooperation can take different shapes according to the different levels and 
degrees of institutionalization: international regimes stand between a minimal 
level of institutionalization (international agreements, which are ad hoc, often 
“one-shot” arrangements) and a maximum level of institutionalization 
(international organizations, which are institutionalized bodies)
12
.  
In political literature, international regimes have been scientifically defined as «a 
set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area of IR»
13
. More 
precisely, principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms are 
standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are 
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are 
the prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice
14
.  In a 
similar perspective, international regimes have also been defined as «sets of 
governing arrangements that include networks of rules, norms and procedures 
that regularize behavior and control its effects»
15
.  
Besides, it is important to remark that international regimes are not spontaneous 
ad hoc arrangements, but are instead institutions that evolve with time and that 
                                                          
11
 Morin J., Global Environmental Governance in Telo’ M., Globalisation, 
Multilateralism, Europe. Towards a Better Global Governance, Ashgate, 2013 
12
 See Telo’ M., Relations Internationales. Une perspective européenne, IEE, Ed. de 
L’Université de Bruxelles, 2007 
13
 Krasner S., International regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983 
14
 Krasner S., International regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983 
15
 Keohane R., Nye J., Power and Interdependence Revisited, International 
Organization, 41, 4, 1987 
15 
 
have deep normative roots
16
. As well, international regimes should not be 
confused with formalized organizations, while organizations are often key 
players setting up and implementing international regimes
17
.  Put in other words, 
while regimes are important because they provide the rules of the games, 
organizations typically emerge as actors pursuing their objectives under the terms 
of these rules
18
.  
Insofar as they are sufficiently institutionalized, international regimes can change 
States’ behaviors, by reducing incertitude and fixing common frameworks of  
dialogue and cooperation
19
. In a world of growing interdependence
20
, such 
interdependence has increased the possibilities to build international regimes, so 
as to both limit international anarchy and national sovereignty.
21
  Since the 
beginning of the XXI century the theoretical approach of international regimes 
has been progressively applied to explain the evolution of thousands of issues 
characterizing international life. Among them, environment and climate change 
would represent a prominent example of international regimes at work
22
.  In this 
perspective, even the European Union could be seen as «a set of international 
                                                          
16  
Morin J., Global Environmental Governance in Telo’ M., Globalisation, 
Multilateralism, Europe. Towards a Better Global Governance, Ashgate, 2013 
17
 Young R., Governance in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, 1999 
18
 Breimeier H. et al., Analyzing International Environmental Regimes – from case 
study to database, MIT Press, 2006  
19
 Telo’ M., Relations Internationales. Une perspective européenne, IEE, Editions de 
L’Université de Bruxelles, 2007 
20
 As observed by Morin, one must first recognize the international community’s 
ecological interdependence. Such preliminary recognition of interdependence does not 
simply mean that countries share a single biosphere, but also that every issue-area of IR 
is functionally linked to each other. See Morin J., Global Environmental Governance in 
Telo’ M., Globalisation, Multilateralism, Europe. Towards a Better Global Governance, 
Ashgate, 2013   
21
 Krasner S., International regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983 
22
 Young O., International Cooperation: Building regimes for natural resources and the 
environment, Cornell University Press, 1989 
16 
 
regimes»
23
. As such, the creation of international regimes flows from the outset 
that multilateral institutionalized cooperation is a necessity to increase the 
problem-solving capacity of nation States
24
 and to fill the gap coming from the 
existing discrepancies between individual and collective interests
25
. The EU, as 
strong supporter of the multilateral system, believes that it is possible to establish 
international agreements with which states comply, as it has been done within the 
EU in an advanced form
26
. Moreover, international cooperation would be in the 
interest of the EU itself, because it enables the Union to “diffuse” its own high 
environmental standards, so as to guarantee the level playing-field that helps 
European companies to compete on equal terms in the world
27
. 
 
Regional integration theory. In political literature, the regional element has 
been investigated both ontologically and epistemologically
28
. Today, regions 
appear not only an alternative mode of reshaping international relations, but also 
a new vector for structuring global governance itself
29
. In other words, regions 
are becoming increasingly important as disseminator of ideas and change 
                                                          
23
 See Moravscick A., The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power From 
Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press, 1998 
24
 Van Schaik L., The Sustainability of the EU’s Model for Climate Diplomacy, in 
Oberthür S., et al.,The New Climate Policies of the European Union, VUBPRESS 2010. 
25
 Morin J., Global Environmental Governance in Telo’ M., Globalisation, 
Multilateralism, Europe. Towards a Better Global Governance, Ashgate, 2013 
26
 Van Schaik L., The Sustainability of the EU’s Model for Climate Diplomacy, in 
Oberthür S., et al.,The New Climate Policies of the European Union, VUBPRESS 2010. 
27
 Van Schaik L., The Sustainability of the EU’s Model for Climate Diplomacy, in 
Oberthür S., et al.,The New Climate Policies of the European Union, VUBPRESS 2010. 
28
 Debarbieux B., How regional is Regional Environmental Governance? In Global 
Environmental Politics, MIT Press,  12,3, 2012 
29
 See Farrel M. et al, Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and practice, Pluto Press, 
2005 
17 
 
agents
30
, mostly as reaction to the persistent deadlocks taking place globally. As 
concisely noted by Ken Conca, much of the impetus for the regional comes from 
global failure, or at least from its stagnation
31
. From a theoretical point of view,  
the regional element can be conceptualized under four possible notions which are 
also progressively sequenced from the most basic to the most complex form of 
regional integration. The first basic notion is the concept of Regioness: it mainly 
refers to a longue durée process whereby historical and cultural roots play a 
relevant role among people and space. As a consequence, to share a common 
historical past would also mean to share similar ideas and interests. The second 
notion is the concept of Regionalization.  At its most basic it means no more than 
a concentration of economic activity at a regional level
32
. It refers to spontaneous 
economic processes and it directly depends on globalization
33
. Indeed, it can be 
identified as the regional dimension of the economic globalization, according to 
which trading among neighboring countries is the first step to go towards the 
progressive access to a globalized competitive economy.  
The third notion is the concept of Regionalism. It a project taking place when 
neighboring states decide to cooperation together. In particular, it deals with the 
economic side of a cooperation. The fourth notion is the concept of New 
Regionalism
34
. For the purpose of our research this is the concept that mostly 
matters. It can be defined as a complex, multidimensional, bottom-up form of 
                                                          
30
 Conca K., The rise of the region in global environmental politics, Global 
Environmental Politics, 12,3, 2012  
31
 Ibidem 
32
  Fawcett L., Exploring Regional Domains: a Comparative History of Regionalism, 
International Affairs, 80, 3, 2004 
33
 Telo’ M., Relations Internationales. Une perspective européenne, IEE, Editions de 
L’Université de Bruxelles, 2007 
34
 For a complete conceptualization of New Regionalism see Telo’ M., European Union 
and New Regionalism, Ashgate, 2007 
18 
 
cooperation between neighboring states, historically occurred during the post-
hegemonic era
35
. Its structural complexity is tested by the circumstance that new 
regionalism is based on endogenous and exogenous factors. In this sense, New 
Regionalism has become a structural component of global governance: it is both 
a political phenomenon that changes the States and an economic phenomenon 
that changes the economic flux
36
.  As for the actors, it is “new” because it 
includes not only the States, but also formal and informal networks
37
, business 
communities, academic scholarships and civil society movements. In this sense, 
New Regionalism significantly differs from regionalism to be multidimensional 
(the economic dimension is not the only one) and more cognitive-oriented (that is 
to say, shared ideas and interests worth much more than they did in the past). 
What is more, the phenomenon of New Regionalism can also be seen as a 
strategy of states to shape development and impact of globalization in their 
region
38
: a strategy to increase the collective competitive position in relation to 
the rest of the world – or to other existing competing trading blocs. Such 
complex, multidimensional, bottom-up, post-hegemonic phenomenon in the time 
                                                          
35
 See Telo’ M., European Union and New Regionalism, Competing Regionalism and 
Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era, Ashgate, 2014 
36
 Telo’ M., Relations Internationales. Une perspective européenne, IEE, Editions de 
L’Université de Bruxelles, 2007 
37
 For the multiple concept of network conceived as «new principle of socio-political 
organization», «new tool of social analysis» and «new metaphor for the logic of the 
modern epoch», first grounded on education and community-building, see Castells M., 
The Rise of the Network Society: the Information Age, Blackwell, 1996. See also 
Hoffmann M., Climate Governance at the Crossroads. Experimenting with a global 
response after Kyoto, Oxford University Press, 2011. For a comprehensive definition of 
transnational networks as «a permanent coordination among different civil society 
organizations (and sometimes individuals, such as experts) which is located in several 
countries and based on a shared frame for a specific global issue, developing both a 
protest and proposal in the form of joint campaigns and social mobilizations against 
common targets at national or supranational level», see Marchetti R., Civil Society, 
Global Governance and the Quest for Legitimacy, in Telo’ M., Globalization, 
Multilateralism, Europe. Towards a Better Global Governance, Ashgate, 2013 
38
 Grugel J., Hout W., Regionalism across the North-South divide, Routledge, 1999 
19 
 
of global competition translates into the discussion and adoption of common 
policies jointly decided by neighboring States
39
. Indeed, environmental policy is 
one of them.  
Global environmental politics. This perspective insists on the importance of the 
North-South dimension in the analysis of environmental governance and 
cooperation. Such theoretical approach is intended to assess to what extent the 
North-South division plays a hindering or enabling role in regional 
environmental cooperation. Broadly speaking, environmental issues – and 
climate politics in particular – are getting more and more divisive for countries 
having different levels of economic development
40
. Such division – if not 
acrimony
41
 – between developed states and developing world has been one of the 
most visible aspects of the recent climate change negotiations. This also tests that 
North - South dimension still carries on playing a relevant role in this relatively 
young field of international relations. Such division even penetrates 
environmental science, when emerging economies see international science (for 
instance the IPPC Reports) as biased towards Northern framings and Western 
interests
42
.  Higher environmental standards would directly affect the 
comparative advantage of emerging economies, creating barriers to certain 
markets, increasing the cost of production and increasing the relative prices of 
                                                          
39
 Telo’ M., Relations Internationales. Une perspective européenne, IEE, Editions de 
l’Université de Bruxelles, 2007 
40
 Hochstetler K., Fading Green? Environmental Politics in the Mercosur Free Trade 
Agreement, Latin American Politics and Society, 45, 4, 2003 
41 
Harris P., Climate Change and Foreign Policy: case studies from East to West, 
Routledge, 2009 
42
 See Jasanoff S. et al., Earthly Politics – Local and Global in Environmental 
Governance, MIT Press, 2004  
20 
 
products
43
, not to mention the fact that the promotion of higher environmental 
standards is often perceived by developing countries as a form of “green 
protectionism” in disguise put in action by post-industrial countries 44 . Such 
concerns of developing countries in their so called “trade-environment agenda” 
relate on the one hand to how market access can be achieved and preserved 
without further environmental harming, on the other hand how the same 
environment can be preserved without making them less competitive so as to 
affect their growth rate
45
.  This is the core-challenge of development, or even 
better, how to make development sustainable: a transition to a carbon neutral 
world that should take place through market-oriented means rather than through a 
radical rethinking of our social and economic system
46
. 
 
2. Methodologies: process tracing. 
In order to carry out our research, this thesis will embrace research as well as 
methodology aspects mainly based on process tracing, as fundamental method of 
qualitative analysis which attempts to identify the intervening causal process - 
the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an independent variable (or 
variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable
47
. 
                                                          
43
 See Salinas R., Environmental Challenges Facing the MERCOSUR, Journal of 
Environment and Development, 11, 3, 2002 
44
 Steel B. et al., Environmental Politics and Policy: A Comparative Approach, 
McGraw-Hill Ed., 2003 
45
 Tussie D., The Environment and International Trade Negotiations: Developing 
Countries Stake, Int. Development Research Centre, 2000 
46 
See Hoffmann M., Climate Governance at the Crossroads. Experimenting with a 
global response after Kyoto, Oxford University Press, 2011 
47
 George A., Bennett A., Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 
MIT Press, 2005 
21 
 
More specifically, the process tracing method makes scientific use of histories, 
archival documents and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory 
hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of 
the intervening variables in that case
48
. Within this framework, the role 
recognized  to formal and informal institutions, agencies, networks concerned 
with environmental protection and regulation at regional level shape the basis of 
this study.  
Our research is mainly based on a literature review, notably scientific articles, 
books and document analysis; also institutional official websites and non-
scientific sources have been taken into consideration, as political leaders' 
speeches on official occasions, press releases of the subjects directly involved in 
the EU decision-making process and in international negotiations’ forums. Here, 
an open approach of “methodological pluralism” has been embraced, assuming 
from the outset that freedom of research can profit from the accumulation of the 
valid knowledge and best outcomes of each IR theory
49
.  In this sense, Realism, 
Institutionalism, Constructivism, Post-colonialism shall not be necessarily 
opposing each other. On the contrary, they can be often complementary in the 
explanation of a given phenomenon, such as the evolution of the EU 
environmental policy, its domestic success and its external implications. 
 
                                                          
48
Bennett A., Checkel J., Process Tracing in the Social Sciences: From Metaphor to 
Analytic Tool, Cambridge University Press, 2014.  
49
 See Keohane R., International Institutions: Two Approaches, in Beck A., et al., 
International Rules. Approaches from International Law and International Relations, 
Oxford University Press, 1996  
22 
 
3. Politics and Climate Change: the Principle of “Common 
but Differentiated Responsibility”. 
Over the last three decades, the rounds of negotiations on climate change have 
become the most complex form of international cooperation of our times
50
.  The 
development of the multilateral climate negotiations encounters various factors 
which increase the complexity of the entire process. First of all, it has to be noted 
that the issue itself is serious and complex because global climate change is the 
main challenge humanity shall face in the 21
st
 century and beyond
51
: it is 
becoming a ubiquitous lens through which we view our world
52
. Despite this, we 
still lack not just robust institutions to confront it, but also robust theories to 
understand it
53
. Such substantial lack of valid and robust theories is also due to 
the fact that the politics of global environmental governance is always evolving 
and all the tools and methods to understand it need to evolve with it
54
. One of the 
other structural factors which tends to increase the complexity of the diplomatic 
negotiations on climate is the heterogeneity of the States involved in such 
decision-making process, as well as a different outcome of the cost-benefit 
analysis carried out by each State.  
                                                          
50
 Morgera E., Le regole di Copenaghen, Accordi climatici, foreste, Relazioni Nord-
Sud, in Equilibri, XIII, n.3, Il Mulino, 2009 
51
 See Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., Introduction: The Ethics and Politics of Climate 
Change: Many Themes, a Common Global Challenge, in Canned Heat, Routledge, 
2014. For the struggle to govern climate change as one of today’s greatest political 
challenges see also Giddens A., The politics of Climate Change, Politybooks, 2009 
52
 Hoffmann M., Climate Governance at the Crossroads. Experimenting with a global 
response after Kyoto, Oxford University Press, 2011 
53
 Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., Introduction: The Ethics and Politics of Climate Change: 
Many Themes, a Common Global Challenge, in Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014 
54
 See Morin J., Global Environmental Governance in Telo’ M., Globalisation, 
Multilateralism, Europe. Towards a Better Global Governance, Ashgate, 2013 
23 
 
Although climate change is a global problem that affects the entire Planet (and 
therefore all States) and although the best form of response to this problem is a 
reasonably extended application of the precautionary principle, each country 
carries on making its own cost-benefit analysis. Such analysis depends not only 
on the historical and cultural diversity of the country, but also by factors such as 
the level of prosperity so far achieved by the country in the current time
55
, its 
level of vulnerability to the adverse effects due to global warming, scientific 
uncertainty
56
, a lack of consensus about the values
57
, the effective capacity to 
implement successful policies of climate mitigation and adaptation within their 
sorting and, last but not least, the effective political willingness of national 
governments in addressing the problem
58
, by fitting readily climate change into 
                                                          
55
 Honkonen T., The Common But Differentiated Responsibility Principle in 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Regulatory and Policy Aspects, Kluwer Law 
International Publ., 2009 
56
 For the fragmentation of the so-called Epistemic Community on climate change, see 
Susskind L., Environmental Diplomacy, Oxford University Press, 1994 
57
 Gupta J., Climate Change and Developing Countries: From Leadership to Liability, 
in Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014 
58
 For the problem of “short-terminism”, tied to the fact that the electoral cycle tends to 
focus policy debate on short-term political gains and satisfying the median voter, see 
Held D., Climate Change, Democracy and Global Governance: Some Questions, in Di 
Paola M., Pellegrino G., Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014. As regards the importance of 
the timing and domestic constraints of national governments on climate national policy, 
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the priorities of a multilateral order, which is still largely designed according to 
the contingent circumstances of  the post-1945
59
.  
Despite a wide-spread feeling of ecological optimism of the early Nineties (Rio 
1992), four orders of serious obstacles to global environmental cooperation 
began to loom: the first one is related to the determined persistence of States to 
preserve their national sovereignty in the field of environmental issues. 
Progressively, the States began to realize that the environment was moving from 
being a secondary, minor, mostly scientific issue of negligible «low politics» to a 
prominent issue of «high politics»
60
 because of the strong impacts that 
environmental policies could produce on economic-industrial national interests. 
This matter of fact also explains why the entrée of climate change politics to the 
public debate and to the center stage of international relations has been 
accompanied by a broad range of strategic linkages to regimes both within and 
beyond the environmental realm, such as security, migrations, exploitation of 
natural resources, fisheries, desertification, human rights and so on
61
.  
The second one is the apparent lack of incentive to bargain, given the vexed 
problem of free-riders
62
. Put in other terms, it has been the classical – and still 
                                                          
59
 See Held D., Climate Change, Democracy and Global Governance: Some Questions, 
in Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014 
60
 Ott, H.E., Climate Change: An important Foreign Policy Issue, International Affairs, 
77, 2, 2001. See also Harris P., Climate change in environmental foreign policy. 
Science, diplomacy and Politics, in Climate Change and Foreign Policy. Case studies 
from East to West, Routledge, 2009. See also Oberthür S., Pallemaerts M., The New 
Climate Policies of the European Union. Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy, 
VUB Press, 2010 
61
 Jinnah S. Climate Change Bandwagoning: The Impacts of Strategic Linkages on 
Regime Design, Maintenance and Death, Global Environmental Politics, 11,3 MIT, 
August 2011 
62
 See Gupta J., Climate Change and Developing Countries: From Leadership to 
Liability, in Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., in Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014 
25 
 
highly controversial – problem of managing global public goods63. The question 
coming up to players’ mind has been as follows: why should I legally join this 
club if I can have all the benefits without bearing any costs? The third obstacles 
deals with the intense economic, political and cultural difference of interests 
between two main groups of actors, that is the so-called North-South Conflict, 
based on an underlying binary logics of the Developed/Developing, 
Colonizer/Colonized, the Victim/Perpetrator, the Polluter/Polluted
64
. According 
to Susskind, the North-South split has often been portrayed as a battle over 
money and technology. To all appearances, some observers have described the 
nations of the South as a «supplicant begging for additional aid»
65
, while the 
nations of the North as «a wealthy but selfish benefactor unwilling to share its 
technological secrets»
66
.  In reality, there has always been something more than a 
mere problem of economic and scientific ascendancy.  Indeed, it was a complex 
core-problem of Environmental Justice
67
. Such concept of environmental justice 
has inspired the formulation of a new principle: the principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities. Its various interpretation and application do 
constitute the fourth serious obstacle to global cooperation. In the light of the last 
UNFCC CoPs (Copenhagen 2009, Cancun 2010, Durban 2011, Doha 2012, 
Warsaw 2013, Lima 2014), it seems likely that the diplomatic deadlock in 
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climate negotiations continues, especially because each State tends to read and 
apply the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in its own, 
different – if not opposing – way.     
The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
68
 was stated for the 
very first time in climate field on the occasion of the famous 1992 Rio 
Declaration. In particular, the principle 7 of the Declaration states that: «Member 
States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different 
contributions to global environmental degradation, States have common but 
differentiated responsibilities»
69
. At the conclusion of the Rio Conference – 
elegantly defined by the Italian ecologist intellectual Alex Langer as «the first 
Peace Conference between Men and Nature»
70
 – the principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility has thus become one of the multifaceted aspects of 
the more complex and cross-cutting goal of sustainable development, which is 
essential for the compatibility between economic growth and environmental 
protection
71
. 
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If Rio offered these innovations, it also demonstrated the difficulty of creating 
consensus among very divergent positions: the one of Developing Countries and 
the one of Developed Countries. The first appeared to be willing to engage in 
actions to cut emissions of gases only if taking this commitment at the 
international level does not interfere with the exercise of their sovereign right to 
economic development and to catch up with the economies of the countries of 
oldest industrialization. Conversely, Developed Countries were willing to invest 
in green finance projects and the transfer of technology and financial resources to 
Developing Countries especially in the interest of preserving those domestic 
margins of freedom of pollution associated with their patterns of mass production 
and mass consumption
72
. 
After having introduced the principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities in the so-called “Era of Environmental Globalism”73, it is now 
possible to survey the material content of this principle. It consists of two 
fundamental dimensions: common responsibility and differentiated responsibility. 
The first dimension is directly evident in the adjective “common”, which means 
the existence of a common problem that affects and should engaged all the 
States. The second is that one of the differentiation of responsibility, directly 
stemming from a diversification in the burden-sharing costs of mitigation and 
adaptation to climate change among individual countries, taking into account 
their socio-economic diversity, their historical responsibilities and their present 
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and future capabilities
74
. More precisely, the consideration of the different 
contribution to environmental degradation is not only about the past (historical 
responsibility), but it also invests the present. The principle indeed behaves like 
an evolutionary clause, leaving open the possibility that these Developing 
Countries now in an advanced stage of development may be expected to accept a 
greater responsibility once they have reached a high degree of economic 
development, resulting in an increase in their contribution to environmental 
degradation
75
. 
The statement of this principle now allows us to proceed to a more detailed 
analysis of the ways in which it has contributed to the governance of actions in 
the field of climate change. In this sense, it is possible to start with the Rio 
Conference in 1992 which progressively contributed to form and “in-form” the 
principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility. Thus, the Action Plan, as 
adopted at the Conclusion of the World Conference on Sustainable Development 
in Johannesburg (2002), was in line with what stated in Principle 7 of the Rio 
Declaration 1992, by reaffirming, reinforcing and expanding the principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in complement with the new 
principle of “Good Governance”76.  The Conclusions of the World Conference on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg (2002) has extended the scope of 
application of the principle to new areas including not only the environmental 
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dimension, but also that economic and social ones in the integrated perspective 
of sustainable development
77
. 
References to greater inclusiveness, solidarity, participation, responsibility have 
also emerged in more recent UN Conferences on Climate Change: from 
Copenhagen (CoP15) in 2009 up to Cancun (CoP16) in 2010, Durban (CoP17) in 
2011, Doha (CoP18) in 2012, Warsaw (CoP19) and – finally –  Lima (CoP20) 
last November 2014.  
According some critical observers, all these UNFCCC Conferences have often 
been exposed to the risk of turning into mere exercise of “global society tourism” 
by becoming forms of «Mega and Macro-Carnivals»
78
 but to no avail as Sartori 
had already denounced in the aftermath of the Johannesburg Summit in 2002
79
. 
Nevertheless, such global UN Conferences on climate change have represented 
an interesting test for the general functioning of the ongoing system of 
environmental governance at the global level. First of all, the UN Conferences 
should be given special credit for clarifying the “public space” of global climate 
governance, which is populated by a huge range of players, such as political 
leaders, government representatives, academics, business corporations, 
entrepreneurs, journalists, church groups, youth movements, activists, NGOs, 
scientific associations and bloggers
80
.  Convened for the purpose of granting the 
States on a system of shared binding rules on climate change mitigation and 
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adaptation, they also made it possible to concentrate the World's media attention 
on the health of our Planet, on common issues and on the difficulties faced in 
finding common, shared and – especially – globally binding solutions to fix the 
problem
81
. During the overall negotiation rounds, Developing Countries have 
often acted as a compact bloc, prone to invoke an application of the principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibilities which gives priority to the aspect of 
the differentiation of the responsibility for Developed Countries. 
On the other hand, the United States in Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban and – more 
recently - Lima has been made plain the so-called negotiating position of “I will 
if you will” towards China and India, both of which are still formally (and 
debatably) falling into the category of Developing Countries – countries outside 
Annex I of the Framework Convention on Climate Change of 1992, therefore 
exempted from responsibilities
82
 and, therefore, from pledging legally binding 
international obligations in respect of GHG emission reductions
83
. 
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4. Responsibility and leadership: the European Union 
between Differentiated Responsibility and Environmental 
Leadership. 
 
Between the American trend to unilateralism and the reluctance of many 
Developing countries to accept common responsibilities within an enlarged 
burden-sharing framework, here comes the distinctive role of the European 
Union in the climate negotiation process. 
The EU's international position on climate change negotiations reflects the way 
in which the Union has intended to apply the principle of Common but 
Differentiated Responsibility. Such consistent passage from the Differentiated 
Responsibility to the Leadership from the Developed Countries has been recently 
started been even questioned by Gupta, who adds a new compelling query in 
international political literature on climate diplomacy: how legitimate is it 
continue to expect and demand for leadership from developed countries in a 
changing world, where new emerging countries such as China and India are 
increasingly assuming economic and political power?
84
 The answer to this 
question is thought-provoking and proves that a key-issue in climate change 
governance still is the allocation of responsibilities for taking action. Two schools 
of thought have slowly emerged on this issue: on the one hand, the so-called 
«liability paradigm» which implies that those countries that caused substantial 
harms to other countries would be held responsible for reducing their emissions; 
on the other hand, a «leadership paradigm» that framed the developed countries 
                                                          
84
 Gupta J., Climate Change and Developing Countries: From Leadership to Liability, 
in Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014 
32 
 
as leaders rather than polluters
85
. The latter paradigm gradually prevailed on the 
former, by replacing the concept of responsibility in terms of liability with the 
concept of responsibility in terms of leadership
86
. By linking the leadership 
concept to the principle of the Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, 
leadership so meant accepting a greater share of responsibility 
87
. In this sense a 
green leadership has been seen as a conscious assumption of greater 
responsibility of Developed Countries in reducing GHGs and in combating 
climate change compared to the other countries
88
.  
Leadership is on targets, timetables and financing
89
. Such connection between 
Leadership and Differentiated Responsibility  is indeed fully consistent with a 
system based on the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in 
compliance with art. 3 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(1992). The article states that: «The Parties should protect the climate system for 
the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity 
and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities.  Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take 
the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof»
90
.  
Of course, leadership is an overarching theme in political science. Recent IR 
scientific literature has proposed different conceptualizations of leadership:  
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leadership as a reciprocal process that requires recognition and acceptance by the 
led
91
. Again, leadership as asymmetrical relationship of influence, where one 
actor guides or directs the behavior of others towards a certain goal over a certain 
period of time
92
. As argued by Young, leadership is a complex phenomenon, ill-
defined, poorly understood and subject to recurrent controversy
93
. It is a difficult 
concept in both analytical and empirical terms
94
. This being said, it can also take 
different shapes. Among the others, Young mainly proposes four types of 
leadership: the structural leadership, the entrepreneurial leadership, the cognitive 
leadership and the symbolic leadership. Structural leadership relates to the actor’s 
hard power and it would depend on material resources, such as military force and 
economic strength. Entrepreneurial leadership deals with the diplomatic skills of 
the actor in negotiating and bargaining to facilitate an agreement. Cognitive 
leadership relates to the continuous definition and redefinition of interests on the 
ground of knowledge, ideas and values behind. Finally, symbolic leadership 
would come from the rhetorical posturing by the actor without necessarily 
implementing concrete measures in effective way
95
. 
In our work, we will build on three leadership classical definitions explored 
Grubb and Gupta in 2000. According to them, the EU aspires (and in fact is 
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potentially capable) of structural, instrumental and directional leadership in the 
global climate regime
96
. The structural leader is the player who uses the “carrots 
and sticks” technique – if not a “arm-twisting” approach – to influence the 
others
97
. More precisely, he leads the bargaining process by the constructive use 
of its political power stemming from material and economic resources. The 
instrumental leader is the player who masters and maximizes its negotiation and 
diplomatic skills to pursue issue-linkages, to exploit diffuse-reciprocity 
situations, to build issue-based coalitions in order to develop an integrative (win-
win) rather than a merely distributive bargaining. Finally, the directional 
leadership is the one related to the idea of leading by example
98
. Indeed, the 
directional leader is the player who showcases – through domestic policy 
implementation  – the feasibility and efficiency of a particular action and, in 
doing this, he tries to change other negotiators’ perception on a given issue. At 
the same time, a directional leader is the one who usually “raises the moral 
standard” against which the other players will be judged, by demonstrating that a 
given course of action must be normatively compelling
99
. In short, directional 
leadership is a leadership by unilateral action to give the example and to make 
the first move, by demonstrating the pre-eminence of particular solution 
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alternatives
100
. What is certain is that political success often requires the 
employment of not only one, but a mix of all types of leadership
101
. As Nye 
points out, effective leadership requires a mixture of soft and hard powers which 
he calls “smarter power”102.  
Now, such theoretical toolbox can be specifically applied to environmental 
negotiations and the EU. As notably observed by Oberthür, the ambitious 
political objective of the Union «to promote measures at international level to 
deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular 
combating climate change»
103
 (art.191 TFEU) has been attempted through a 
double strategy: the so-called «EU leadership by diplomacy» and the so-called 
«EU leadership by example»
104
.  
In the light of the previous theoretical conceptualization about different types of 
leadership, it can be so argued that while «EU leadership by diplomacy» mainly 
contains elements of structural and instrumental leadership, the «EU leadership 
by example» relies on the directional - and partly - symbolic
105
 types of 
leadership. 
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« Reducing greenhouse emissions calls for a truly global alliance. Governments will 
have to be mobilized, as much as grassroots. The EU Delegations – our embassies to the 
world – will use Climate Diplomacy Day to reach out to our partners, to the general 
public, to the business community, to civil society organizations. Everyone can do their 
part. And everyone must do their part, for this is not just something that concerns 
cabinets and institutions. It is the battle of all present and future generations. It is a 
matter of survival. It is our responsibility». See http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/2015/150617_02_en.htm   
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1. The EU environmental «leadership by example». 
 
The concept of the EU «leadership by example» flows from the outset that 
internal climate change policy (EU domestic dimension) and the approach 
adopted by the Union in international climate change politics (EU external 
dimension) are inextricably linked. This is because the European Union is the 
only supranational institution to have adopted an internal climate change policy 
which has allowed it to perform the external role of a leader in international 
climate change politics
106
. 
Qualitatively speaking, a leadership by example – to be credible107 – requires the 
achievement of appropriate measures at home which help to prove that the 
perceived negative impacts of climate policies on economic development could 
be minimized, for instance, through industrial transformation policies: this would 
be possible thanks to the promotion of macro and micro incentives, such as 
taxing pollutants rather than labor, internalizing environmental costs, creating 
micro incentives for consumers to make their consumption patterns more eco-
friendly
108
. On such grounds, the concept of leadership by example embodies the 
influence the EU can exert through the power of its historical experience of 
environmental policies and institutions
109
. 
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2. From the Treaty of Rome to the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Over the last 30 years, the European environmental policy has moved from 
playing a marginal role in the EU political agenda to gradually assume a 
prominent role among the core-policies of the Union. Before offering an 
historical outlook of the evolution of environmental policy in the EU, it is 
important to conceptualize the term environmental policy. It can be broadly 
defined as the «public policy concerning  environmental protection and 
sustainability»
110
. The topics of environmental policy vary and can include air 
and water pollution, solid waste management, biodiversity, climate mitigation, 
climate adaptation, ecosystem management, biodiversity preservation, the 
protection of natural resources, wildlife and endangered species
111
. 
In the history of the European integration, it is primarily interesting to observe 
that the environment was born with a initial status of «illegitimate child»
112
, 
without an explicit legal basis provided in the EEC Treaty. When, in fact, the 
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) was 
signed in 1957, it contained no mention of environment or environmental 
protection policy
113
. In short, the environment was not born as a value, since the 
official purpose of the Treaty of Rome was to ensure the four fundamental 
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economic freedoms, namely the free movement of goods and services, capitals 
and workers within the space of the EEC.  
Historically, the environment was a «relative latecomer»
 114
  which started to 
become subject of legal consideration for mere instrumental reasons, such as the 
improvement of the functioning of the common market through the respect of 
competition between different Member States. It was basically to avoid that 
potential regulatory a-symmetries among Member States in the environmental 
field would indirectly encourage environmental dumping phenomenon or the 
relocation of an industry towards other Member States with lower standards of 
environmental policies
115
. In addition to this, the so-called greenest members 
such as West Germany and Netherlands expressed fear that the imperative of 
competitiveness in the area of the common market could produce an effect of 
race to the bottom of their already existing advanced environmental 
legislations
116. This initial “constitutional silence” is not surprising, if the original 
historical context of the Treaties is properly taken into account. In the aftermath 
of World War II, the international initiatives to protect the environment were 
patchy and sporadical.  As a preliminary point, it should be noted that neither the 
UN Charter mentioned the environment. Postwar times looked after the 
reconstruction and the economic development, while the environment was 
mainly seen as an unlimited reservoir of resources to draw on for meeting basic 
needs and to recover postwar economies
117
. 
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Internationally, the first multilateral environmental treaties did not have as main 
objective the conservation of natural resources, but the protection of underlying 
economic interests of the States
118
. Even in the EEC as supranational entity, 
environmental consciousness was originally very poor
119
. The fact is that the 
EEC process had a formally different task: to create a common market based on 
the principle of economic competition. Although environmental protection did 
not concern the competence of the treaties, European environmental policy 
measures were pragmatically taken by deducting the competence throughout a 
wide interpretation to two articles of the EEC Treaty: art. 100 and art. 235 
concerning the harmonization of Member States’ policies and the so-called 
Doctrine of Implied Powers as introduced by the Court of Justice.  Such a 
pragmatic juridical device enabled the Community to overcome the initial hurdle 
coming from the lacking of an explicit legal basis. At the same time, this utterly 
disclosed the expansive force of European Court of Justice in contributing to 
develop environmental regulation under the justification of the Implied Powers. 
So that, it can be said that environmental protection has been initially included 
into the matters subject to the EEC competence in a dynamic way, without 
necessarily requiring an official treaties’ revision. After having provided the first 
legitimacy for a EEC environmental policy – still considered an illegitimate child 
until 1986 – the first European environmental measures introduced under the 
form of Directives and Regulations concerned the classification of dangerous 
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substances and their packaging, as well as the protection of the atmospheric and 
acoustic pollution caused by motor vehicles
120
.  
Over time, whereas the national borders were no longer necessarily synonymous 
with economic frontiers of the internal market, the environmental protection has 
gradually assumed an increasing importance. As noted by Krämer, the attention 
for environmental protection began to emerge in 1963 when Rachel Carson,  an 
American biologist, published the famous book Silent Spring, in which she 
denounced that the massive use of pesticides in agriculture and pollution 
resulting from industrial activity and traffic had caused the disappearance of a 
large number of wild birds
121
.  Along with the Silent Spring, the alarming report 
of the Club of Rome on the Limits of Growth (1969) and the several oil-tankers 
accidents on European shores, all contributed to the rise of a public awareness on 
the potential disruptive effects of human economic activity over the environment 
as common good
122
.  
Internationally, the first sign of a visible change of attitude emerged in 
Stockholm during the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972.  The 
Summit concentrated the media attention of the international community on the 
problem of environmental degradation and the need to adopt national and 
international measures. Almost in parallel with Stockholm,  the EEC began to 
speak of the need to seriously address the environmental problem at the 
Community level.  Just one year before Stockholm, the Commission issued its 
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first public Environmental Communication SEC (71) 2616 of July 22
nd
, 1971, 
where the EEC policy was placed for the first time in direct connection with 
environmental concern
123
.  
If soft law-based Communications, Declarations and Action Plans on the 
environment become even more frequent since the 1970s, it was only in 1986 
that the Community decided to intervene directly at the level of hard law. Since 
the Single European Act of 1986, the environmental policy has become officially 
governed by Treaties. This turning point marked by the Single European Act 
provided the explicit legal basis for the objectives of safeguarding, protecting and 
improving the quality of the environment as one of the aims of the EEC. In 
addition to the principles of “the polluter pays” and “prevention”, the Single 
European Act also introduced the principle of integration, according to which the 
requirements related to the protection of the environment shall constitute a core-
component of the Community's other sector-based policies (art. 130 R, c. 2). In 
doing this, the Single European Act marked a fundamental milestone in the 
evolution of Community environmental policy. Therefore, since 1986 up to the 
most recent revision of the Treaties in Lisbon 2007, the environment has 
progressively been raised to an “essential purpose” of the Organization that goes 
through the pursuit of sustainable development, today specifically mentioned 
among the Union's objectives (article 3 TEU), while one title of the Treaty is 
entirely dedicated to the environment (art. 191-193 TFEU). 
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Without explicitly mentioning the concept of Sustainable Development, the 
Single European Act 1986 already expressed the need to ensure a prudent and 
rational use of natural resources in strict connection with the original principles 
that underpin environmental policy (prevention, rectification of damages at 
source, the polluter pays principle).   Art.  130 R, 130 S, 130 T of the Single 
European Act explicitly give the Community the competence in environmental 
issues, by specifying objectives, principles and criteria for a common policy.  
In particular, article 130 R states that the Community shall contribute to: preserve, 
protect and improve the quality of the environment, contribute to the protection 
of human health, the prudent and rational use of natural resources, also taking 
into account the community's social development and the balanced development 
of its regions. In short, the art. 130 R, 130 S and 130 T of the EC Treaty 
disclosed the solemn joint commitment of two great political visions of the last 
twentieth century: European integration and environmental protection
124
 
Just six years later, the Maastricht Treaty 1992 came to integrate Title XVI of the 
EC Treaty with more detailed provisions relating to the environment.  It 
introduced for the first time an explicit provision on the precautionary principle 
(art. 174, c. 2, EC Treaty). The Maastricht Treaty also conveys to promote the 
integration of environmental requirements into the different EU policies and to 
make the principle of competition compatible with environmental protection. The 
General Provisions, indeed, establish as a first objective to promote a balanced 
economic, social and sustainable progress (Treaty Tit. I). Such an apparently 
small reference marks the beginning of a new season for European environmental 
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policy. This emerging idea of sustainability is repeated in different points of the 
Treaty. First, environmental protection has fully become one of the areas of 
intervention of the Union (Treaty, title II, art. g. k.); the purpose of economic 
growth shall be integrated to the necessity that such growth is sustainable, 
harmonious and balanced (Treaty, title II, section g).  Finally, the articles devoted 
to the environment have been reformulated  in terms of setting goals, as well as 
in institutional terms of attribution of powers, by strengthening  the role of the 
European Parliament. A special remark shall also be made as for the application 
of the principle of subsidiarity. Indeed, the very first time it appeared was in the 
field of environmental sector-based provisions, (Treaty Tit. XVI art. 130 R, S, T), 
hearing local institutional instances expressed at peripheral level. 
What is more, the final act of the Maastricht Treaty includes a Declaration on 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), by stating the need for a constant and 
transversal integration of environmental protection with other many EU sector-
based policies (the Treaty, Final Act, Declaration No 20). The above-mentioned 
Declaration together with the famous Directive 1985/337 specifically concerning 
the EIA proves the value-change into the Community: the economic initiative so 
far seen as the engine for European integration seemed to slowly lose its 
centrality in favor of a more qualitative growth based on the balance between 
production, consumption and environmental protection, all under the integrated 
three-dimensional vision of sustainable development. In this sense, it may be 
argued that the Maastricht Treaty (February 1992) has therefore introduced in 
advance the instances then more solemnly proclaimed on the occasion of the 
United Nations World Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio 
de Janeiro (June 1992). Principle 3 and Principle 4 of the UN Declaration state 
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that the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations 
(Principle 3). Furthermore, in order to achieve sustainable development, 
environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development 
process and cannot be considered in isolation from it (Principle 4). In this sense, 
it can be noticed a substantial parallel historical correspondence of goals between  
environmental objectives at UN level and environmental objectives at EU level 
(sometimes coming in advance)
 125
. 
Following up such reconstruction of the EU environmental policy, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam 1997 placed the environmental protection  (art.2 ECT), in a 
prominent position among the other objectives of the Community. The title XIX 
of the EC Treaty concerning the environment, as amended in Amsterdam, 
confirms and reinforces all the goals already introduced by Maastricht, adding 
something even more significant in art. 6 of the EC Treaty (now art. 11 TFEU), 
where the principle of integration was raised as general principle of Community 
law, so as to be applied not only for environmental issues, but in all EU actions 
and policies.  
The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced sustainable development also in the 
Preamble, which affirms the will of Member States to promote economic and 
social progress for their people, taking into account the principle of sustainable 
development in the context of the completion of the single market, the 
reinforcement of the cohesion and  of environmental protection. Any further step 
in economic integration shall be accompanied by a parallel progress in other 
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fields» (Preamble, consolidated version, signed in Amsterdam 1997). The 
decision-making procedures in the field of environmental policy have, finally, 
been reduced from three to two: in general, environmental policy will be adopted 
through the co-decision procedure, while the provisions concerning tax aspects, 
territorial and energy remain subject to the consultation procedure with 
unanimity voting in the Council of EU Ministers. 
Later on, the Nice Treaty signed in February 2001 does not introduce any 
significant legislation progress. Only the article 175, which regulates procedural 
aspects in the adoption of Community instruments relating to the environment, 
explains which decisions need to be taken unanimously on the subject of water 
resources’ management126. 
Instead, the EU Charter of fundamental rights, proclaimed a few months before 
in Nice in December 2000 emphasizes this new cultural approach on 
environmental issues and translates it into a programmatic principle. In paragraph 
3 of the Preamble to the Charter, in fact, the notion of Sustainable Development 
is expressly referred as a guiding principle of European action, stating that «The 
Union contributes to the preservation and to the development of these common 
values while respecting the diversity of the cultures and traditions of the peoples 
of Europe as well as the national identities of the Member States and the 
organization of their public authorities at national, regional and local levels; it 
seeks to promote balanced and sustainable development» (Preamble, paragraph 3, 
EU Charter). This provision should be combined with article 37 of the Charter 
itself, which States that «a high level of environmental protection and the 
improvement of the quality of the environment 
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must be integrated into the policies of the Union and ensured in accordance with 
the principle of sustainable development». It is worth noting in this respect that, 
beyond its legal value, the Charter lays down a principle of reinforced integration 
in relation to article 6 of the EC Treaty, according to which all EU policies must 
be shaped in compliance with standardized environmental requirements. 
The signing of the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 and its coming into force in December 
2009 has informed environmental policy since giving it a new name: it is no 
longer the Community's environment policy, but the Union's Policy on the 
environment, according to the terminology used in the new art. 191 TFEU (ex 
Article 174 TEC).  
Specifically, the Lisbon Treaty confirms the principles already defined in the 
course of the European integration process and some relevant novelties, proposed 
in the previous Constitutional Treaty never entered into force. The new art. 3 
TEU (former art. 2 EC Treaty), considers the sustainable development and 
intergenerational solidarity for Europe
127
 as ones of the objectives of the Union, 
based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive 
social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a 
high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment.
128
The Lisbon Treaty also significantly innovates on the general 
provisions on the Union's External Action, compared to earlier treaties, including 
the 2004 Constitutional Treaty
129.
 The new article 21 TEU states that the Union 
shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high 
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degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to help 
develop international measures for the improvement of the quality of the 
environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in 
order to ensure sustainable development (art. 21, c. 2, f). 
The new Title XX, in fact, does not deal only with environment, but also with 
climate change (with a significant difference compared to 2004): article 191, 
working on this specific reference to climate change, remarks the promotion of 
«measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change». As 
suggested by the UK House of Lords European Union Committee, the explicit 
reference in the Lisbon Treaty against climate change assumes both “strategic 
and judicial” meaning 130.  The HL Committee, known for an ability to study and 
deepen European issues, notes that the EU has made an important step in being 
the first to adopt the discipline of an area so politically sensitive, and recognizes 
the long-term meaning of this strategy
131
. Among the changes in environmental 
matters by the Lisbon Treaty, the Report gives special emphasis on the following 
points: 
1. The Lisbon Treaty states that environmental policy should be a matter 
subject to a regime of shared competence between the Union and the 
Member States (art. 4, c. 2) 
2. Climate change is explicitly mentioned in the Treaties for the very first 
time. Indeed, the policy of the Union must contribute to pursuing the 
objective of promotion at international level of measures designed to 
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tackle environmental problems at regional or world-wide level and, in 
particular, to combat climate change. 
3. Closely related to the latter, there is also the new article 194 on energy, 
where, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, the Union's policy 
in this sector is intended to ensure the functioning of the energy market, 
guaranteeing the security of energy supply in the Union, promote energy 
saving, energy efficiency and the development of new and renewable 
energies and, lastly, promoting the interconnection of energy networks 
(TITLE XXI Article 194, c. 1). 
4. The titles XXII (tourism) is also potentially relevant for environmental 
issues. The Union action shall be aimed to promote cooperation between 
Member States in particular through the exchange of best practices. Then, 
the title XXIII  states that the Union action shall aim to support and 
supplement Member States’ action at national level, regional and local 
levels – confirming the multi-level nature of good environment – as for 
risk prevention, in preparing their civil-protection personnel in the 
Member States and the intervention in case of natural disasters or man-
made accidents inside the Union» (art. 196, c. 1). 
5. A further change has been finally introduced as regards the decision-
making procedure to follow in environmental areas so far deemed 
“nationally sensitive”, with the effect of enhancing and expanding the role 
of the European Parliament, considered by many observers to be the 
«Greenest European Institution»
132
, also in relation to the Commission. 
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Under the old art. 175 TEC, the Council adopted the environmental 
legislation, voting by qualified majority voting (QMV) and co-decision 
procedure. However for some measures considered nationally sensitive 
(such as those with primarily fiscal provisions, measures affecting spatial 
planning, quantitative management of water resources, soil target, the 
Member States’ choice between different energy sources and the general 
structure of energy supply) it continued to apply the unanimous voting 
system within the Council, after consulting the European Parliament 
(article 175.2 TEC). Now, article 192.2 TFEU introduces a further 
innovation when it adds at the end of paragraph 2 that the Council, acting 
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Parliament, the European economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the regions, may make the ordinary legislative 
procedure applicable to the matters referred to in the first subparagraph ' 
(those which are considered nationally sensitive), so as to allow a potential 
expansion of the role of the European Parliament if the Council decides 
unanimously to apply ordinary legislation on those subjects
133
.           
 (House of Lords European Union Committee 10th 
Report,2008) 
 
Finally, in the context of division of powers, further elements of novelty are 
contained in the new article 3 TFEU. This establishes that the Union has 
exclusive competence in the conservation of marine biological resources under 
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the common fishery policy (art. 3, c. 1, lett. d), and maintains a system of 
concurrent legislation with Member States in the field of agriculture and fisheries 
and the environment (art. 4, c. 2, letter e). In the latter case, the European 
legislation governing such matters subject to concurrent jurisdiction scheme may 
be subject to the application of control procedures in compliance with the 
principle of subsidiarity pursuant to art. 5, c. 3 of the new EU Treaty. 
 
Brief overlook on the environmental policy’s provisions contained in the 
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union after Lisbon. 
 
TITLE XX 
ENVIRONMENT 
Article 191 
(ex Article 174 TEC) 
1. Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following 
objectives: 
— preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, 
— protecting human health, 
— prudent and rational use of natural resources, 
— promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide 
environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change. 
2. Union policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking 
into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Union. It 
shall be based on the precautionary principle and on the principles that 
52 
 
preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should as a 
priority be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay. 
 
 
 
To sum up, the EU environmental policy is ruled in the TFEU by art. 2 (shared 
competence), art. 11 (principle of integration), the Title XX from art. 191 to 193 
laying down in detail policy’s objectives and principles. In addition to this, 
article 3 of the TEU states that the Union shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a 
highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social 
progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the 
environment (art. 3, c. 3 TFUE). This aims to ensure sustainable development in 
Europe, adding that «in relations with the rest of the world, the Union promotes 
its values and interests, contributing to the protection of its citizens. It contributes 
to the peace, security and the sustainable development of the Earth» (art. 3, c. 5, 
TEU). Has it been truly put into practice? 
Externally, the above-proclaimed pursuit of the sustainable development of the 
Earth seems to be far from being fully satisfactory, despite the solemn 
commitment of the EU to promote such objective at international stage.   
Internally, according to most of analysts in contemporary political-juridical 
literature, the EU environmental governance, despite some difficulties, has been 
an «uncontested success story»
134
. Even if it is a work in progress, the Union has 
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created some of the most progressive environmental policies of any State in the 
world, although it is not actually a State
135
. Its system of regional governance can 
more easily constitute a form of appropriate and effective response to major 
global challenges such as climate change and protection of biodiversity, because 
the regional political and economic institutions are generally more robust and 
more structured than global ones
136
. Such statement seems to be empirically 
confirmed by the case of the European environmental policy. Over the 
institutional landscape of the contemporary world, the EU is the first political 
laboratory of geo-juridical regional integration aimed at cultivating the threefold 
objective of economic growth, social cohesion and environmental protection in 
an integrated vision of sustainable development
137
. 
The European environmental policy is greater than the mere sum of national 
policies of the environment. In their turn, they have been deeply 
«europeanized»
138
 as a result of their interaction with the European supranational 
policy-making. In such a tortuous history of “settling and moving” 139, the overall 
assessment on the EU contribution to environmental protection can bring back to 
the simple question put forward by Sbragia: nowadays, what other Supranational 
                                                          
135
 Jordan A., Introduction: European Union Environmental Policy-Actors, Institutions 
and Policy Processes in Jordan A., Environmental Policy in the European Union, 
Earthscan Ed., 2005 
136
 Patt A., Effective Regional Energy Governance – not Global Environmental 
Governance –Is what we need right now for climate change. Global Environmental 
Change, 20, 1, 2010 
137 
McEldowney J.,  McEldowney S., Environmental Law, Pearson Education, 2010
 
138  
See Jordan A., Liefferink D., Fairbrass J., The Europeanization of national 
environmental policy: A comparative analysis, in Barry J., Europe, Globalization and 
Sustainable Development , Routledge Research, 2004
 
139 See the idea of “movimento e assestamento” by Amato G., Il trattato di Lisbona e le 
prospettive per l'Europa del XXI secolo in Bassanini F., Tiberi G., Le nuove istituzioni 
europee. Commento al Trattato di Lisbona, Quaderni di Astrid, Il Mulino, Bologna, 
2010
 
54 
 
Organization deals with drinking water, protection of wild birds, bees health, 
treatment of urban waste water and the fight against water pollution by nitrates, 
as the European Union does?
 140
 
Initiatives such as the Europe 2020 Strategy, the formula of the so-called «EU 
bubble»
141
, the 2008 climate and Energy Package, the most recent 2030 Climate 
and Energy Policy Framework for the European Union proposed by the European 
Commission in February 2014 and approved by the European Council in October 
2014 are some of the latest demonstrations of a trend that sees the Union directly 
engaged in the fight against climate change, differentiating unilaterally their 
commitments to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases
142
. The original 2008 
Climate and Energy Package included the so-called “20-20-20 targets”, setting 
three key objectives for 2020: raising the share of EU energy consumption 
produced from renewable resources to 20%; a 20% improvement in the 
EU's energy efficiency; a 20% reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 
1990 levels. More recently, the EU 2030 Climate and Energy Policy Framework 
approved in October 2014 adds something more to the previous objectives: 
indeed, the European Council endorsed a binding EU target of an at least 40% 
domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 
1990;  increasing the share of renewable energy to at least 27% of the EU's 
energy consumption by 2030 and increasing energy efficiency by at least 27% by 
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2030
143
. The latter's unilateral reduction target has been reaffirmed on the 
occasions of the CoP20 UNFCCC Conference in  Lima 2014
144
. 
The results so far achieved by the Union in the fight against climate change 
should not however directly lead to uncritical and simple conclusion that the EU 
represents an environmental governance model to be exported elsewhere. The 
EU's role as a "model" remains widely debated and controversial in literature
145
. 
Indeed, the problem of degree of effectiveness of European environmental policy 
implementation  within some of the Member States’ domestic orders still remains 
critically open and it still depends on each Member State. The effectiveness 
becomes a fundamental factor for the credibility of the model, for the «leadership 
by example»
146
 of the Union and for its possible reproducibility in other contexts 
of regional integration
147
. Besides, the EU can carry on representing an advanced 
laboratory
148
 and an interesting reference for other regional integration areas, 
which see the EU as a deeply institutionalized regional form of multilateralism 
still able to exert a «soft power»
149
 and to turn out reactions of emulation and 
competition with other regional organizations. 
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3. The key-success factors of the EU regional 
environmental governance’s  experience. 
 
This chapter aims at explaining which have been the key success factors of the 
EU experience in environmental domestic policy and if there are institutional 
conditions/obstacles to replicate the European experience in other regional 
integration areas. In order to investigate the key success factors of the EU 
environmental policy and why the EU has become to take the lead in 
international environmental negotiations since 1989-91, we will apply IR 
theories to the case of EU environmental policy. We will see how each selected 
theory (Realism, Path dependence, Constructivism, Neoinstitutionalism) can 
contribute to provide its part of explanation. As already affirmed in our 
introduction, an open approach of “methodological pluralism” has been here 
embraced, assuming from the outset that freedom of research can profit from the 
accumulation of the valid knowledge and best outcomes of each IR theory
150
.  In 
this sense, Realism, Institutionalism, and Constructivism shall not be necessarily 
opposing each other. On the contrary, they can be often complementary in the 
explanation of a given phenomenon, such as the evolution of the EU 
environmental policy, its domestic success and its external implications. 
3.1  The  limits of the Realist approach.  
Despite some explanatory limits, the realist theory could be able to provide its 
own interpretation to the phenomenon of the greening EU. According to realists, 
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the success of the EU regional environmental policy could be found out in two 
explanatory factors: the first one is internal and mainly relates to the inside 
dynamics within the EU: the dominant position of Germany as green leader 
among the other Member States. Germany, with greater structural powers and 
economic strength, would have largely led the so-called Europeanization of 
environmental policy, here intended as «macro-process of mutual learning and 
harmonizing force of convergence between systems, principles, structures, 
practices and national styles of environmental policy among Member States of 
the EC/EU»
151
. Indeed, the general approach of the European Commission has 
always been to take inspiration from the models of the most advanced 
environmental policies in European countries (Germany, Netherlands, Austria) 
and then induce the catch-up of the other European countries. 
The final outcome has been the setting-up of more stringent standards to the rest 
of Member States which saw Germany as the dominant uploader of its 
environmental policy to the rest of the EC/EU
152
, in order to avoid that 
potential regulatory a-symmetries among States in the environmental field would 
indirectly encourage environmental dumping phenomenon or the relocation of an 
industry towards other Member States with laxer standards of environmental 
policies
 153
. In addition to this, Germany and Netherlands expressed fear that the 
imperative of competitiveness in the area of the common market could produce 
                                                          
151
 Jordan A., Impact on UK Environmental Administration, in Lowe P., Ward S., 
British Environment Policy and Europe. Politics and policy in transition, Routledge, 
1998 
152
 For the role of Germany in EU environmental policy, see Janicke M., German 
Climate Change Policy. Political and Economic Leadership in Connelly J. et al., 
The European Union as a leader in international climate change politics, Routledge, 
2011. See also Weibust I., Green Leviathan, The case for a federal role in 
environmental policy, Ashgate, 2009
 
153
 See Corazza C., EcoEuropa. Le nuove politiche per l’energia e il clima, Egea, 2009 
58 
 
an effect of race to the bottom of their already existing advanced environmental 
legislations
154
. 
The second factor is more external-oriented and relates to the recent industrial 
performance of the EU in comparison with the rest of the world. While most of 
EU countries are today largely de-industrialized, countries such as India and 
China are facing an emerging phase of industrialization which is also reflected in 
a larger volume of carbon emissions
155
. For the EU, the economic cost of 
reducing emissions would be relatively lower than those sustained by the so-
called newly industrialized countries. Against this background, the EU would be 
so “green” not for ideals and norms, but for its economic interests to pursue 
against the rise of new industrialized countries. The outcry of the EU over 
environmental degradation would be a tactic to keep the poor ones from 
industrializing
156
. So, the push for a EU advanced environmental policy is in line 
with the realist approach. However, the realist school seems to be able to explain 
only in part the phenomenon of a greening EU. Against its economic competitors, 
the EU could just stop imposing itself unilateral environmental targets and stop 
struggling for a global agreement to fight against climate change. But why the 
EU does not stop fixing higher unilateral environmental standards? Why the EU 
does not stop pooling resources for a cooperative solution to fight climate change? 
At the very end, realism doesn’t seem to be able to explain the whole picture. 
In this sense, a very similar interpretation on the EU environmental policy has 
been conducted by the post-colonial school. As we will see in part IV of the work, 
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according to a postcolonial perspective,  many developing countries have been 
suspicious of the “environment” as a public issue on a global scale because the 
promotion of higher environmental standards would have required for them 
expensive costs in production processes, inputs and factors translated in resulting 
increased costs of production that would hurt countries’ ability to compete with 
industrialized countries that have already met such standards. Under developing 
countries’ perspective, such (in)intentional outcome would create new economic 
disadvantages for them, because new environmental protections would make 
them less competitive
157
.  In short, it would deal with a technique of the West to 
prevent the emerging economies from catching-up EU and US.   
 
3.2  The contribution of historical institutionalism: a policy 
beyond suspicion? 
According to a path-dependence explanation, the EU environmental institutions, 
agencies, policy makers have been able to determine inertial dynamics, so as to 
give the EU environmental policy a kind of “independent life”158.  This would 
have been even more true if we consider that environmental policy has been seen 
– at least at its very beginning – as a policy “beyond suspicion”159. Indeed, the 
historical institutionalist theory of path-dependency would view the same 
European integration itself not solely as an endogenous response to exogenous 
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shifts in structural variables, but as an largely endogenous path-dependent 
process of recursive “spillover”160, in which even environmental policies and 
institutions would provoke autonomous dynamics and “unintended 
consequences”, which then lead to further integration, by spill-over effects. 
According to this theoretical approach, the overall history of the EU integration 
should be largely viewed as a path-dependent process producing a multitier 
European polity
161
.  
 
3.3  Environmental policy as identity building? 
According to Constructivism
162
, the evolution of international life would not be 
necessarily determined by material and rational interests, but by ideas, values, 
identities, subjective perceptions: against this background, the thought would not 
passively reflect the reality, but rather influence the realization itself
163
.  In 
dealing with the complex dialectics between agent and structure, constructivists 
single out the social structure as the independent variable.  The social structure is 
immaterial and idealistic, mainly composed of ideas, norms, values and identity. 
In such perspective, in international forums the States will tend to assume a 
position of policy consistent with the norms that they have institutionalized at 
domestic level. As a consequence, the States will be expected to act 
internationally by trying to “diffuse” their normative order. Such choice to export 
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norms at international level can become economically expensive if the norm-
setter State has not followers
164
.In  fact, what leads such norm-diffusion is the 
belief in the inherent validity of the norm itself
165
. Now, by applying such theory 
to the purpose of our research, it emerges that the EU environmental policy 
would be so relevant for the EU because it would have acted (internally) as green 
identity-building factor and (externally) as green norm-setting factor. In doing 
this, the EU could reinforce its green identity and increase its domestic 
legitimacy by offering a chance for European citizens to find out what Europe 
can do and to show the wider world what Europe can offer
166
. What is more, EU 
climate policy does not only represent a strategy to tackle the climate problem, 
but it can also be intended as an opportunity to increase its institutional autonomy 
from Member States
167
 and a strategy for reinforcing the EU foreign policy
168
, 
not to mention the climate policy as vehicle to address energy security 
concerns
169
. So that, environmental policy would come to play a driver role for 
EU identity-building and for European integration in general
170
, seemingly even 
as the economy and the common currency (both of them  historically essential in 
the process of integration) are currently under pressure and seem to have 
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missed today the absolute centrality they had in the past. Climate change has 
fitted the right profile and has often been seen as a “savior issue” for the EU 
itself, in desperate need for an appealing issue to showcase its added value to 
European citizens
171
. Besides, the link between the EU purposeful approach to 
climate change and the pushing for the European integration is paralleled in the 
external projection of the Union
172
, because the issue of global warming has also 
provided the EU a strong actorness in the international arena
173
. Summing up, 
over the last thirty years the issue of environmental protection has become a key 
component of European identity in the making and one of the main European 
foreign policy principles
174
 which lead the Union to play a role of normative 
power towards third or partner norm-receiving States, by pressing them to 
change their behaviors through the so-called EU environmental conditionality 
(see PART IV).  
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3.4  The Neoinstitutionalist approach and democratic 
legitimacy. 
In a neoinstitutionalist perspective, focused on variables explaining limitations 
and self-limitations of sovereignty
175
, the key-success factors of the EU regional 
environmental governance’s  experience would be mainly found out in 
institutional reasons, thanks to the creation and implementation of an 
international regime, composed of formal and informal norms, procedures and 
institutions working at regional level and operating under political and 
democratic legitimacy. 
The first explanatory key-success factor of the EU regional environmental 
governance’s experience is directly stated in the text of the  Fifth Action 
Program in relation to the environment and sustainable development (1993).  It 
stresses that one of the major strengths of the EC in order to protect environment 
is its legislative-making power.  
As pointed out in environmental  literature by Robin  Sharp,  an 
important explanatory  factor  of European success in  the field  of 
environment is in fact represented by the nature of EU legislation
176
. Indeed, the 
Union uses binding normative instruments such as Directives, Regulations, 
Decisions, which compose a body of norms representing perhaps the only 
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example of a solid base at supranational level legislation providing for the 
establishment of minimum standards of environmental protection. The style of 
environmental legislation goes through the so-called standard-setting
177
. The 
standard-setting means to set standards of scientific and technical nature on 
performance and on quality, which however always imply more profound ethical 
instances
178
. Environmental standards must be sufficiently clear and precise to 
ensure that the quality and environmental performance can be measured and 
compared to each other, in order to assess the health status of the European 
environment as a whole
179
. The cross-cutting spectrum of environmental 
problems requires the acquisition of different regulatory tools: multiple and 
integrated. The dynamic mix of hard law and soft law is expected to guide the 
change, taking into account that sustainability is not an immediate result, but a 
compound process. In short, it is not a final product, nor can it be identified 
solely on the basis of certain formal requirements. It is rather a «work in 
progress», in which it is fundamental to be able to respond flexibly to arising 
challenges. It is not fixed harmony, but a process that varies over time and 
requires a continuous adaptation to external and internal circumstances. 
The functioning of the European environmental governance is  also tied to a 
second explanatory factor: the decision-making procedures within the Méthode 
communautaire. After the Lisbon Treaty reform, co-decision has become the 
ordinary legislative procedure so as to reach a total of more than 86 legal bases 
for this procedure. This also includes environmental matters, where decisions are 
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taken jointly by Parliament and the Council (except the exceptions explicitly 
numbered article 192 par. 2 TFEU, where the Council decides on its own and 
unanimously). 
Besides, the general procedural rule is that environmental legislation is adopted 
through joint decisions of the European Parliament and of the EU Council which 
deliberates by a qualified majority voting, without thus running the risk that one 
country can exercise a substantial veto power until its requests are not met.
 180
 
Another explanatory factor of European success in environmental matters can be 
traced back to the arrangement of a evolved control system of monitoring and 
sanctioning that, on the contrary, cannot be found in international law, 
often known for its shortcomings in terms of structural effectiveness. In 
particular, the monitoring of the application of European environmental law and 
implementation of EU environmental policies  represent  the most  
powerful  «cornerstone of EU environmental public policies»
 181
. 
At European level,  the principles, the policies, the objectives of Art. 191TFEU 
par. 1-3 constitute legally binding obligations for Member States.  
Any unjustified failure in this can be sanctioned by the Court of Justice, in its 
turn activated by the Commission by starting infringement procedures pursuant 
to art.258 TFUE. In addition to this, even the role of individuals and 
NGOs  is put to good use, by acting as  "confidential informants"  to the 
Commission in cases of alleged infractions/violations.  
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As deterrent, it has been provided a penalty mechanism to laggard member 
States, under which they may be condemned to pay lump sums and penalty 
payments, if they do not  adopt  the measures deemed necessary for the 
implementation of a sentence pronounced by the Court.  More precisely, pursuant 
to art. 258 and art. 260 TFEU, if the Commission considers that a Member State 
has failed to fulfill an obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned 
opinion on the matter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit 
its observations. If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within 
the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. Then, if the Court of Justice of the 
European Union finds that a Member State has failed to fulfill an obligation 
under the Treaties, the State shall be required to take the necessary measures to 
comply with the judgment of the Court. If the Commission considers that the 
Member State concerned has not taken the necessary measures to comply with 
the judgment of the Court, it may bring the case before the Court after giving that 
State the opportunity to submit its observations. It shall specify the amount of the 
lump sum or penalty payment to be paid by the Member State concerned which it 
considers appropriate in the circumstances. If the Court finds that the Member 
State concerned has not complied with its judgment it may impose a lump sum or 
penalty payment on it
182
. 
The entire procedure, broadly outlined here, has been shown to work very well in 
environmental matters since the 1980s, when the Commission took more 
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seriously its role of “watchdog”. 183  Again, according to a Neoinstitutionalist 
approach, the above-mentioned norms and procedures are inherently linked to 
institutions: the European Parliament, the Commission, the Court and the Agency. 
They - individually and together - can be considered further crucial factors for 
the explanation of the success of the European environmental governance 
experience. 
 
 A greening Parliament 
 
Given its historical attitude to deliberate on measures related to environmental 
matters, the European Parliament has obtained the reputation of «the Greenest 
EU Institution»
184
 , while the Parliamentary Committee Environment, Public 
Health and Food Safety as one of the most active, high-profile and influential 
Committees in the EP
185
. Democratically elected by European citizens, the 
European Parliament also mirrors the awareness of European citizens towards 
environmental and climate issues. This is proved by the interesting results 
reported by Special Eurobarometer 409 published in 2014, according to which 
half (50%) of all Europeans think that climate change is one of the world’s most 
serious problems and around one in six Europeans (16%) think it is the single 
most serious problem. The proportion of people who think that it is one of the 
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most serious problems ranges from 81% in Sweden to 28% in Estonia
186
. More 
generally, climate change is perceived to be the third most serious issue facing 
the world, behind poverty, hunger and lack of drinking water, and the economic 
situation. In 2011 it was seen as the second most serious, with the economic 
situation now seen as more serious
187
. Again, as for the problem of climate 
change, on a scale of 1-10, where 10 means an “extremely serious problem” and 
1 represents “not at all a serious problem” the overall average score for the EU28 
stands at 7.3. Nine in ten Europeans (90%) think that climate change is a very 
serious or a serious problem, with 69% scoring it 7-10 and 21% scoring it 5-6." 
Only a minority (9%) believe that climate change is not a serious problem 
(scoring it 1-4). These results are similar to those reported in 2010. Four in five 
Europeans (80%) agree that fighting climate change and using energy more 
efficiently can boost the economy and jobs in the EU, with around three in ten 
(31%) saying that they “totally agree”188. 
Europeans are most likely to think that responsibility for tackling climate change 
lies with national  governments (48%), with slightly smaller proportions thinking 
responsibility lies with business and industry (41%) and the EU (39%)
189
. One in 
four Europeans (25%) think they have a personal responsibility for tackling 
climate change. Half (50%) of all Europeans report that they have taken some 
form of action in the past six months to tackle climate change. Since 2011 there 
has been a small decrease in the proportion claiming to have taken any action 
over the past six months (-3 percentage points). Respondents in Sweden are the 
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most likely to say that they have taken some form of action (80%), compared 
with a quarter or less of people in Estonia (25%) and Romania (23%). When 
prompted with a list of specific actions to fight climate change, and with no 
timescale specified, the proportion reporting that they have taken some form of 
action rises to 89% of all Europeans, with this figure showing an increase since 
2011
190
. The action Europeans are most likely to say they have taken is to reduce 
their waste and regularly recycle it (69%). The other actions most widely 
undertaken include: trying to cut down on the use of disposable items (mentioned 
by 51%); buying local and seasonal produce whenever possible (36%); choosing 
new household appliances mainly because they are more energy-efficient (34%); 
regularly using environmentally-friendly forms of transport as an alternative to 
their own car (28%); and improving home insulation to reduce energy 
consumption (21%). Just over nine in ten Europeans (92%) think that it is 
important for their government to provide support for improving energy 
efficiency by 2030, with around half (51%) saying that it is “very important” for 
their government to do so. Nine in ten Europeans (90%) think that it is important 
for their government to set targets to increase the amount of renewable energy 
used by 2030, with around half (49%) saying it is “very important”. Seven in ten 
Europeans (70%) agree that reducing fossil fuel imports from outside the EU 
could provide the EU with economic benefits, with around one in four (26%) 
saying they “totally agree” 191 . 
The increasing attention of European citizens towards environmental issues is 
also witnessed by the composition of the European Parliament. This 
representative institution welcomed its first Green MEP in 1984. Then, the 
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institution continued to represent environmental instances directly in growing 
political numbers, with the extraordinary (and to some extent unexpected) 
success 1989 election, when 28 MEPs Greens entered Parliament.  
After the last elections in May 2014, the European parliamentary group 
Greens/EFA counts 50 MEPs from 17 countries. In addition to this, GUE/NGL 
(Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left) has a parliamentary 
group of 52 Members  from 19 different political delegations and 14 countries. 
All of them seats at the European Parliament. The environmental issue has, in 
fact, gained popularity and political representation, also thanks to the validity of 
a European electoral proportional system, therefore most attentive to the 
representation of different emerging instances (environmental ones included). 
The British scholar Maria Lee, writing about the alleged democratic deficit in the 
EU, argues that the citizens' right to environmental information constitutes an 
essential key to enhance the process of democratization of the Union.  Despite 
the significant changes introduced by the Aarhus Convention in 1998, 
information mechanisms still seem to be weak so as to require an effort of 
"almost heroic" compensation by the EU institutions
192
.  
Within this framework, the role of the European Parliament reopens the debate 
on the complex relationship between environmental sustainability and 
democratic accountability. In the field of political liberalism, green political 
theorists advocate accounts of a empirical connections between environmental 
protection and democracy
193
, as well as that democratic regimes would tend to 
enhance better protection of common goods such as environment and climate. In 
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an on-going theoretical framework characterized by various definitions of 
democracy
194
  and various definitions of sustainability
195
, the leading green 
political mainstream now seems to agree to the existence of an empirical linkage 
between sustainability and democracy, such that democracy would work as 
transmission mechanism for boosting the protection of the environment
196
. 
According to such theoretical mainstream, there is evidence to suggest that 
democratic decision-making is more conducive to environmental protection than 
non-democratic regimes
197
. In details, consensual democracy would demonstrate 
a higher level of environmental performance than adversarial democracy, 
because of the effort consensual democracy makes to integrate seemingly 
conflicting values in a deliberative way
198
. From a juridical perspective, this has 
been therefore solemnly affirmed at Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 1992, 
according to which «environmental issues are best handled with the participation 
of all concerned citizens at the relevant level»
199
.  Then, if we move to adopt a 
historical perspective, the consistency of the above-mentioned correlation  can be 
quite easily proved by the low level of environmental protection characterizing 
non-democratic regimes of Eastern Europe during the era of Bipolarism. The 
most patent example of that was represented by the Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
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(1986) which revealed how a non-democratic system like Communism could not 
match well with the goal of sustainability and public transparency
200
. 
Nowadays, political liberal literature on the greening of liberal societies starts 
being vast and ongoing. Environmental issues are widely recognized among 
Western democracies to be one of the most compelling priorities of the XXI 
century
201
. However, while the correlation between democracy, environmental 
protection, greening of liberal societies has started being largely explored and 
stressed by the most recent political literature, such theory seems to present a few 
limits. 
Such theory would be confirmed if applied to the Chinese case (non democratic 
and reluctant
202
 to commit legally binding GHG reduction’s constraints). 
However, the same theory would appear to be drastically denied if tested on the 
US case (democratic but reluctant too) 
203
.  As for the EU case, the democratic 
nature of the EU Member States (at national level) and the democratic nature of 
the European Parliament (at the supranational level) certainly represent relevant 
factors that can contribute to explain the special emphasis of the Union towards 
the environment and climate, but it cannot be considered the only explanatory 
factor in the analysis. This is to say that the democratic elements are the 
foundations, not the edifice. 
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This been said, democracy is presumably a necessary, but not sufficient condition 
to explain the adoption of advanced environmental policies. Presumably, other 
variables intervene to explain the success of the EU in the environmental policy-
area. Together with the democratic nature of the EU States and the EU 
Parliament, some of these factors can be found through the school of 
institutionalism itself (the presence of Supranational Institutions, transnational 
scientific agencies and NGOs). All of them – under different degrees and levels 
of analysis – can contribute to understand the complexity of the phenomenon that 
we are going to investigate. 
• A greening Commission 
The European Commission is the institution with the power of initiative of EU 
policy and the responsibility for ensuring that policies are properly implemented 
by Member States. By working at supranational level, the Commission is aimed 
at pursuing the general interest of the Union as a whole. Within the general 
interest it is no doubt included also the protection of the environment. 
More precisely, the Commission is a key-institution in environmental policy-
making. Its responsibilities include the exercise of power of investigation, power 
of proposal, evaluation and control of EU law
204
. As far as environmental policy 
is concerned, the Commission has been also the author of seven Environmental 
Action Programs and it should be recognized that, without it, the environment 
might not have received the attention it has got thanks to the relevant role of the 
Commission. As «creative and productive policy-entrepreneur»
205
, the 
Commission has been able to give a push to the development of environmental 
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policy, due to its often highly technical nature. Its acting for the general interest 
of the Union has given the EU more autonomy and space in the environmental 
field, where otherwise the efforts of individual States uti singuli would have not 
been sufficiently able to ensure adequate protection of the environment. In its 
role as “guardian” of the Treaties, the Commission has to ensure that European 
measures to be properly applied. More precisely, it has also to ensure not only 
that the European environmental legislation to be formally incorporated into the 
national legal systems, but also that this is actually applied
206
.   
The figures of the European Commissioner for the Environment and the Climate 
Action Commissioner represent a driving force behind the increasing volume of 
environmental legislation. As separate institutional articulations, the two 
Directorates-General have strengthened the role of the Commission in 
environmental policy-area, by providing new administrative capacities
207
. Such 
role is not limited to the EU internal environmental policy. Indeed, the 
inextricable link between EU internal climate change policy and the position 
adopted by the EU in international climate change politics makes the 
Commission’s role crucial in the development of the internal policy which then 
becomes the common policy of the EU projected at global level
208
.  
• A greening Court of Justice 
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Here, the role of the European Court of Justice is particularly relevant not only 
because it guarantees the effective compliance of European environmental law, 
by ruling and imposing financial penalties on Member States that infringe EU 
law
209
, but also - and mostly  - because it has often demonstrated a general 
orientation to a more open and wider interpretation of EU environmental 
directives and more generally of European environmental law. In this sense, its 
judicial rulings in environmental matters has played a “creative and propulsion” 
role, as largely proved by the Court’s tendency to reject restrictive and often 
minimalist readings of EU law as regards environmental protection
210
.  
As notably observed by Krämer, the «environmental witness» provided by the 
Court of Justice over the past twenty-five years has been almost always positive, 
by trying to interpret existing EU legislation in the most favorable and advanced 
way for environmental instances
211
. 
• A greening Agency: the European Environmental Agency (EEA): to 
inform is to form. 
One of the main problems in international environmental law is that individual 
States remain the main (if not the only) source of data and information on the 
state of the environment falling under their jurisdiction.  
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The European Environmental Agency was originally set in 1990 in order to fix 
this problem and to become an authoritative, reliable supranational source of 
environmental information all around the territory of  the European Union
212
. 
Whereas it is true that some of information going to Copenhagen still come 
directly from the States, it is also true that  independent "satellites" (such as 
scientific committees and non-institutional channels of European environmental 
groups and associations acting as “environmental watchdogs”) have properly 
been established. 
The right to participation stems from the right to information. In its turn, the right 
to information derives from the monitoring power
213
. In the light of these logical 
steps, suffice it to show how crucial is the role played by the European 
Environment Agency (EEA) for the right to information and, as a consequence, 
the right to participation. In fact it contributes to guarantee the monitoring, 
information, participation and, ultimately, the democracy within the European 
environmental governance. The European Environment Agency is not an EU 
institution in the proper sense of the term, but a decentralized Agency of the EU 
that collects data and environmental information from different Member States to 
carry out its evaluation.  
According to its original mandate, the EEA’s task is to provide sound, 
independent information on the environment. Its main duty consists of helping 
the Union make informed decisions about improving the environment, 
integrating environmental considerations into economic policies and moving 
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towards sustainability
214
. The EEA’s main clients are the European Union 
institutions —  the European Commission, the European Parliament, the Council 
— and the same member States. In addition to this central group of European 
policy actors, even the business community, academia, non-governmental 
organizations and other parts of civil society are also important users of EEA’s 
information
215
.  
Hailed as a «positive step»
216
  for the well-functioning of the European 
environmental governance, the Agency was formally established in 1990 with 
Regulation 1210/90,  even through the initial lack of agreement among Member 
States on the location of the headquarter has delayed the effective opening of the 
Agency which came into operation only in December 1993 in Copenhagen. The 
reason for  its establishment must be found in the late 1980s, when the increasing 
popularity of the EEC's environment policy led the Greens’ Group of the 
European Parliament to issue the idea of creating something corresponding to the 
American example of the U.S. Environmental Agency at European level.  
Under these circumstances, the Delors Commission issued the Regulation 
1210/90 establishing the European Environment Agency. In order to avoid the 
opposition of Member States within the Council, the Agency had been initially 
set up as an organization without formal role in the field of inspection and 
enforcement. In the lack of precedents that could have been helpful in clarifying 
certain ambiguities about its political and legal status, the Agency received 
internal autonomy and external independence. This recognition has often kept it 
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away from formalisms which characterized the Commission's procedures and, in 
particular, the quite limited room for manoeuvre of DG Environment
217
. 
The Agency has among its main objectives the collection and analysis of 
environmental information, the establishment of a common system of 
environmental information for the European Union and the setting-up of a 
network observatory system for the achievement of EU objectives in the 
environmental field. Its main duty consists of collecting, processing and 
providing environmental information which shall be «objective, reliable and 
comparable» at European level so as to give the Union and the States the right 
information to take the necessary measures to protect the environment, to assess 
the results of such measures and to ensure that the public is properly informed 
about the State of the health of  environment
218
. Given the widening character of 
its mandate, the Agency established from the very beginning its own modus 
operandi, by tuning its relationships with the Commission and the European 
Parliament in order to avoid unnecessary overlaps or duplications in their 
respective matters of competence. 
Broadly speaking, a common mistake is the wide-spread tendency to 
underestimate the role of the EEA, on the ground of its neutrality and alleged 
exclusion from the decision-making processes. According to this minimalist 
reading, the Agency would simply collect and process «objective, reliable and 
comparable» data, necessary for the policy-making of the EU environmental 
public policies and their effective implementation (Regulation 1210/90, art. 2). 
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Even through the EEA may not have a direct role in developing  strategic choices 
on environmental policy, whose responsibility is primarily attributed to the 
European Commission, it has also to be noticed the gradual strengthening of the 
Agency’s function as a special partner with the Commission, especially in the 
phases of identification, monitoring and assessment of environmental risk 
management and assessment
219
.  
In short, the intrinsic value of information lies in the fact that it enables the 
Union and the Member States to make decisions about the environment. In this 
way, information simultaneously becomes a «preparatory»
220
  and a 
«strategic»
221
  instrument to adopt, implement and evaluate European 
environmental policies. In practice the line between neutral information and 
formulation of public policy is very thin and ambiguous. In other words, the 
Agency has a role which, although not directly involved in the decision-making 
process, remains crucial. As noted from former Director EEA Beltran when he 
was asked how the EEA should have dealt with information exposed to a high 
risk of politicization by organized interest groups, he answered : «The Agency is 
a watchdog without teeth, but the best tooth today is written information [...] If 
you have good information, the public and the Administration will do everything 
else» 
222
. What is more, the concept of comparability of environmental 
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information tends here to play a crucial role, because the Agency is also 
responsible for the so-called standardization of European environmental 
information, by pooling together different sources and national information 
systems (starting from the definition of waste which has varied from State to 
State), in order to reach a sufficient coherent level of uniformity that can allow 
the same Agency to do one of its main duties related to data: comparison and 
rationalization, here also understood as a cultural process
223
. As consequence, 
standardization and harmonization of environmental information at European 
level finish up rekindling the ongoing debate on the distinction between 
information as fact-finding (merely descriptive) and decision-making as 
prescriptive moment. Indeed, the time of scientific knowledge and the time of 
political decision seem to go together in a process of mutual construction. It 
flows from this that both the effectiveness of knowledge and the effectiveness of 
decision-making cannot be seen as solely arising from institutionalized models. 
The sources of credibility and legitimacy are progressively becoming much 
wider and independent from traditional institutional channels such as the State, to 
include the informal networks
224
 of academia, civil society
225
, business 
communities in a decentralized, fruitful process enriched by the contribution of 
plurality of voices expressed by institutional and non-institutional players. This 
                                                          
223
 Jimenez-Beltran D., European Environmental Agency :Putting Information to Work, 
EEA Publication, Copenhagen, 1994 
224
 For the multiple concept of network conceived as «new principle of socio-political 
organization», «new tool of social analysis» and «new metaphor for the logic of the 
modern epoch», first grounded on education and community-building, see Castells 
M.,The Rise of the Network Society: the Information Age, Blackwell, 1996. See also 
Hoffmann M., Climate Governance at the Crossroads. Experimenting with a global 
response after Kyoto, Oxford University Press, 2011   
225 
For a comprehensive introduction to the role of Civil Society in the time of global 
transformations, see Marchetti R., Civil Society, Global Governance and the Quest for 
Legitimacy, in Telo’ M., Globalization, Multilateralism, Europe. Towards a Better 
Global Governance, Ashgate, 2013  
81 
 
process is more evident in the public sphere of the environment where 
standardization of environmental information – led by the EEA – must therefore 
be seen as a collective learning between local and universal, between public and 
private, between the natural and the human
226
. In this way the Union itself 
becomes an arena able to draw and disseminate lessons. In other words, it can 
become a truly Epistemic Community
227
. 
The legal scholar Jananoff captures the dynamics of this process in his study on 
standardization as a “reasoning together”: a fertile ground for the exchange of 
knowledge and not merely as a bureaucratic procedure
228
. The power of 
standardization therefore is expressed in re-thinking the common problems to 
come together for a common solution, through the extension of boundaries and 
parameters of knowledge to transfer best practices into a single socio-legal 
context. To harmonize, in short, becomes «the vehicle through which the players 
of a game with different opinions finally choose to run the risk to reason 
together»
229
. 
Among the arguments in favor of the European Environment Agency there is not 
only the importance of the “information-transparency-participation-democracy” 
effect on environmental policy-making, but also another important characteristics: 
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it is the so-called «normative shaping power of information»
230
.  In this sense, the 
former Director of EEA Jimenez-Beltran used to say: «We do not use stored data 
for the pleasure of completing an elegant yet arbitrary mathematical model or the 
single hypothesis that they might one day happen in the hands of someone. Our 
job is to put the data to work, to free information on goods and services, [...] and 
to expand future opportunities through knowledge and technology for the 
solution of real problems»
231
.  So, normative shaping power of information 
means that «information is seen no longer as sterile, but as an element that plays 
an active role and a potentially regulatory power, which normally opens windows 
of opportunity previously underestimated or regarded as marginal»
232
. 
In a more comprehensive perspective, it can be argued that the joint and 
structurally coordinated role of the European Parliament, the European Court of 
Justice, the EU Commission and the European Environment Agency – all as a 
supranational actors  –  has actively contributed to the success of environmental 
governance at European level. The EU environmental policy has gradually 
established itself first as a side-policy to the original economic engine of the 
European integration process, then an increasingly autonomous policy-area to 
take into serious account - if not a real «strategic counteroffer compared to other 
possible policy-priorities»
233
. 
• A greening Environmental Action Program 
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According to the institutionalist approach, the presence of environmental Action 
Programs would have also contributed to the success of EU environmental 
policies and the overall well-functioning of European environmental regional 
governance. These Action Programs establish principles and policy objectives up 
to medium-long term commitments at the highest political level. In this way, the 
programs would focus public attention on transnational priorities, whose non-
fulfillment would create the effect of being politically accountable. Furthermore, 
the possible success of such environmental Action Programs – including its 
multi-level mechanism for their joint implementation (UN, regional, State, local)  
– may finally have a domino-effect, with positive consequences in terms of 
progressive confidence-building and network spirit
234
 . 
• Societal actors: the influence of NGOs and Business lobbying in 
Brussels. 
Another important factors for ensuring success to environmental policy is the 
role of environmental stakeholders and NGOs. As for the Business sector, it can 
be first mentioned BusinessEurope, the umbrella group for European companies. 
Within this organization, there is often a division between those businesses 
which oppose EU advanced environmental policy measures because they would 
lead to increased costs of production and, on the other hand, those businesses 
which encourage ambitious measures in the field of environmental protection 
because the introduction of such eco-friendly measures would increase the 
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demand for their goods and services
235
.    As for environmental NG s    whose 
growing role has been often explained with their function of 
information/expertise services and legitimacy provider
236    it can be argued that 
NG s’ capability to influence the decision-making process mainly depends on 
their internal leadership, expertise, size of membership, reliable funding and 
communications technology
237
. Applying the underpinnings of this mainstream 
theory to the case of the environmental NGOs in Brussels, it can be argued that 
they largely reveal a quite strong, permanent structure. They communicate each 
other and - most of all - European NGOs, civil society movements and interest 
groups do organize in regional networks under the common inclusive grouping of 
the Bureau Européen de l’Environnement (EEB) set in 1974 in Brussels. The 
EEB  is Europe's largest coalition of grassroots environmental organizations.  
This federation is composed of over 140 environmental organizations based in all 
28 EU's Member States. According to its official mission statement, the EEB is 
the «environmental voice» of its members and European citizens. It focuses on 
influencing the EU policymaking implementation and assessment of its agreed 
policies. It aims to be effective by combining knowledge with representativeness, 
active involvement of its members and coalition building 
238
.  
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The Commission often seeks their cooperation in the decision making process. 
Over the last five years, the Commission has also aimed to better structure its 
engagement with civil society in external relations, as proved by the European 
Commission’s Communication of 12th September 2012 on The roots of 
democracy and sustainable development: Europe's engagement with Civil 
Society in external relations
239
.  In this document, the Commission singles out 
three priorities for EU support: 1) to enhance efforts to promote a conducive 
environment for CSOs in partner countries; 2) to promote a meaningful and 
structured participation of CSOs in domestic policies of partner countries, in the 
EU programming cycle and in international processes; 3) to increase local CSOs' 
capacity to perform their roles as independent development actors more 
effectively.  
Within this framework, the next CoPs set in Paris (December 2015) will be an 
interesting testing workbench for NGOs constructive capabilities and for the EU 
support. Meanwhile, the regional dimension of the Bureau Européen de 
l’Environnement (EEB) and the multilateral context where it operates on the 
occasion of the international UNFCCC CoPs may provide two potential strong 
points. The multilateral context where the EEB works does not only increase its 
visibility by transforming the fora alongside the CoPs in global stages, but it 
could also represent the right moment to catch the potential benefits coming from 
the so-called “international political opportunities structure” (IP S), so as to 
expand the opportunities for resource mobilization and political access to 
government decision-making process
240
. 
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Against this institutional background, it can be confirmed that in the EU 
laboratory a remarkable set of formal and informal norms and supranational 
institutions working at regional level and operating under political and 
democratic accountability have advocated and europeanized higher 
environmental standards, while transnational networks of civil society
241
 have 
increasingly spread general awareness around the issue of environmental 
protection among European people. Such complex combination of factors has 
contributed to make substantive improvements in the field of environmental 
protection within the Union. 
Now, the step forward in our research consists of understanding  whether  – or 
not – the above mentioned institutionalist and transnationalist key-success factors 
of the EU regional environmental governance’s  experience (the role of the EU 
Parliament, EU Commission, EU Court of Justice, EEA, Action Plans, 
Environmental NGOs) are likely to be applied, transferred or more simply 
communicated in other regional integration’s contexts such as ASEAN and 
MERCOSUR (see PART III). 
On the one hand, the substantial lack of supranationality in the structure and 
functioning of ASEAN and MERCOSUR (see PART III) makes the possibility to 
“circulate” a European Parliament, a European Commission or a European Court 
of Justice in these areas of the world particularly difficult and unlikely at the 
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moment. Besides, such approach itself would be ontologically wrong, given the 
fact that the EU is something more than a typical regional organization. 
Supranational institutions establish actors and processes that are at least partly 
independent from Nation-States
242
. This is not yet the case of the ASEAN and 
MERCOSUR, where a mature exercise of «pooling and sharing» of national 
sovereignties has not yet taken place.   
On the other hand, the other above mentioned key-success factors of the EU 
regional environmental experience (such as the role of regional Environmental 
Agency, a regional Action Program and regional NGOs characterized by a softer 
and more creeping approach in dealing with national sovereignty’s cession) 
represent environmental driving forces which appear to be more likely applicable 
in other regional integration areas of the world. 
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PART III :  
 THE GREENING OF THE EU, ASEAN AND 
MERCOSUR IN A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE. 
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1. Why Comparative Regional Studies matter. 
The third part of the research will investigate whether the EU experience 
can be borrowed in other regional integration areas. Such investigation will 
be undertaken within the framework of Comparative Regional Studies243. 
This is because, before analyzing if something of a case can be borrowed in 
another case, it is important to understand whether – and to what extent – 
both cases are comparable. With this respect, it can be first noticed that in 
the 1960s the role of comparison was still underdeveloped in the field of 
regionalism, measured to most of the other fields of social sciences244. The 
main reason of this delay came from the fact that the European experience 
was largely considered as a single, mostly  unique case, trapped into the so-
called “n=1 dilemma” 245. Only later on, the proliferation of many other 
regional projects by far circumscribed to Europe started posing the 
conceptual problem of comparison in regionalism, under the impetus of the 
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multidimensionality and pluralism of the regional phenomenon occurring 
since the 1990s: in this decade we have witnessed a growing interest in 
comparing regionalisms as fields of study which entered a new phase of 
dynamism and expansion246. So, Regionalism beyond Europe became both 
a reality and an object of study247. As a consequence, regional comparative 
studies started acquiring and consolidating their academic autonomy, 
justified by the intellectual discovery that Europe was not (anymore) a n=1 
case. Besides, the EU could have been compared to other regional 
laboratories around the world. As pointed out by Söderbaum, now the 
challenge of comparative regionalism consists of both including and 
transcending the European experience 248 , in a mutual, cross-fertilizing 
learning process of discovery and enrichment between the EU Studies and 
Regional Studies, the EU itself and other regional projects disseminated in 
different areas of the world, such as Asia and Latin America. This is the 
main reason why regional comparative studies do matter: they show (and 
reinsure) us that the EU is not an isolated case.     
This been said, here the research will focus on two selected cases-study: the 
ASEAN and the MERCOSUR as emerging areas of regional integration. 
Moving from the premise that deviation from the orthodox EU blueprint 
may not mean that the environmental integration process or environmental 
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policy has failed249, such comparative exercise will imply the analysis of 
the key success factors of the EU and the institutional conditions/obstacles 
of circulation of it, moving from the European historical lesson, from its 
environmental «leadership by example» and its capacity-building potentials. 
 
2. Environmental Governance in the ASEAN: the 
constructivist path towards a regional sustainability. 
For the purpose of our discussion – before dealing with the specific 
functioning of the environmental governance in the ASEAN – it is worth 
briefly looking back to the origins of this regional organization and its 
original mission. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
was originally established in 1967 in Bangkok, with the signing of the 
Bangkok Declaration by the ASEAN founding fathers, namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, whose governments 
originally shared little beyond anti-communism250. Later on, Brunei joined 
in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Lao and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 
1999, so making up what is today the ten Member States of the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations. 
Broadly speaking, the current ten members of the Association compose a 
huge region characterized by political, religious and cultural differences, 
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not to mention the economic ones. In this sense, industrialized countries 
such as Singapore, Thailand and Philippines coexist with least developed 
ones such as Laos and Myanmar. Besides, most of them can be considered 
quite young nations that achieved independence after the end of the 
European and American colonialism 251 . Against such heterogeneous 
background, the Bangkok Declaration aimed at fostering the promotion of 
economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region 
through joint endeavors in the spirit of non-interference in internal affairs 
of one another, equality and partnership in order to strengthen the 
foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community; the promotion of 
regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule 
of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to 
the principles of the United Nations Charter; then, the promotion of active 
collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the 
economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and environmental fields252. 
Composed of three pillars (namely the ASEAN Political-Security 
Community, the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community), the ASEAN is nowadays often deemed as the higher 
expression of the so-called «Asian regionalism»253, here understood as the 
multilateral approach to solve common problems and as an important 
instrument to ensure peace and stability in the region. 
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From a historical point of view, it can be argued that - since its setting up - 
the ASEAN’s evolution has been split in two important phases: the Cold 
war and the post Cold War254. While the Cold War period was largely 
affected by inter-states conflicts in the South-East region, the end of the 
Cold War paved the way to a fruitful intensification of regional cooperation 
in important issues - such as immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism, 
energy security, maritime piracy and environmental depletion. The main 
feature of such no-border issues was the raising awareness that they could 
not be addressed unilaterally, because their inherent nature would have 
required a multilateral approach among the States of the region.  
On such basis, ASEAN has progressively grown over the last two decades, 
becoming an important regional forum to discuss and promote matters of 
regional interest 255 , largely oriented to the construction of a regional 
identity which has been facilitated by the avoidance of institutional grand 
designs and an informal consensual approach256.  
For the purposes of our discussion, ASEAN has been selected because it is 
a relatively young laboratory of regional governance in which the 
dimension of cooperation in the field of environmental protection has 
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recently taken a twofold importance both from a scientific and political 
point of view257.  The coexistence of both these dimensions has found its 
highest expression in the concept of ASEAN as a «single ecosystem»258, 
first used in the official text of the Cooperation Plan against Transboundary 
Air Pollution in 1995. As noted by Elliot, this has been an important 
statement for ASEAN regional identity and identity-building process259. 
From a constructivist point of view and according to the theorists of 
«cognitive regionalism»260, the identification of the ASEAN as ecosystem 
builds the image of a South-east Asia with common interests in 
safeguarding a unique ecosystem and a strong ecological identity 261 . 
Besides, the path followed by ASEAN has not been formalistic at all. This 
would have been extremely difficult because of the nature of a organization 
giving historical priority to the substantive importance of informal network 
style rather than a formal process of institutionalization.  
In the light of this premise, it is now possible to better understand why - in 
the framework of environmental cooperation - the effort made by the 
Member States of ASEAN went in the direction of building a progressive 
image of regional identity coinciding with the idea of ecological identity 
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(ASEAN: unique ecosystem). Historically, the attention towards the 
environmental issue within the organization dates back to 1977, the year of 
the first ASEP (Asean Sub-regional Environmental Program). In 
compliance with the ASEAN spirit, this initial phase was characterized by 
a high degree of informalism, witnessed by Joint Declarations, acts of soft 
law, general principles and not legally binding guidelines.  The main goal 
achieved during this phase of environmental cooperation was to maintain a 
«continuous availability of natural resources»262as essential elements to 
ensure the economic development of individual Member States.  This is the 
setting that emerged at the conclusion of the first Ministerial Meeting of 
Asean on Environment in 1981 (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the 
Environment). From that meeting, the environment gradually became a 
subject of regional cooperation, by gaining new discussion spaces and 
consensus within the organization agenda. A critical turning point in the 
process of regional ecological identity-building occurred in 1995 on the 
occasion of the adoption of the above-mentioned Cooperation Plan on 
Transboundary Pollution where it is stated for the first time that the 
ASEAN region represents «a unique ecosystem». 
In 1995 the Organization's Member States symbolically proclaimed 1995 
the ASEAN Year of Environment, thus powering up the so-called process 
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of «ASEAN-anization of environmental governance»263, inspired by the 
criteria of informal policy, networks , action plans, Joint Declarations 
which increasingly found an external projection of Asean common  
position in international conferences on climate and the environment264. An 
example of this is well represented by the observer status of Asean at the 
UNFCCC Conference of Parties265.  In this direction, the ASEAN Leaders 
at the regional level have issued Joint Statements related to climate change 
in Climate Change UN Summits since Copenhagen in 2009 up to Lima 
2014. Through these Statements, the ASEAN Leaders have expressed 
ASEAN’s common position and aspirations towards a global solution to 
the challenge of climate change and their will to achieve an ASEAN 
community resilient to climate change through national and regional 
actions 266 . With particular regard to the ASEAN  Joint Statement on 
Climate Change 2014, it can be noticed that the Heads of 
State/Government of ASEAN Member States declared «to call upon all 
Parties to the UNFCCC, including ASEAN Member States, to work 
effectively and in good faith to adopt a protocol, another legal instrument 
or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to 
all by the end of 2015, and to table their Intended Nationally Determined 
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Contributions well in advance of COP21 in Paris in December 2015 or by 
first quarter 2015 by those Parties ready to do so»267.  
As for the regional internal dimension, an historical turning point in the 
ASEAN regionalism has also been represented by the ASEAN Vision 2020, 
adopted in 1998 by the ASEAN leaders on the 30th Anniversary of 
ASEAN. On that occasion they agreed on a shared vision of ASEAN as a 
concert of Southeast Asian Nations, outward looking, living in peace, 
stability and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in dynamic 
development and in a community of caring societies268. According to the 
ASEAN Vision 2020, the concert of Southeast Asian Nations also 
«envisions a clean and green ASEAN with fully established mechanisms 
for sustainable development to ensure the protection of the region's 
environment, the sustainability of its natural resources, and the high quality 
of life of its peoples»269. What is more, the concert of Southeast Asian 
Nations «envision the evolution in Southeast Asia of agreed rules of 
behavior and cooperative measures to deal with problems that can be met 
only on a regional scale, including environmental pollution and degradation, 
drug trafficking, trafficking in women and children, and other transnational 
crimes»270.  
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Later on, it is also worth mentioning the ASEAN Charter 2007, serving as a 
firm foundation in achieving the ASEAN Community by providing legal 
status and institutional framework for ASEAN. It codifies common norms, 
rules and values; sets clear targets for ASEAN; and presents accountability 
and compliance. The point 9 of the Charter solemnly states that the purpose 
of the ASEAN also includes «to promote sustainable development so as to 
ensure the protection of region’s environment, the sustainability of its 
natural resources, the preservation of its cultural heritage and the high 
quality of life of its people»271.   
Within the framework of the ongoing Roadmap for Asean Community 
2009-2015, the ASEAN countries have been responding to climate change 
by focusing on the implementation of relevant initiatives within the 
ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint 2009-2015. Section 
D10 of the Blueprint is titled “Responding to Climate Change and 
addressing its impacts”. It states the strategic objective of «enhancing 
regional and international cooperation to address the issue of climate 
change and its impacts on socio-economic development, health and the 
environment in ASEAN Member States through implementation of 
mitigation and adaptation measures, based on the principles of equity, 
flexibility, effectiveness, common but differentiated responsibilities, 
respective capabilities, as well as reflecting on different social and 
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economic conditions»272. The actions provided in the Blueprint are eleven 
and include: 1) Encourage ASEAN common understanding on climate 
change issues and, where possible, engage in joint efforts and common 
positions in addressing these issues; 2) Promote and facilitate exchange of 
information/knowledge on scientific research and development (R&D), 
deployment and transfer of technology and best practices on adaptation and 
mitigation measures, and enhance human resource development; 3) 
Encourage the international community to participate in and contribute to 
ASEAN’s efforts in reforestation, as well as to reduce deforestation and 
forest degradation; 4) Develop regional strategies to enhance capacity for 
adaptation, low carbon economy, and promote public awareness to address 
effects of climate change; 5) Enhance collaboration among ASEAN 
Member States and relevant partners to address climate related hazards, and 
scenarios for climate change; 6) Develop regional systematic observation 
system to monitor impact of climate change on vulnerable ecosystems in 
ASEAN; 7) Conduct regional policy, scientific and related studies, to 
facilitate the implementation of climate change convention and related 
conventions; 8) Promote public awareness and advocacy to raise 
community participation on protecting human health from the potential 
impact of climate change; 9) Encourage the participation of local 
government, private sector, NGOs, and community to address the impacts 
of climate change; 10) Promote strategies to ensure that climate change 
initiatives lead to economically vibrant and environment friendly ASEAN 
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Community taking into account win-win synergy between climate change 
and the economic development; 11) Encourage the efforts to develop an 
ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI) 273. 
As regards the latter point, the Asean Socio-Cultural Community has 
developed an ASEAN Climate Change Initiative (ACCI) in 2010. Falling 
within the category of so-called “non-traditional security issues”, this 
initiative has been promoted by the Environment Ministers of the Member 
States for the purpose of preparing a consultative platform for coordination 
and regional cooperation on issues related to climate change, including 
exchange of information, capacity-building and transfer of environmentally 
friendly technologies. To implement this initiative, the ASEAN Working 
Group on Climate Change was established. It acts as Executive body of 
coordination currently chaired by Thailand274. 
Operationally, ASEAN Member States have taken various actions to 
address climate change through various environmental, economic and 
social initiatives over the last decade.  Most of ASEAN Member States 
have announced voluntary mitigation targets, including Indonesia 
(emission reduction of 26% from business-as-usual BAU by 2020, to be 
increased to 41% with enhanced international assistance), Malaysia 
(reduction of 40% in terms of energy intensity of GDP by 2020 compared 
to 2005 levels), Philippines (deviate by 20% from BAU of their emission 
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growth path), and Singapore (emission reduction of 16% below BAU by 
2020) 275. 
All in all, the ASEAN action on climate change is predominantly focused 
on strengthening adaptive capacity in urban development projects, through 
adaptation policies, which means the complex set of measures undergone in 
response to climate change, in order to reduce its negative impacts on 
human life276. Despite the existence of considerable implementation deficits 
at the level of individual States and the shortage of financial resources 
necessary for the implementation of the integrated environmental policies 
on a regional scale, the environmental governance system of the ASEAN 
represents an interesting laboratory for regional cooperation in progress, 
where the need to seek common responses to the problem of environmental 
degradation was proposed in such innovative and original terms, to become 
– quite paradoxically – consistent with the original classical principle of 
ASEAN: the principle of non-interference. Indeed, environmental 
degradation itself has been seen as a form of interference, because it affects 
the quality of the environment of other States and, ultimately, of the entire 
regional ecosystem 277 . As for the limited use of institutionalized 
mechanisms, this point shall not necessarily be interpreted as a weakness of 
ASEAN, but - on the contrary - as a potential element of strength: through 
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the «Asean spirit» 278 , it has been possible to strengthen the ties of 
cooperation between Member States in environmental matters, as witnessed 
by the mechanism of cooperation and joint management for the 
development of the Mekong, the great river that runs through the entire 
“unique regional ecosystem”. 
Put in a comparative perspective with what argued about the EU experience 
in PART II of our research,  the ASEAN remains a precious case-study to 
take into consideration during the analysis. In general terms, both of them 
can be considered two advanced examples of regional organizations279. 
Besides, it can be argued that they embody two different logics of 
integration: the European Union is an example of regional integration 
mainly based on institutions. Asean is a regional integration especially 
based on the concept of informal network 280 . Alongside elements of 
difference, we can detect a significant element of analogy: there is the 
common allocation of both organizations within the theoretical category of 
Neo-regionalism, as process of multidimensional and multilateral 
cooperation between neighboring States, based on endogenous and 
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exogenous factors281. Indeed, environmental and ecological disasters can be 
listed among the more recent challenges for Neo-regionalism282. Thus, the 
case-studies of EU and ASEAN fundamentally prove that the regional 
organization can represent an interesting laboratory for environmental 
governance from which to start rethinking and looking for innovative and 
realistic responses to the global challenge of climate change. 
 
3. Environmental Governance in the MERCOSUR: the 
institutionalist path towards a regional sustainability. 
For the purpose of our research – before investigating the current state of play of 
regional environmental governance in the MERCOSUR – it is worth providing a 
synthetic overview of this Latin American organization with a dedicated focus on 
the institutionalization of the environmental dimension into MERCOSUR 
integration process. The main point discussed in this chapter is to understand 
how - and to what extent – the so-called regionalization of environmental policy 
has taken place in the bloc of MERCOSUR. The structure and decision-making 
modes of the Organization will be examined, together with the institutions in the 
field of the regional environmental policy.  
First of all, it can be argued that Regionalism in Latin America has been a plural 
long-standing process, characterized by different outcomes and degrees of 
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success
283
. Nowadays, such attempts have not yet led to the creation of a single 
regional organization covering all the countries of the continent
284
.  Even the 
purpose of such regional attempts has shifted greatly from trade agreements to a 
more multidimensional idea of regional integration such as the MERCOSUR, 
which also includes today the dimension of environmental protection. 
Born as an attempt to reverse a decade of economic decline and to fend off the 
negative externalities of bloc formations elsewhere
285
, the MERCOSUR is 
largely given as the most accomplished example of on-going process of regional 
integration in Latin America
286
. At times, it has been described as the regional 
organization that most closely resembles the European Union and as an example 
of thriving regional cooperation
287
.  
In 1991 Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay signed the Treaty of Asunción, 
establishing the "Mercado Comun del Sur" (MERCOSUR) and agreeing to build 
a common market of the South. Venezuela officially joined the regional bloc in 
2012. As evident from the name “Common Market of the South”, the aims of the 
regional organization consists of the progressive elimination of all trade barriers 
among the signatory Parties; promoting the free circulation of goods, services 
and other productive factors between Member States; establishing a common 
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external tariff, building a common market; coordinating macroeconomic policies 
among Member States and, last but not least, harmonizing sector-based 
policies
288
. In doing this, MERCOSUR has also given a significant contribution 
to regional peace in relation to the concept of “border”, by moving from the idea 
of «conflict focus» to the idea of «focus of greater concentration of 
cooperation»
289
.  
In 1994 the Protocol of Ouro Preto settled juridical personality and institutional 
structure to the Organization
290
, mainly composed of the Council of the Common 
Market (CCM), the Common Market Group (CMG), the Trade Commission, the 
Administrative Secretariat and, since 2006, the Parliament of Mercosur 
(PARLASUR). The Council of the Common Market (CCM) is the highest 
political institution consisting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs or Ministers of 
Economy. It is in charge of the political leadership, by guiding the integration 
process and adopting Decisions in order to achieve the mission outlined in the 
treaty, especially the time-frames, the roadmaps, the strategies and the objectives 
of the Organization for the fulfilling of the Common Market. In complement to 
such leading role, the CCM can set new organs and take decisions in budget-
related issues. Depending on the policy-issue under discussion, regular-based 
Ministerial Meetings have been established under the umbrella of CCM. 
The Common Market Group (CMG)  is  the executive branch of the Council. It 
can provide Resolutions and make proposals to the Council. It mainly has 
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executive and administrative competences. Depending on the policy-issue under 
discussion, Sub Working Groups (SGT) have been established under the CMG. 
The Trade Commission (Comisión de Comercio del Mercosur) is trade-customs 
technical body in charge of supporting the CMG for the implementation of the 
customs union and the creation of a common trade policy. It can adopt directives 
as for the matters of its competence
291
. Finally, the Administrative Secretariat is 
in charge of the general administrative affairs for the ordinary functioning of the 
Organization. Despite its limited competences, it is nevertheless the only 
permanent institution of the Organization. As far as the decision-making system 
is concerned, the consensus remains the general rule among the organs. This 
basically means that every Member State has a veto-power.  
From an institutional perspective, it is also particularly important to mention the 
setting-up of the Parliament of the South (PARLASUR). It has been originally 
settled in 2006 in order to strengthen regional integration and to ensure 
democratic legitimacy to the Latin-American Organization. The Parliamentary 
Assembly is composed of 81 elected members who have consultative and 
opinion-starting functions
292
. Despite its still limited political power, this 
parliamentary institution represents an important step made by South America 
towards the strengthening of the so-called «parliamentary dimension of 
regionalization».
293
 For the purpose of our discussion, it is worth stressing the 
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active role of a specific Parliamentary Committee: the “Comisión Desarrollo, 
Regional Sustentable, Ordenamiento Territorial, Vivienda, Salud, Medio 
Ambiente y Turismo” where cross-cutting environmental issues have been 
scheduled and publicly discussed at regional parliamentary level
294
. 
As far as the environmental policy and its legal basis are concerned, the Treaty of 
Asunción had the creation of a Common Market as primary goal for the regional 
organization. This included the progressive free movement of goods, services 
and productive inputs, as well as the gradual elimination of internal customs and 
the setting up of common external tariff and – in a long term perspective – the 
adoption of common trade policy
295
. Besides, the Treaty of Asunción also 
mentioned – among other multidimensional aspects involved – environmental 
protection in its Preamble as one of the issues subject of regional cooperation 
among the signatory Parties
296
. In particular, the Preamble of the Treaty declared 
that the guiding principle of the MERCOSUR should also take into account the 
«preservation of the environment [...] on the grounds of gradualism, flexibility 
and balance»
297
.  This circumstance appears to be logical as MERCOSUR dates 
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back to the 1990’s when environmental protection had already emerged as a 
global issue at stake in the international agenda. Moving from the time of 
MERC SUR’s foundation, the attention for the environment – and its 
incorporation within the institutional process of MERCOSUR – has come to 
cover an increasing importance in the integration process
298
. Since there, the 
environmental policy of MERCOSUR began to deal with the inclusion of 
environmental costs in economic analysis, the sustainable use and management 
of resources, the development of clean technologies, the monitoring of common 
shared ecosystems, the coordination of international acts and the environmental 
management of tourism
299
. In this direction, the MERCOSUR established a 
specific body in charge of environmental policy-making just one year after its 
birth, through Resolution 22/92. Indeed, the Member States settled the so-called 
REMA (Reunión Especializada de Medio Ambiente) as a political means for 
addressing environmental policy
300
. In this sense, the REMA can be considered 
the first significant step towards the institutionalization of the environment in the 
MERCOSUR integration process, here understanding the concept of 
institutionalization in the Haas’s proper scientific way, that is, the process by 
which bureaucratic organizations, rules and practices are created and adopted to 
constrain activities and to shape expectations
301
. 
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In particular, the REMA was created in order to analyze and to compare the 
existing policies and national legislations of Member States (including  the 
compilation of a digest of the different national environmental legislations) and, 
then, to design common actions to protect the environment of the regional area
302
. 
It originally consisted of a sub-forum of representatives of the Member States in 
charge of discussing the main environmental challenges of the region and 
formulating recommendations for adequate protection of the environment to 
CMG for its approval
303
. More precisely, the REMA meetings were intended to 
single out a deal on a few general criteria for the management of the environment 
within MERCOSUR; to promote the incorporation of environmental issues in 
international joint-projects within the framework of MERCOSUR; to concert and 
– possibly – to coordinate common actions among Member States at international 
level; to orient the efforts made by the Common Market Group in the cases of 
cross-cutting issues related to environmental issues; and, finally, to promote 
educational, training, research and informational activities for environment’s 
management
304
. The most important achievement of REMA has been the 
formulation of 11 guidelines for the environmental policy in Mercosur. Such 
principles have been then formally adopted by the CMG under Resolution 10/94 
“Directrices Básicas en Materia Ambiental” (Basic Guidelines on Environmental 
Policy) in 1994. Such Resolution aimed at developing a joint management 
scheme over the activities of the Member States in the field of environmental 
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protection. In particular, such list of Basic Environmental Guidelines included: 
the adoption of basic environmental-friendly practices in all processes where 
natural resources were used; the introduction of a pioneering mechanism for 
environmental impact assessment; the minimization of pollutant’s emissions; the 
sound treatment of solid, liquid and gas waste; the adoption of technical 
procedures on maximum atmospheric emission limits for vehicles, then 
transposed and enforced in the more detailed Resolution 84/94 adopted by the 
CMG 
305
.      
In 1995, the REMA has been definitely transformed and institutionalized into a 
proper permanent Sub Working Group (SGT), called SGT6 Environment 
(Subgrupo de Trabajo VI - Medio Ambiente) under the Common Market Group, 
through Resolution 20/95. As integrated part within the institutional structure of 
MERCOSUR, the SGT6 has been composed of members of the national 
environmental bureaucracies meeting on average four times annually. They have 
met to discuss a vast array of environmental issues (from trade in environmental 
goods to desertification and air quality) linked to MERCOSUR, so as to give 
support for the high level Ministerial decision-making process. The SGT6 has 
developed recommendations in various environmental sub-sectors to be issued to 
the competent CMG. Nowadays its main role consists of working on specific 
issues and to propose resolutions to the CMG
306
.   
In this sense, the set-up of SGT6 can be mainly seen as a further MERCOSUR’s 
attempt to harmonize national legislations, so as to prevent barriers to the free 
trade due to regulatory asymmetries and inconsistent environmental regulations 
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among Member States
307
. This is because environmental policy is one of the 
sectors where fundamental differences in policy-making easily pose barriers to 
the establishment of a common market. As a consequence, the harmonization 
efforts appear to be a fitting way to fix the problem of environmental policy-
asymmetries for regional economic integration
308
. Besides, it has to be noted that 
the complex process of so-called harmonization in MERCOSUR should not be 
intended in a strict, hard law juridical way – contrary to what occurs in the EU 
institutional laboratory. In other words, harmonization efforts in MERCOSUR 
does not consist of creating a single common supranational legislation but rather 
fixing broad common criteria that national legislations have to conform with. 
This consequently means that, once all the Member States have reached a given 
target, the issue is declared harmonized
309
. As pointed out by Hochstetler, the 
fact ultimately remains that there is no competence for the SGT6 to establish 
environmental legislations on its own
310
.  At the most, Member States limit 
themselves to adopt their own legislation according to agreed upon targets
311
.  
However, even through the effective powers of the SGT6 have been objectively 
limited, this Group has been able to play a fruitful role, by exchanging ideas, 
setting-up networks, sharing best practices, working on joint-projects, promoting 
innovations, and thereby upholding each other’s position in the domestic context, 
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not to mention collective initiatives to prepare for international environmental 
meetings
312
.  
In order to strengthen the institutional dimension of environmental integration 
within MERCOSUR, the CMC adopted, by Decision 2/01, the MERCOSUR 
Framework Agreement on Environment (called AMMAM, Acuerdo Marco sobre 
Medio Ambiente del Mercosur) in 2001. Basically considered as a soft law 
agreement
313
, the AMMAM reiterated the commitment of Member States 
occurred during Rio Conference in 1992, with the aim of expanding and further 
specifying the environmental aims of MERCOSUR
314
.  
 ften considered the normative milestone of MERC SUR’s environmental 
policy
315
, this agreement provides for cooperation in 10 points, which include 
sustainable use of natural resources, quality of life and environmental planning, 
tools for implementing environmental policies and sustainable activities. All the 
agreed points should have been achieved in compliance with the principles of 
coordination, integration, prevention, participation and costs internalization
316
. 
As for their implementation, the mechanism underscored in the Framework 
Agreement to make operative the points is – basically – the cooperation among 
Member States. According to art. 5 of the Agreement, the States must cooperate 
in the implementation of international environmental agreements, by including 
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the adoption of common policies for environmental protection, information 
exchange, natural resource management and – last but not least – the 
coordination of national positions in international forums
317
.     
As for the last point, the Member States co-ordinately – but separately – ratified a 
comprehensive array of multilateral UN-sponsored environmental international 
agreements on international trade in endangered species, ozone depletion, 
biodiversity, climate change, wetlands preservation, as well as the follow-ups of 
the Rio Conference in 1992
318
. 
A further landmark in the institutionalization of the environmental dimension in 
MERCOSUR integration process has been undertaken in 2004. With the purpose 
of implementing the above-mentioned Framework Legal Agreement,  regular-
based Summits of Specialized Meeting of Ministers of the Environment (called 
RMMAN, Reunión de Ministros de Medio Ambiente de Mercosur) have been 
established since 2004, while distinct ad hoc Working Groups have been settled 
under SGT6
319
. Up to now, they carry on meeting and deliberating on regular 
basis. As for the RMMAN in particular, it can be observed that its setting-up 
significantly changed the institutional situation and implied not only the 
existence of a political forum for articulating and coordinating environmental 
initiatives at the highest level of MERCOSUR, but also a higher instance for 
pushing the promotion of environmental actions at the highest competent level of 
the regional organization.  
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Besides, the significant steps so far undertaken by MERCOSUR in the 
institutionalization of its regional environmental governance should not directly 
lead to the uncritical and simple conclusion that MERCOSUR  is a successful 
example of regional integration through environmental policy. Indeed, various 
limits of the entire MERC SUR’s system still exist and tend to slow down the 
effectiveness of regional environmental policy. 
First, serious tensions in the area covered by MERCOSUR still take place due to 
the reckless exploitation of natural resources. The huge amount of natural 
resources is a clear element of difference if compared to the EU integration 
experience. According to Saguier, this can potentially affect the process of 
regional integration in Latin America, by causing socio-environmental conflicts 
among Member States
320
.  
Secondly, some Member States in MERCOSUR are more advanced in 
environmental protection than others: this is the case in Brazil and – in part – 
Argentina, which also count for the highest number of environmental studies and 
researches in the field of environmental policy. This gap makes particularly 
difficult to fully implement a harmonized environmental policy in different 
countries, with different economic interests at stake and different levels of 
industrial development
321
. In particular, significant inter-countries economic 
asymmetries still persist as regards structural disparities, quantifiable by different 
indicators: the size of the country, the density of population, the kinds of territory, 
the distribution of natural resources, the economic growth rate, the degrees of 
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development, the quality of democracy, the income distribution, not to mention 
the geopolitical position.
322
 
Third, the current limits have been also drawn by the attitude of national 
governments who do not find enough incentives to support a robust supranational 
action in the field of environmental protection
323
. This is largely because – as 
argued by Drnas de Clement – MERCOSUR is still an intergovernmental 
organization where Member States have not delegated any significant sovereign 
competences to supranational authorities
324
. This matter of fact stirs up one of the 
most complex challenges the MERCOSUR is going to face today: the research 
for «Harmonization without Supranationality»
325
. Opinions differ if such lack of 
supranationality in MERC SUR is due to Brazil’s powerful unbalanced presence 
smothering the smaller member States’ inclination towards a more supranational 
governance
326
 or whether no Member State would be profoundly convinced of 
the win-win outcomes possibly deriving from supranationalism
327
. As a 
consequence, without a supranational body, Member States wouldn’t have 
enough incentives to strengthen environmental protection when there is a 
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comparative advantage not to do so
328
. At present, such lack of supranational 
authorities in MERCOSUR does not help to vigorously re-launch the process of 
regional environmental integration objectives overall
329
.  
Fourth, a further element of slowing down the process of regional environmental 
integration can be traced back to the fact that the dispute settlement resolution 
mechanism of MERCOSUR seems still to be largely undeveloped for 
environmental disputes
330
. In other words, there is no such thing as a 
supranational EU Court of Justice, able to add an expanding impulse to the 
normative development of environmental policies and legislation in Member 
States. Five, taking into account what said about the importance of role and 
function of a regional Environmental Agency (see PART II), a current weak 
point of MERCOSUR is the lack of any comprehensive provision for information 
collection and full environmental impact assessment’s evaluation. More precisely, 
it is worth noticing that information on regional environmental policies is mainly 
provided by the Secretariat for Environment and Sustainable Development of 
Argentina, without an autonomous source of information and scientific 
legitimacy
331
 for MERCOSUR itself. This means that neither SGT 6 nor any 
other MERCOSUR bodies collects and disseminates data and environmental 
information about the MERCOSUR region.  
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Six, the issue of degree of effectiveness of MERCOSUR environmental policy 
implementation into Member States’ orders still remains problematic because it 
ultimately depends on each Member State’s legal capability and will to provide 
effective protection to the environment
332. What’s more, this point appears to be 
even more sharpened by the substantial lack of supranational authorities in 
MERCOSUR
333
. 
To conclude our survey on the current state of play of regional environmental 
governance in the MERCOSUR, it is also important to critically highlight the 
potentials and the limits of the external projection of the Organization in 
international multilateral forums since the Declaration of Canela in 1992, signed 
just before the beginning of the Rio Conference in 1992. Such solemn Joint 
Declaration was to issue the first real position-document of most of Latin 
American States which stressed the need for international cooperation in 
environmental issues such as protection of atmospheric protection, biodiversity, 
forests and marine environment, degradation of the land, toxic waste, climate 
change by taking into account the common but differentiated responsibilities’ 
principle and intergenerational justice
334 . Three years later, MERC SUR’s 
Member States issued the Declaration of Taranco in 1995 which expressed the 
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need to harmonize and to enforce environmental legislation, by going beyond the 
strict economic considerations provided by GATT-WTO agreement
335
.  
A similar common-based approach occurred in 2002, when the MERCOSUR 
Member States released a Joint Statement to the Latin American regional 
preparations for the UN’s World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg
336  and    more recently    in 2012 when the MERC SUR’s leaders 
discussed the sustainable development Strategy Post-Rio+20. On this occasion, 
the Presidents of MERCOSUR Countries have issued a joint declaration 
addressing sustainable development, climate change, global mercury negotiations 
and mining. In particular, the leaders of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and 
Venezuela acknowledged the outcomes of the UN Conference on Sustainable 
Development (Rio+20) and welcomed the renewal of commitment to the Rio 
Declaration, the Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. They 
have also stressed the importance of the economic, social and environmental 
pillars of sustainability, by also claiming the right of States and peoples to choose 
their own path to sustainable development. In addition to this, the leaders have 
also called for ambitious cuts in greenhouse gas emissions by industrialized 
countries, according to the principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility and the respect for “Mother Earth”337, as well as the provision of 
more financial resources for climate mitigation and adaptation and the transfer of 
clean technologies
338
. Besides, despite all these interesting self-proclaimed 
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initiatives towards a common external projection of MERCOSUR in 
international forum, it has to be noticed that MERCOSUR – contrary to ASEAN 
– does not have any status at UNFCCC Conferences of Parties, where it is neither 
a Party (such as the EU), nor a Observer Organization (such as the ASEAN)
339
. 
Such “big silence” of MERC SUR in the UNFCCC Conferences of Parties can 
be explained by two fundamental reasons: the first one is related to a certain 
tendency to personal protagonism of Latin American leaders in international 
forums. The second reason deals with the way by which Latin American 
Constitutionalism has usually treated and intended the issue of environment as 
common good. 
As for the first reason, it can be argued that the concentrated presence of strong 
political personalities in Latin America could make the research for a “single 
regional voice” in big international stages (such as the UNFCCC CoPs) 
particularly difficult.  At the same time, the strong influence of Presidents of the 
Member States may also tend to affect the course of the integration in a place 
where the arrangements on environmental issues often have a remarkable «inter-
presidential component»
340
. This is largely because the top decision-makers of 
MERCOSUR are the national Presidents
341
. As a consequence, the co-existence 
of strong political presidents doesn’t necessarily help to find common agreed 
positions
342
.   
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As for the second reason, it has been observed that the Constitutions of Latin 
American countries expressly proclaimed the principle of sustainable 
development and the right to a clean environment. In general, they declare the 
duty to protect the environment, providing that it is responsibility of the State and 
the citizens to respect this duty
343
. Nevertheless, such principle has been deemed 
more in terms of their own natural heritage rather than in global terms
344
.  It 
follows that such particularistic Latin American approach to the issue of 
environment may not match so well with the so-called «Era of Environmental 
Globalism»
345
, whose the UNFCCC Conference of Parties is deeply part of.  
Despite all these existing critical limits, it remains the fact that the countries that 
began the MERCOSUR integration process with a very sluggish level of 
environmental protection capacity (such as Paraguay, Uruguay and – partially – 
Argentina) have been able to expand this capacity quite considerably during the 
last decades. Put in other words, national environmental legislations improved in 
all the Member States under the MERCOSUR framework
346
. Surely 
MERCOSUR process of integration has not been the only driver for 
environmental improvement. Also a variety of other factors and channels – such 
as the end of authoritarian governments and the availability of international 
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funding, development banks and foreign donors
347
 – intervened and influenced 
all together the timing of environmental improvements for the States of the 
region. In doing this, the Member States have been able to increase step-by-step 
their level of domestic environmental standards during the years of economic 
integration through MERCOSUR, also by consolidating their legislations and 
even stretching out it towards more ambitious environmental targets.  
From a comparative perspective, it can be argued that there are several 
interesting elements of analogy between MERCOSUR today and the EU in 
the ’70-80. In both cases the regional cooperation in environmental policy has 
originally been proceeded as a side-product of other more explicit objectives, 
such as the creation of a common market. This is why, while trade has been the 
original driver of integration for the EU and for the MERCOSUR, the regional 
integration has – in both cases - progressively committed to a multidimensional 
cooperation on other issues, including environmental policy.  Furthermore, in 
terms of public policy’s analysis, environmental cooperation in MERC SUR 
still appears quite fragmented and characterized  by ad hoc dispersed responses 
rather than following a comprehensive, systemic, strategic environmental 
approach.  This policy-style doesn’t seem to be so different from the EU’s one at 
its beginning, when the Community’s first environmental policies in the 70’ were 
mostly focused on the immediate demands of removal of asymmetries and 
barriers to free trade, including differences in environmental regulations
348
.  At 
that time, the EEC environmental policy-style was characterized by a high degree 
of fragmented incrementalism. Against this background, there are several 
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grounds for thinking that the European Union could provide an interesting road 
map for the further institutionalization of the environmental dimension into 
MERCOSUR integration process in the near future. In broader terms, such 
developments cannot be disjoint by the general evolution of the entire integration 
process of the region. That is to say that the progressive – sometimes difficult 
and if not critical – steps which MERCOSUR has gone through during its 
institutional development have largely been reflected in the evolution of its 
environmental policy. Besides, considering its above-mentioned existing limits, 
if MERCOSUR environmental policy will follow a similar course as the EU still 
remains hard to predict. 
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PART IV: 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AS GREENING 
PLAYER OF FOREIGN POLICY. 
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1. The EU environmental «leadership by diplomacy». 
 
In terms of «leadership by diplomacy»
349
, the EU has been striving to emerge as 
green leader in International Relations with the ambition to act as global 
protagonist in the struggle to govern climate change
350
. In doing this, the EU has 
progressively tuned its environmental foreign policy, which can be analytically 
conceived as the outcome of an interplay between domestic forces (institutions 
and actors involved in environmental decision-making) and international forces, 
such as environmental changes interacting with other phenomena (for instance 
democratization and globalization)
351
.     
In order to avoid a situation in which the EU is a leader without followers, the 
Union has been engaged in deploying a vast array of different policy-tools at its 
disposal to take on global climate change leadership. They include the practice 
and institutionalisation of diffuse reciprocity
352
 and issue linkages
353
 approaches, 
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by developing a package approach that makes integrative bargaining possible
354
; 
the strengthening of EEAS’s diplomatic coordination efforts 355  to drive 
international negotiations on climate change for the post-Kyoto regime; the 
adoption of an unilateral policy having extraterritorial effects (such as the 
introduction of measures that link access to the rich and attractive EU internal 
market to certain environmental standards, matching enforcement methods and 
climate change mitigation requirements); cooperation initiatives that are directly 
targeted to transfer European green technologies and know-how towards third 
countries, so as to stimulate reforms there through financial and capacity-
building efforts (i.e. the Clean Development Mechanism provided by the Kyoto 
Protocol). 
In the light of the theoretical conceptualization about different types of leadership 
illustrated in PART I, it can be argued that while the «EU leadership by example» 
relies on the directional and symbolic types of leadership (see PART II), the «EU 
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leadership by diplomacy» mainly encompasses elements of structural and 
instrumental leadership. 
 
1.1  The EU structural leadership and the Environmental 
Conditionality. 
The EU shows a few typical elements of structural leader. As mentioned in 
PART I, the structural leader is a power-based player who uses the “carrots and 
sticks” technique to influence the others356. He leads the bargaining process by 
the constructive use of its political power stemming from material and economic 
resources. In this sense, the EU seems sometimes to behave as a structural leader 
when it comes to environmental negotiations.  
With its membership (28 Member States), its combined population (more than 
506 million people
357
) and combined GDP  (13,920,541 million euro
358
) in 2014, 
the EU has the potential strength to combine political will with a common 
negotiating position for 28 upmost industrialized economies. In addition to this, it 
can rely on 28 Foreign Offices and Environmental Ministries of the 28 Member 
States to use their longstanding diplomatic relations with third countries
359
. This 
means that – despite its lack of autonomous military power – the EU has some 
potential elements for structural leadership.  
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A first structural tool for «leadership by diplomacy» has been the so-called 
“Environmental Conditionality” 360 : a value-driven sophisticated technique of 
combination of diplomacy and coercion.  The inclusion of  "environmental 
clauses" in many trade treaties – understood as the provisions envisaged by the 
Union in order to condition the granting of preferential tariff treatments, 
commercial benefits or financial aid to the compliance by a beneficiary State for 
certain rules for the protection of the environment – takes a particularly relevant 
profile not only because the Union has started practicing it on the occasion of the 
Barcelona European Council of March 2002, but also – and above all – because 
such political choice (as normally happens for any other type of conditionality) 
seems to leave economic and commercial policy in a subordinate position with 
respect to the pursuing of another goal, functionally considered more important: 
the one of the environmental sustainability. In short, the choice to link the 
recognition of additional preferences to the compliance with international 
environmental conventions reflects the integral vision of sustainable 
development as elaborated by the European Union. In the light of such reversed 
approach, the development cannot solely focus on the pursuit of economic goals, 
but it must also be based on the protection of human rights and respect for the 
environment (social and environmental conditionality)
361
.  
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According to an environmental conditionality’s approach, many EU sector-based 
policies can actively support the EU’s environmental goals in the ongoing 
preparation of COP21 negotiation process. This is the case of EU sector-based 
policies such as the development cooperation policy,  the scientific, research, 
innovation policy and, last but not least, the EU trade policy.  
As regards development cooperation policy, the recent European Commission’s 
Communication of 25th February 2015 entitled “The Paris Protocol – A 
blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020” states that the Union 
and its Member States are already the leading providers of official development 
assistance and climate finance to developing countries. The EU delivered more 
than 9.5 billion euro for climate finance in 2013. To this end, for the period 
2014-20 it has already been agreed that at least 20% of the EU development 
assistance will have to be climate-relevant which is in the order of €14 billion 362.  
Secondly, as far as the EU scientific, research, innovation policy is concerned, 
the Communication states that the Union is intended to take better advantage of 
the fact that its research and innovation framework program Horizon 2020 is 
fully open to third countries' participation and provides financial support to less 
developed countries. The EU will promote awareness of its commitment to invest 
under this program at least 28 billion euro for climate-related actions. This will 
allow broad international collaboration to bring climate technologies to the 
markets, to educate scientists and entrepreneurs, and contributes to climate 
diplomacy goals
363
.  
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Thirdly, as for the EU trade policy, the Communication states that in its bilateral 
trade agreements the EU and its free trade partners commit to promote climate 
goals and effectively implement the UNFCCC, including through regular 
structured dialogues and cooperation on climate and trade issues
364
. An incentive 
mechanism for environmental conditionality in trade agreements is the 
Generalized Scheme of Preferences PLUS Scheme (GSP+). The GSP + has been 
introduced in 2012 and, by reforming the first GSP 2006-2015, currently 
represents the ongoing core incentive instrument through which the EU has 
offered increased market access to developing countries that have ratified and 
effectively implement conventions on environmental protection and climate 
change. Such system has been progressively tuned after the limits of the previous 
GSP and the rigidity of the Lomè Conventions
365
. The existing rules under the 
functioning of the GSP+ are contained into the Regulation 978/2012 of 20
th
 
November 2012 applying a EU scheme of generalized tariff preferences (2012-
2023) 
366
.  According to art. 9 of the Regulation, a GSP beneficiary country may 
benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive 
arrangement for sustainable development and good governance if the country has 
ratified all the relevant conventions listed in Annex VIII, Part B (Conventions 
related to the environment and to governance principles)
 367
 and the most recent 
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available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions do not 
identify a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions. 
Furthermore, the most recent structural instrument for the EU environmental 
«leadership by diplomacy» has been the application of the so-called internal 
environmental measures with extraterritorial implications
368
. More specifically, it 
is a form of unilateral policy having extraterritorial economic effects, such as the 
introduction of measures that link access to the rich and attractive EU internal 
market
369
 to certain environmental standards, matching enforcement methods and 
climate change mitigation requirements. The potential of such instrument 
consists of unilateral measures that extend the reach of EU environmental law 
even beyond EU borders, by contributing to make the EU one of the biggest 
regulator in global competition policy
370
. At present, they include legislation on 
ship recycling, inclusion of aviation emissions in the EU Emissions Trading 
System
371
, the EU legislation on sustainable bio-fuels
372
 and regulation of 
imports of timber in the European Single Market. In this sense, they can be seen 
as additional tools in the hands of European environmental leadership. From a 
third states’ perspective, it may be advantageous to join the EU high regulatory 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (1989);  the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (1992); the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (1992); the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (2000);  the Stockholm 
Convention on persistent Organic Pollutants (2001);  the Kyoto Protocol to the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1998).   
368
 See Birnie P., Boyle A., International Law and the Environment, Oxford University 
Press, 2009 
369
 According to Eurostat, the EU's trade with the rest of the world accounted for around 
20% of global exports and imports in 2014. See http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures  
370
 See Dewatripont M., Legros P., The EU Competition Policy in a Global World, in 
Telo’ M., The European Union and Global Governance, Routledge, 2009 
371
 For an introduction to the functioning of the EU Emission Trading Mechanism, see 
ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets. See also the voice «EU BUBBLE» in Park C., 
Dictionary of Environment and Conservation, Oxford University Press, 2007 
372
 See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/biofuels/sustainability_criteria_en.htm  
131 
 
standards not only to get access to the rich European internal market and to 
improve trade relations with the EU, but also because the costs of compliance are 
easier to bear with the awareness that competitors will stick to the same rules and 
will face similar costs
373
. 
 1.2 The EU instrumental leadership and the Green Diplomacy 
Network. 
When it comes to matters like the elements of instrumental leadership owned by 
the EU, a special focus has to be dedicated to the role, the organization and the 
skills of European negotiators and policy-makers, because an instrumental leader 
is the player who masters and maximizes its negotiation and diplomatic skills to 
pursue issue-linkages, to exploit diffuse-reciprocity situations, to build issue-
based coalitions in order to develop an integrative (win-win) rather than a merely 
distributive bargaining outcome
374
. In this direction, a concrete example of the 
steps taken by the European Union towards the creation of a truly environmental 
diplomatic expertise has been represented by the Green Diplomacy Network 
initiative, launched in 2003 at the end of the European Council meeting in 
Thessaloniki
375
. It has been an environmental foreign-policy initiative aimed at 
promoting the integration of environment into external relations through the 
creation of an informal network. This informal network, composed by officials 
dealing with environment and sustainable development issues in the Member 
States' Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the EU diplomatic missions, is assuming 
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an increasingly important role in enhancing the coherence, consistency and 
effectiveness of European actions in environmental issues. Their main task 
consists of outreaching and reporting the substance of climate-related exchanges 
with third countries back to the relevant EU bodies
376
. Since January 2012 this 
Network has fallen under the direction of the European External Action Service 
in order to strengthen the integration of the environment as growing issue of high 
politics in International Relations. Within the EEAS, the Green Diplomacy 
Network is intended: 1) to promote the use of the EU’s extensive diplomatic 
resources (diplomatic missions, delegations, development cooperation offices) in 
support of environmental objectives, by orchestrating outreach campaigns; 2) to 
exchange views, gather information and share experiences on how Member 
States (in particular Foreign Ministries) and the Commission are integrating 
environmental concerns into their diplomatic efforts; 3) to focus on the added 
value it can bring by supporting the development of local informal green 
diplomacy networks in third countries between EU Embassies and the 
Commission
377
. Working together, the EU Missions in third countries can gather 
intelligence on specific positions of international partners regarding emerging 
issues and feed this back to EU negotiators
378
. 
Put in other words, the Green Diplomacy Network does in the environmental 
field what the EEAS traditionally does in the field of CFSP, that is, to contribute 
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to coordinate horizontal and vertical interests, to disseminate information and to 
produce new strategic ideas
379
. 
This practice of coordination for external action can take inspiration from the 
experience the EU has already performed for its domestic policies. There, a 
prolonged dialogue throughout which Member States’ representatives operate on 
the basis of achieving consensus has often led them to not only persuade each 
other but also to convince their capitals to redefine their interests and pursue 
outcomes that are beneficial to all Member States in a win-win game
380
. In doing 
this, the EU network of national civil servants has been gradually transcended to 
become from bureaucratic committees to influential epistemic communities
381
. 
As well, it can happen that national experts participating in the EU working 
parties, ad hoc groups and committees in Brussels often feel more affiliated with 
their European counterparts than with their national colleagues from other 
departments
382
. In doing this, they have progressively developed a process of so-
called “EU socialization” 383 , that is a sense of “we-ness” emerging from 
institutionalized issue-based coordination practices between Member States’ 
representatives
384
. Besides, this specific aspect related to the 
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socialization/internalization of Europe in national identities can be more critically 
framed into the larger, still controversial ongoing debate on twofold trends 
occurring in the Union: on the one hand the “Europeanization of the national 
foreign policies” and, on the other hand, the “Diplomatization of the EU”. At 
present, we are witnessing that the Europeanization of national foreign policies is 
proceeding slower than expected, whereas diplomatization of EU 
intergovernmental institutions is far from disappearing
385
. This current trend has 
been particularly evident when dealing with urgent CFSP-related international 
challenges (Libya, Syria, Palestine, the UNSC)
 386
, while it seems to be less 
evident in other (and more consensual) fields, such as the EU environmental 
policy. Here, the above-mentioned process of socialization emerging from 
institutionalized coordination practices between Member States’ representatives 
is pressing ahead with a dynamics that Jordan defines “departmental”387, through 
an unpredictable game not too dissimilar from the one described in the Castle of 
Crossed Destinies by the Italian writer Italo Calvino
388
. More precisely, while the 
state-centric theory assumes that individual departments are simply state-
executives and have very little independence from their central States, the EU 
integration in environmental policy would tell a quite different story of “crossed 
destinies”: the Union has created a new political system in which each of the 28 
environmental departments has a common incentive to ensure that its 
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departmental interest is communicated to Brussels. So, such cross-national 
alliances of middle-ranking actors representing similar departmental agencies 
emerge, by seeking to increase their influence and willing to shape sector-based 
policies even against the wishes of other agencies in their own national 
Administrations
389
.   
All this proves that departments matter and can make a difference by framing and 
implementing key-pieces of secondary policy which fit their sector-
based/departmental interests. Such independent actions of departments can 
produce perverse processes which have capacity to escape the grasp of their 
States’ direct control390. The recurrent interactions taking place between national 
EU administrative elites in European committees or in the Council working 
groups can lead to a «cooperative trans-governmental behavior»
391
 that 
challenges the conventional state-centric theory which would see both the 
national and the European level always separated and confronted.  
As the above-mentioned process is still young, the creation of a fully “EU-
socialized” departmental community, not to mention the Green Diplomacy 
Network, still remains at early stages of a learning and  identity-building process. 
With reference to the most recent international updates, the European 
environmental diplomacy (as epistemic community in progress) in the UNFCCC 
19CoPs of Warsaw 2013 has operated in accordance with the indications 
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contained in the Conclusions of the EU Environment Council in October 2013. In 
the Conclusions of the Environment Council Meeting in Luxembourg October 
2013, the EU Council solemnly stressed a crucial point: « Responsibilities and 
capabilities are differentiated but evolve over time […]. The agreement should 
reflect those evolving realities by including a spectrum of commitments in a 
dynamic way»
392
. The new global climate agreement scheduled for December 
2015 should therefore reflect the evolution and changes of circumstances, 
including a range of tasks in a more dynamic way. These Conclusions of the EU 
Council clearly show the European Union is intended to call for a more active 
and responsible engagements (i.e. taking legally binding commitments to the 
reduction of emissions) even from the so-called Developing Countries and 
especially from the Most Advanced Developing Countries (paragraph 14 of the 
Conclusions of the Council), such as China and India. Put it differently,  a static 
interpretation of the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities 
would be unfair, as many Developing Countries are progressing rapidly
393
.   
More recently, the Environment Council Conclusions on preparations for the 
CoP20 in Lima 2014 go in the same direction when the text states that: «the 
intended nationally determined mitigation contributions (INDCs) are a way to 
operationalize the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and 
respective capabilities in a manner that takes into account evolving 
circumstances and economic realities»
394
 and that «the 2015 agreement should 
[…] provide a long-term vision of the needed transformation towards a low-
emission and climate-resilient economy, with in-built flexibility and capacity to 
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respond dynamically to evolving scientific and technological knowledge, 
circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities, and enable broad and effective 
participation»
395
. 
As regards the preparation of the last rounds of UNFCCC negotiations, the EEAS 
and the Commission services have also issued a joint reflection paper in 2013 
entitled “EU climate diplomacy for 2015 and beyond”396. This non-paper singles 
out the main challenges for the EU in playing a leading role, through its own 
climate policy but also by projecting it internationally. The non-paper also offers 
a strategic toolbox to deploy an effective EU climate diplomacy and to 
strengthen the EU’s single voice in UNFCCC fora, so as to negotiate with a 
higher degree of bargaining power, through a coordinated action by the EEAS, 
the Commission and Member States’ national diplomacies. By developing a 
strategy that combines structural, instrumental and directional elements of 
leadership, the non-paper considers and deepens three strands of climate 
diplomacy already elaborated in the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of 18
th
  
July 2011. They consist of: 1) lifting climate change as a strategic priority in 
diplomatic dialogues and initiatives at the highest level; 2) supporting to low-
emission and climate resilient development; 3) stressing the nexus between 
climate, natural resources, prosperity and security
397
. 
On such original basis, the European Commission has issued the before 
mentioned Communication of 25
th
 February 2015 entitled “The Paris Protocol – 
A blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond 2020”398 in the view of 
COP21 in Paris. This document can be considered the fundamental reference 
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point which is intended to prepare the Union for the Paris Conference in 
December 2015.  The Communication sets out a vision for a transparent and 
dynamic legally binding agreement, containing fair and ambitious commitments 
from all Parties based on evolving global economic and geopolitical 
circumstances. In aggregate, these commitments - based on scientific evidence - 
should put the world on track to reduce global emissions by at least 60% below 
2010 levels by 2050
399
.  
In particular, the Communication proposes that the 2015 Agreement should be in 
the form of a Protocol under the UNFCCC. Major economies, in particular the 
EU, China and the US, should show political leadership by joining the Protocol 
as early as possible. It should enter into force as soon as countries with a 
collective total of 80% of current global emissions have ratified it. Under the new 
Protocol, climate finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity 
building should promote universal participation and facilitate the efficient and 
effective implementation of strategies to reduce emissions and adapt to the 
adverse effects of climate change
400
. 
As for the objectives to deliver, the Communication singles out that the Paris 
Protocol should: 1) secure ambitious reductions of emissions by specifying that 
the long term goal should be to reduce global emissions by at least 60% below 
2010 levels by 2050; 2) set out clear, specific, ambitious and fair legally binding 
mitigation commitments that put the world on track towards achieving the below 
2°C objective; 3) ensure dynamism by providing for a global review, to be 
conducted every five years, to strengthen the ambition of these mitigation 
commitments consistent with the latest science; 4) strengthen transparency and 
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accountability in order to be able to assess whether emissions reduction targets 
and related commitments have been met; 5) establish a common set of rules and 
procedures for annual reporting and regular verification and international expert 
reviews of emission inventories; 6) encourage climate-resilient sustainable 
development by promoting international cooperation and supporting policies that 
decrease vulnerability and improve countries' capacity to adapt to the impacts of 
climate change; 7) promote efficient and effective implementation and 
cooperation by encouraging policies that mobilize substantial, transparent and 
predictable public and private sector investment in low-emission climate-resilient 
development
401
.   As for the level and sector-playing field of the Protocol, the 
Communication specifies that it should have a broad geographical coverage, a 
comprehensive coverage of sectors and emissions and a robust mitigation 
commitment. 
In order to ensure dynamism to the Paris Protocol, the Communication proposes 
a process, applicable to all Parties, to regularly review and strengthen mitigation 
commitments, consistent with the Protocol's long term goal. If Parties' collective 
efforts fall short of what is necessary, the process should encourage Parties to 
raise the level of ambition of existing commitments and formulate sufficiently 
ambitious commitments in subsequent target periods. Starting in 2020, the 
review should be repeated every five years and facilitate transparency, clarity and 
understanding of mitigation commitments in light of their contribution to the 
below 2°C objective
402
. The review should invite Parties to explain progress on 
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their mitigation commitments and why they think their actions have been fair and 
ambitious
403
.  
In addition to this, the Communication insists on a policy integration’s 
perspective and highlights how other EU policies such as, trade, scientific 
research, innovation and technological cooperation, economic and development 
cooperation, disaster risk reduction and environment could reinforce the EU’s 
international climate policy. 
In conclusion, the same Communication is also complemented by a Climate 
Diplomacy Action Plan jointly developed by the European External Action 
Service and the Commission.  The Action Plan has been endorsed at the Council 
of Foreign Affairs in January 2015 and it is aimed at scaling up EU outreach and 
building alliances with ambitious international partners in the view of the Paris 
conference. 
The Climate Diplomacy Action Plan makes the promotion of ambitious global 
climate action a central strategic priority in EU political dialogues, including at 
G7 and G20 meetings and the UN General Assembly. It also supports low-
emission and climate and disaster resilient development through EU development 
cooperation. Finally, it is intended to link climate change with its potential long-
term consequences, including security challenges
404
.   
The success of the EU in the Paris Conference will depend on a number of 
factors which include: the extent to which other countries are willing to commit 
to meaningful emission reduction targets in the time of economic crisis, the EU’s 
capability to cut greenhouse emissions at a low cost and its ability to provide 
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resources for adaptation and technology transfer to developing countries
405
. The 
EU performance will also be influenced by the way the Union organizes itself 
within the dynamic, multilateral, complex framework of the so-called “Climate 
diplomacy”.   
 
2. Climate Diplomacy in action: States and NGOs towards the 
Paris Conference 2015. 
Broadly speaking, Climate Diplomacy is a sub-branch of the environmental 
diplomacy, defined as a «system of complex interactions and procedures by 
which global environmental understandings are formulated, ratified and 
implemented»
406
. More recently, Climate Diplomacy has come to be thought of 
as “a system”, to be intended in a dynamic and multifaceted way, where four 
political processes are involved: issue-definition, fact-finding, bargaining and, 
finally, regime-strengthening
407
.  
Besides, such diplomatic negotiations are governed by predictable sets of actors 
engaged in a relatively structured process, constrained by formal and informal 
rules and customs. As for the main players involved in the environmental treaty-
making system, the list includes the Environment Ministers of the Parties, 
Diplomats, seconded national experts, the Secretariat, UN agency servants, 
UNEP and UNDP experts, unofficial or non-state interest groups (including 
environmental NGOs, Business Associations and members of the Scientific 
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Community). The growth and inclusiveness of NGOs, usually excluded from 
conventional interstate diplomacy, make this system an example of the so-called 
praxis of «sustainable diplomacy»
408
, which aims at meeting the need to convert 
ecological discourse into diplomatic policy, so as to create a more intimate and 
profound understanding of the lives, beliefs and concerns of people on the 
ground
409
. Such praxis is rooted in the pledge to be in open dialogue with 
multiple conversation partners and actors
410
. Within this system, these actors 
have become significant entities with skills and resources to deploy in the 
process of global environmental cooperation
411
. Thanks to the expansion of new 
international political opportunities (whose two main components have been the 
increase of resource mobilization and political access)
412
, nowadays most of  
NGOs can meet in some formal and informal sessions to discuss, to exchange 
views, to supply daily bulletins of negotiation rounds, to engage in parallel fora,  
to formulate proposals and to negotiate issues related to climate technical issues. 
To do this, NGOs have progressively developed a range of mechanism and 
procedures to communicate their positions, to coordinate their action and clarify 
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their role vis-à-vis the States
413
.  It is a dynamic interaction that sees the States 
firmly remained at the «driver’s seat»  and the NGOs as «passengers» so far414.  
All this system of multifaceted interactions among these groups of actors is 
guided by formal rules, directive principles, informal practices and soft law
415
 
that the United Nations has developed over several decades
416
. Within such large 
operational framework, the cross-cutting nature of climate as policy-issue has 
rapidly engendered multidimensional interactions and strategic linkages
417
 with 
other areas and other institutions which can often go beyond the climate-issue as 
such. As observed by Jinnah, nowadays it is rather difficult to find an 
international organizations, governmental or non-governmental agency, national 
or multinational firm, university, foundation, church that does not have a climate-
relevant goal or focus
418
. With the participation of 188 States Parties of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, each UNFCCC CoP  accounts for a 
world forum of approximately 9,000 participants, including officials from around 
3,000 to 5,000 representatives of Governments, organs and UN agencies up to 
over 1,200 NGOs and IGOs’ observers now accredited to attend the Plenary of 
the Conferences
419 . Put in Jinnah’s words, it seems that «everyone, from 
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McDonald’s to the Vatican, is jumping on the proverbial climate change 
bandwagon»
420
. Such trend definitely shows that global climate politics has risen 
in political importance by leading newspaper headlines across the world and by 
infusing diplomatic discussions on a specific topic, that is climate, which has 
required the above-mentioned need to create a specialized technical sub-branch 
of diplomacy, precisely called Climate Diplomacy. 
However, the current process of climate negotiations seems to be «in a limbo»
421
. 
What is more, such limbo directly affects the functioning of the global climate 
governance at UN level.  According to David Held, the limits of the climate 
governance would be nothing but the most evident symptom of a general failure 
of global governance
422
. Put in other words, the insufficient progress so far made 
in generating «a sound and effective framework for managing global climate 
change would be one of the most serious indicators of the challenges facing the 
multilateral order»
423
. Held is right in arguing the partial failure of the current 
global climate governance in achieving immediate successful results. This 
observation is plain, but it is also important to not jump to any hurried 
pessimistic conclusions. What is crucial here is the call for a strong green leader 
able to overcome this “limbo”. In this sense, the further question to ask is why 
the EU has been struggling so hard in order to promote its leadership in climate 
change negotiations? This leadership has been constantly tested and 
                                                          
420
 Jinnah S. Climate Change Bandwagoning: The Impacts of Strategic Linkages on 
Regime Design, Maintenance and Death, Global Environmental Politics, 11,3 MIT, 
August 2011 
421
 Gupta J., Climate Change and Developing Countries: From Leadership to Liability, 
in Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014 
422
 Held D., Climate Change, Democracy and Global Governance: Some Questions, in 
Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014 
423
 Held D., Climate Change, Democracy and Global Governance: Some Questions, in 
Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014 
145 
 
overstretched with different outcomes time by time: from Kyoto in 1997 to Bali 
in 2007, when the Climate Chance Conference agreed a new deal paving the way 
for a new agreement after 2012 (the expiry date of the Kyoto regime), up to 
Copenhagen in 2009, when the final deal recognized the need to limit global 
temperature rise to 2°C, without envisaging any legally binding commitments 
and the high parties were only asked to submit voluntary reduction targets on the 
basis of the appendix of the accord
424
. Against this various historical background, 
which are the political and institutional factors that currently limit the EU 
influence in leading the process towards a climate change global agreement in 
2015?  
 
3. Political and institutional factors that currently limit the EU 
influence in leading the process towards a climate change 
global agreement. 
There are several possible explanatory factors which account for the EU’s 
(under)performance in the course of the last twenty years of climate negotiations. 
They include: the presence of a credibility-gap; the EU’s substantial lack of a 
“muscled” hard power; the structural complexity for reaching a global agreement; 
the behavior of the other players; the EU complex institutional architecture; the 
EU problematic strategic planning; the so-called phenomenon of the “EU bunker” 
mentality; and, last but not least, the persistent difference in interpreting the 
principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility between Developed 
Countries and Developing Countries.    
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- First of all, there still is a credibility-gap425 of a self-proclaimed leader (the 
EU) that, in its turn, comes from a capability-expectations gap
426
. This aspect 
is not just a matter of perception, but it becomes particularly relevant if we 
think that – as observed by Underdal – negotiations is not only a decision-
making process, it is also an unofficial game of performance and reputation
427
. 
If it is true that the Union has gained significantly in stature and international 
recognition as a «central protagonist in the climate regime saga»
428
, it is also 
important to avoid the risk of a «self-inflicted rhetorical trap»
429
. This means 
that if we carry on raising overly excessive expectations on the EU as 
«champion of multilateralism, transnationalism, democracy and 
cooperation»
430
, the EU will be inevitably doomed to failure and 
disappointment. In this way, such capability-expectations gap will be always 
unrealistic to fill. On the contrary, the EU should be first analyzed on its own 
merit rather than as it ought to be according to abstract patterns from the past 
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or determinist approaches to its future
431
. In our work this important 
pragmatic re-conceptualization has also been applied to the EU 
environmental foreign policy.  Indeed, studying such re-conceptualization 
does not mean to take a strict normative political stance on environmental 
issues, but rather to understand and explain the political dynamics at stake, 
without being cynical nor fatalistic, but simply trying to investigate the 
circumstances and implications that allow the EU to better achieve its 
political objectives. By adopting this perspective, some argue that the EU is 
much more of an actor in climate policy than it is in other areas, notably the 
CFSP. According to them, the EU as environmental policy actor has been a 
great deal more successful than the EU as a foreign policy actor under the 
CFSP
432
. Despite the persisting existence of a “capability-expectations gap” 
in climate domain, it would be nevertheless difficult to deny the distinct role 
of the EU during climate negotiations
433
.  This been said, the EU leadership 
has often continued to be perceived among the other negotiators to be strong 
in rhetoric and weak in action
 434
. Against this background, a further element 
can be added in our analysis: the fact that the official documents of the EU 
Institutions so frequently and explicitly make reference to the European 
leadership in climate negotiations might well have other aims apart from the 
external one of promoting an international climate regime: the rhetoric of the 
EU leadership is not only “ a trap”, but it might be done for internal political 
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reasons such as to increase the democratic legitimacy of the Union, by 
showing the European voters that the Union is actively doing its best as 
united leader on the international political scene
435
.   
- According to the realist approach, a possible answer to the EU 
(under)performance during the UNFCCC negotiations could consist of the 
fact that the EU lacks “hard power”. So that, it would be unable to provide a 
strong structural leadership in international climate change politics. In other 
words, the EU’s overreliance on soft, normative, civilian power would be 
insufficient to persuade powerful countries, such as US, China and India to 
follow the EU commitment
436
. On the contrary, it is a slightly different story 
with weaker Parties (most of African and Caribbean Countries). In their eyes, 
the EU seems to be particularly strong by the virtue of its economic weight. 
Thanks to this weight, the Union can successfully adopt a more 
uncompromising stand in front of smaller countries, in a tactics that could be 
summarized under the expressions “There are no free lunches” or “We have 
cooked up a deal: take it or leave it”437. But – of course – such tactics cannot 
work with economic giants, such as US, China, India, Brazil
438
.    
- Another factor that currently limits the EU influence in leading the process 
towards a climate change global agreement relates to the inherent nature of 
the challenge at stake: here we are talking about “tuning/conciliating the 
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world”439.  It is a challenge without historical parallel. As noted by Morgera, 
the rounds of negotiations on climate change have become the most complex 
form of international cooperation of our times
440
. It is dizzyingly complex 
both in terms of content and in terms of procedure. In terms of content, 
climate policy is a long-term policy that has to be undertaken in the context 
of sustainable development
441
. The issue itself is serious and complex 
because global climate change is the main challenge humanity shall face in 
the 21
st
 century and beyond
442
. Despite this, we still lack not just robust 
institutions to confront it, but also robust theories to understand it
443
. Such 
substantial lack of valid and robust theories is also due to the fact that the 
politics of global environmental governance is always evolving and all the 
tools and methods to understand it need to evolve with it
444
. One of the other 
structural factors which tend to increase the complexity of the diplomatic 
negotiations on climate is the heterogeneity of the States involved in such 
mega decision-making process, as well as a different outcome of the cost-
benefit analysis carried out by each State (see PART I).  In terms of procedure, 
the process appears to be particularly complex because, as pointed out by 
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Depledge, when it comes to decision-making, the UNFCCC is indeed a rather 
“odd bird” in the UN family445. Indeed, the UNFCCC, as central forum for 
the organization of global climate governance, is an independent treaty body 
which has yet to adopt clear and shared rules of procedure with the respect of 
the functioning of the vote. This means that, without formal voting 
procedures, all decisions – to be adopted – require, if not unanimous 
agreement, at least consensus
446
.  
- In the case of international environmental diplomacy, the EU plays both as a 
single actor and as a group of 28 sovereign states represented by the Rotating 
Council Presidency
447
. In the light of a combination of legal and practical 
modus operandi, while the Commission is in charge of the EU negotiation 
pursuant to art. 218 TFEU, the Rotating Presidency of the Union is 
responsible for coordinating the Member States and finally presenting a 
common EU position. In the view of the climate change international 
negotiation rounds, common EU position has been agreed in advance by the 
Member States, with the participation of the Commission
448
. Indeed, while 
for a sovereign State coordination is the process whereby officials from 
different departments meet to cooperate on a given issue, for the EU the 
exercise is much more articulated because it means to involve officials from 
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28 departments of 28 different governments, not mention the DGs (at least 
two) of the European Commission
449
. In the procedural sequence, the 
proposal for a negotiating mandate or a common platform in the view of a 
UNFCCC Conference is first discussed in the competent Council Working 
Group (the WPIEI, the Working Party on International Environmental Issues), 
then in Coreper I and finally in the Environmental EU Council of Ministers. 
If this description seems to perfectly work on paper in a static framework, the 
situation can dramatically change in a more dynamic context, that is, when 
UNFCCC negotiations have already started and are fully under way. Here it 
comes what has been called the «Herculean problem of co-ordination”»450, 
which means to accommodate and coordinate sub-meetings within a 
negotiation, not to mention the tendency of some Member States to defy EU 
Council Rotating Presidency leadership during the negotiation and to cut 
deals with other Parties
451
. For instance, this had been the case of CoP6 when 
United Kingdom tried to by-pass the French Presidency and to build a direct 
line with the US at the Hague Climate Change Conference in 2000
452
. This 
kind of difficulties of coordination among Member States often produces a 
lack of the necessary flexibility, which is a fundamental component for a 
successful international negotiation. In such dynamic context, all upcoming 
issues during the climate negotiations have to be previously discussed into 
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the intra-EU coordination and can be blocked by any Member State, by 
limiting the EU’s overall ability to react swiftly in the negotiation453. This 
complication facing the EU during the course of international climate change 
negotiations is known as the “EU bunker” phenomenon454, occurring when 
any kind of upcoming change of position and new proposals by other 
international actors during the negotiations finishes up requiring new further 
internal consultations within the EU, so as to be a major source of delay and 
frustration with endless re-coordination meetings and the inflexibility of the 
original Council Mandate
455
. So it happens that, while the crucial UNFCCC 
core-negotiation begins and the final decision is close to be taken, the EU 28 
Environmental Ministers are still presumably trying to re-establish a common 
position in another room
456
: so that, the EU remains locked in its bunker, too 
busy and preoccupied for its internal coordination
457
.  
On the one hand, the EU bunker has a strategic benefit for the EU, because it 
allow the EU negotiators to have a “on-the-spot coordination meeting” with a 
debriefing on the overall developments in the various negotiations groups, 
multiple all-night sessions and high-level huddles
458
, to exchange, to share  
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and to collect information coming from the actors of 28 Member States about 
the state of play of international negotiations, that otherwise it could not be 
fully monitored because most of the processes during the CoPs happen 
simultaneously and no Member State would be able to follow everything
459
. 
On the other hand, the amount of time and diplomatic resources that is 
required for these intra-bloc negotiations often means that the Union is 
conducting «a conference within the conference»
460
. The new position to take 
by the EU negotiator has to be updated throughout this “re-coordination 
meeting” within the EU bunker on the basis of the reactions of the Member 
States (who usually use the EU bunker also to operate an ad locum state-
control function on the EU negotiators
461
) and on the basis of the 
developments at international level
462
. So, new instructions to the EU 
negotiator will follow, by taking four main possible forms: 1) the discussion 
of an issue without an outcome on paper; 2) a bulleted list with elements that 
can be used in negotiations and from which the EU negotiator can choose the 
elements he wants to use at international level; 3) the preparation of a paper 
with speaking points and official statements for intervention during the 
international negotiation; 4) a structured proposal for an article that the EU 
would like to see filled in the final Declarations of the CoPs or, even better, 
in the final juridical environmental agreement
463
.  The phenomenon of EU 
bunker, which often opts for the quicker of the above mentioned four 
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solutions, has happened in several occasions, such as the final striking night 
on 10
th
 - 11
th
 December 1997 in Kyoto
464
, the CoP6 of The Hague in 2000
465
 
and the CoP15 of Copenhagen in 2009
466
: in all these crucial circumstances, 
as a consequence of the EU bunker mentality, the UNFCCC final decisions 
were going to be taken while the European Environment’s Ministers were 
still debating and trying to coordinate their common position in another room. 
Summing up, such complex, endless exercise of EU intra-bloc coordination 
which follows a process of re-negotiation is often time-consuming and delays 
prompt action. 
- Furthermore, over the last ten years, the risk of the EU bunker phenomenon 
has been amplified by the progressive enlargement of the Union up to 28 
Member States, by increasing the costs and the time of environmental 
decision-making within the EU. The ex - Eastern bloc Member States 
(Poland in particular) tend to make more difficult for the Union to develop 
and maintain a coherent, ambitious leadership position in international 
environmental politics
467
. As a consequence, this increased heterogeneity is 
having a quite significant impact upon preference formation within the EU
468
. 
If there is a consolidated awareness among Member States that the EU 
coordination and external representation is an enabling factor for unity, the 
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fact that all EU Member States will finally defend and agree upon a common 
position has not to be taken always for granted
469
.  
- Sometimes, the EU seems to be still ill-equipped to offer political leadership 
because decision-making powers are dispersed among a wide range of actors 
including EU Institutions (the Commission) and Member States (the Rotating 
Presidency)
470
. It has been observed that the latter often focuses too much on 
itself and runs the risk to consider leadership as an end in itself, so as to 
excessively insist on too progressive and overly ambitious proposals of CO2 
reduction targets that other international partners would finish up considering 
as “not serious” because completely out of reality471. It is plausible to think 
that the Rotating Presidency doesn’t tend to take into account diffuse 
reciprocity
472
: the Member State under Presidency would just want an 
immediate success to collect at the end of its six-months term, without 
reflecting too much about the afterwards
473
.  
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- Among the other factors that can influence the EU performance in 
international negotiations there are: the action of issue-specific power such as 
commercial interests
474
, the strong will and personal authority of political 
leaders, not to mention the overall context of the negotiating environment
475
. 
In short, it is a situation dealing with the overlapping coexistence of 
numerous cross-setting, intertwining factors that, if taken together, contribute 
to increase the level of complexity of the entire open-ended negotiation 
process. The final outcome of the EU performance in UN climate talks is also 
difficult to predict and to calculate because whether the EU is or not effective 
in environmental negotiations is very much influenced by the behavior of its 
negotiating non-EU partners and by the perceptions of the other players who 
are involved
476
 - including the external perceptions they have on the EU as 
global player
477
. That is to say that the external context still remains a largely 
independent variable. In this context, the recent re-engagement of the U.S. – 
as announced by Barack Obama on August 3
rd
 2015 with the launch of the 
so-called Clean Power Plan 
478
 setting achievable standards to reduce CO2 
emissions by 32% from 2005 levels by 2030 – has to be welcome as a  
positive signal at the time of writing.  
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- Finally, over the last ten years of UN climate negotiations, the outstanding 
disagreement that still remains to be fully resolved among the UNFCCC 
Parties lies in the different interpretation each one gives to the principle of 
Common but Differentiated Responsibility (see PART I): in particular, it 
deals with the post-colonial approach by which many big developing 
countries’ governments continue to read and apply this principle on climate.  
According to such postcolonial critics raised by most of Developing 
Countries led in particular by India, environmentalism would be “something 
for the rich”: it is distinctly a preoccupation for Western wealthy people479. It 
would be climbing up in the EU and US middle classes’ hierarchy pyramid of 
needs and values inherently linked to culturally-specific visions of individual 
and collective responsibility.  Under the theoretical framework of post-
colonialism, most of developing countries have affirmed two fundamental 
statements: first, the recognition of the different historical responsibility for 
causing climate change; secondly, the call for differing responsibility to 
address the problem of climate change, according to a per-capita equity 
calculation. Geographically speaking, such postcolonial perspective on 
environmental politics is prominently focused on viewing the reality 
(including climate change) from the “Periphery”. As a consequence,  
postcolonial studies tend to adopt a geographically and historically limited 
local vision rather than a universal perception of the problem. While the 
Western approach to environmental justice maintains a comprehensive 
theoretical universalism, postcolonialism has often run the risk to plunge into 
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a «militant particularism»
480
 . Unsurprisingly, such radical result is not but 
the consequence of a strong anti-Eurocentrism and an emphasis on cultural 
localism as applied to environmental justice. In this sense, it can be argued 
that both of these postcolonial tenets indirectly imply a cultural rejection of 
universalism and that such lack of universal consciousness is probably also 
one of the main explaining factors of the current policy gridlock in climate 
change negotiations
481
. 
The last controversial element of emphasis used by post-colonialism in 
approaching environmental politics is the importance given to the so-called 
ecological debt in charge of the North. It recalls the classical postcolonial 
arguments of justice in the form of reparations. More precisely, claims for 
reparations would be the effective consequence of the postcolonial argument, 
on the basis of the past historical injustices – here not only linked to slavery, 
racial oppression, mass human rights violations
482
 – but also to exploitation  
of natural resources by the “Europeans” and the environmental degradation 
due to the Western long-standing industrialization’s process. Here, the 
underlying binary logics of Colonizer/Colonized, Victim/Perpetrator, 
Polluter/Polluted seems to remain broadly the same, without any possible 
pacific way-out solution if the past colonizer and past colonized, the past 
victim and the past perpetrator, the past polluter and the past polluted do not 
start growing a shared feeling of collective consciousness. In the light of the 
most recent outcomes of the UN Climate change conferences, such feeling of 
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collective consciousness still seems to be a long way off. The postcolonial 
approach to the issue of climate change possesses the traits of what it can be 
called an “antagonist ideology”. It has started by questioning the objectivism 
of the IPCC Working Group Assessment Reports on Climate Change since 
the 1990s. The reports have been seen as a product entirely made by 
individuals and governments of the West. In particular Indian delegates saw 
it as the agenda reflection of Northern de-industrializing countries without 
paying any attention to the interests and concerns of the South
483
. Again, 
postcolonial thinkers have denounced the so-called «highly partisan’s  ne-
Worldism» inherent in Western prescriptions largely inspired by the 
outcomes of the Brundtland Report in 1987. One of the most contemptuous 
rhetorical question posed by postcolonial authors has been: «Whose future 
generations are you seeking to protect, the Western World’s one or the Third 
World’s?»484 . As well, also environmental cornerstone’s masterpieces such 
as The limits to growth and The Tragedy of the Commons
485
 in the 1970s had 
been originally met with strong suspicious skepticism from Third World 
intellectual elites: they saw those discourses as masked vehicles for neo-
colonialism.  In this context, a leading role in applying a post-colonial 
approach in UN climate talks has been so far particularly played by India. 
During the last UN Conference of Parties in Lima 2014, India has still kept a 
firm official position around the link between responsibility, solidarity, 
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financial support and technology transfer from the North to the South.  Over 
time, India has built its position around a particular interpretation of the 
principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility, by emphasizing no 
emission targets for developing countries. Nearly twenty-five years later, the 
Indian stance continues to insist on the argument of the historical 
responsibility for emissions, by arguing for equity between nations in a 
historical perspective grounded on per-capita emissions.  According to 
Indian postcolonial stances, the North would have an ecological debt towards 
the South
486
.  Western countries should entirely bear the burden of mitigation, 
in addition to offering financial assistance and technological transfer for 
Developing Countries. As a consequence, India has refused any legally 
binding commitments to contribute to reduce global warming, while claiming 
for the right to any remaining «atmospheric space»
487
.  
Among the several criticisms raised by most of Developing Countries during 
the UN Climate Chance Conferences, the Indian delegation has also 
contested the formula of Pactum de contrahendo for 2015.  Developing 
Countries (including India) would have been asked to sign an agreement in a 
“blind-sight”, without knowing yet the legal content of the climate global 
agreement that will be signed in December 2015 in Paris. This is also why the 
Indian Minister of Environment and Forests, Jayanthi Natarajan, was very 
clear in her National Statement in Durban 2011: «I am asked to sign a blank 
cheque and to put the quality of life of 1.2 billion Indians in danger, without 
even knowing what's in the roadmap. And I wonder if this is not an agenda 
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that moves the weight of actions on those who cannot be held responsible for 
global warming»
488
. 
Political declarations and national statements apart, a more analytical 
exercise of conceptualization can now be done in assessing climate politics 
and investigating  the position of Developing Countries. In particular, Dubash 
has formulated an interesting scheme of the three Indian diplomatic strategies 
on climate change, each one corresponding to a proper political reading, a 
philosophic demand, a domestic political agenda, a international strategy and 
catch-phrase slogans. 
 
 Growth first 
stonewallers 
Progressive 
Realists 
Progressive 
Internationalists 
Political reading Geopolitical 
threat 
India as excuse – 
Fatalism 
India as excuse – 
Cooperation 
Philosophic 
Demand 
Equity Equity Equity + climate 
effectiveness 
Domestic Agenda Growth first Co-benefits Co-benefits 
International 
Strategy 
Stonewall 
commitments 
Focus at home, 
Delink globally 
Link domestic and 
global 
Slogans It’s our turn! It’s an unfair 
world! 
Seize the moment! 
 
Source: Dubash, N. K., Toward a progressive Indian and global climate politics, Centre for Policy 
Research, 2009 
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Until now India has adopted a Growth First/Stonewallers approach, largely 
inspired by postcolonial tenets
489
.  In doing that, it has allowed climate talks to 
become a springboard for a reinvigorated North-South agenda along the lines of 
earlier unsuccessful claims for the past New International Economic Order of the 
1970s
490
.  
To conclude this point, it is difficult to predict the future behavior of India and 
other big Developing Countries in the next UNFCCC CoPs in Paris.  Besides, it 
is likely that a persistent stonewaller position will not be a “sustainable” strategy 
in the long run, given their high vulnerability and exposure to climate change. 
Even economically speaking, it has been estimated that India, like other 
Developing Countries, may lose up to 1.7% of its GDP if the annual mean 
temperature rises by one degree Celsius compared to pre-industrialization level, 
hitting the poor the most
491
. What is worse, the last IPCC's Fifth Assessment 
Report on Climate Change
492
 has warned that the growing effects of climate 
change will produce severe stress on water resources and food-grain production 
in the future, by increasing the risk of armed conflict among India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and China
493
. Against this background, ultimately it all comes down 
to the research of a pragmatic and mutually advantageous application of the 
principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility which, in its turn, 
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underlies an open-ended classical question of international political economy: 
“Who should pay?”494   
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Conclusions and Perspectives. 
 
Now, always keeping this ultimate open, vexed question in mind (Who should 
pay?), some conclusive remarks can be formulated: here, they will be presented 
as fourteen points in the view and in preparation of the Paris Conference in 
December 2015. 
1. A truly global climate agreement will require the active participation of the 
Developing Countries that will result in the commitment of emissions reduction. 
Such active participation would offer two immediate advantages: 
• Active participation would actually share the responsibility of countries 
whose most recent levels of development and economic growth can no 
longer be classified under the category of “developing countries”495. In 
other words, as emphasized at paragraph 12 of the Conclusions of the EU 
Environment Council of October 2014, «the principle of common but 
                                                          
495
 The issue of an objective categorization of countries for differentiation still remains 
open because it lacks a clear definition of developed country and developing country. 
The term “developing countries”, functional for identification of the legal regime to be 
applied to a country, is not at all specified by the UNFCCC nor by the Kyoto Protocol. 
Although it is well established in international practice that membership in the OECD 
would make a country among those in the Group of developed countries, that criterion 
was not accepted in the compilation of Annex I of the framework Convention on 
climate change (1992). From this point of view, the lesson of the 1987 Montreal 
Protocol is a good example to follow. Categories and lists in force in the Convention 
and the Kyoto Protocol do not already reflect the change in economic conditions that 
have taken place in many developing countries. Such adjustment and updating 
requirements with respect to changed international realities have no longer been 
reflected in Doha, where it left the previous classification scheme, without the 
introduction of new and more objective criteria – for example based on the GDP growth 
rate and mix of criteria and indicators – that could lead to a new and more 
comprehensive categorization of countries (such as India and China) whose impetuous 
economic growth level no longer seems neither to reflect nor to justify their belonging 
to the category of developing countries – parties outside Annex I of the UNFCCC. See 
Biniaz S., Common but Differentiated Responsibility, Remarks, 96, American Society of 
International Law Proceedings, 2002 
165 
 
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities have to be 
operationalized in a manner that takes into account evolving 
circumstances and economic realities
496
. So, the agreement should 
therefore be able to reflect these changing realities. 
• An active participation with a universal membership would put an end to 
the widespread phenomenon of so-called carbon leakage
497
, as a result of 
the way the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility has 
been applied so far
498
. 
2. The principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities reflects how 
international law is gradually adapting to the challenges of new realities that arise 
before the international community as a whole. A peaceful, balanced and integral 
reading of the principle will require to act on two-side complementary fronts: a 
call for more cooperation by Developing Countries and a call for greater 
solidarity by the Developed Countries. 
3. A commensurate body of international political literature has formulated 
several proposals in the view of a global climate agreement. Three of them will 
be remarked  here as follows: 
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• Proposal “à la Montréal”. It proposes to apply the formula already proven 
to the Montreal Protocol to the international climate regime: the so-called 
“grace period”, after which it will be required to Developing Countries to be 
fully bound in accordance with emission reduction obligations. The temporal 
deferral of commitments for Developed Countries could give them a separate 
and active status. In the light of the success of Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer of 1987, such device could be 
inserted into 2015 global climate agreement: this would allow, on the one 
hand, to protect Developing Countries from the likely risk to see their 
economic growth rates cliff suddenly down due to an immediate imposition 
of emissions cuts, and on the other hand, it would commit Developing 
Countries to take serious constraints by reducing emissions of gases
499
. 
• Halvorssen Proposal 500 . It introduces a tertium genus, a third category 
between developed countries and developing countries: the one of the great 
emerging countries (BRICS), providing for the latter a differentiated regime 
in the sense of taking binding obligations to reduce emissions, but 
accompanied the establishment of a specific ad hoc Fund for assistance. Such 
mechanism could improve large polluters today (such as China and India)’s 
environmental performance.  
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• Weisslitz Proposal501. It deals with drawing a new regime of international 
adjustment based on a formula that incorporates both differential and absolute 
standards. According to this scheme, the absolute/uniform standard should 
consist of a regime of emission reduction obligations. This would be unique 
and equal for all countries (both developed and developing countries). The 
size of differentiation would depend on the availability of developed 
countries to strengthen their channels of financial assistance and technology 
transfer to developing countries. A bigger engagement of developed countries 
to cooperate on financial front would lead greater initial cost, but this could 
be accepted (and, in the medium to long term, offset) thanks to the increased 
legitimacy of a system whereby developing countries fairly accept to reduce 
emissions of gases and, at the same time, developed countries commit to 
reduce the phenomena of so-called environmental dumping practices or 
relocation of an industry to other countries because of laxer environmental 
policies. 
4. An truly active and comprehensive participation inspired by a balanced and 
integral interpretation of the principle of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibility could represent an opportunity for a new configuration of the 
cooperative relationship between the North and the South of the world within a 
governance of mankind's common challenges (such as climate change), founded 
on shared rules more and more politically empowered. 
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5. However, a matter of fact exists: the progresses made so far in reducing 
emissions of greenhouse gases at global level have been very low. The theory of 
multilateral cooperation has explained the reasons of the negotiating gridlocks - 
first of all to Copenhagen in 2009
502
 – by using the interaction of factors 
specifically related to the case of climate: a) the mutual benefits to be derived 
from the majority of players; b) benefits must arrive on time and this is quickly 
enough to justify the choices of Governments; c) internal costs required focus in 
the short term, while the benefits can be seen here only in the medium-long run. 
And it is clear that no Government is interested in working for the next 
government who will replace it
503
. That is to say that immediate cuts in 
greenhouse gas emissions are not on the political cards, domestically or 
internationally
504
. In addition to those micro-economics reasons, there are also 
troubles in overcoming the international deadlock created by the negotiating 
technique of the so-called “I will if you will” position of the United States, China 
and India during the last UNFCCC rounds. Especially in the light of these 
obstacles, the rise of more limited participation initiatives have soundly shown 
that the ideal aspiration for universal membership is no longer to be considered 
as «something sacrosanct»
505
. 
6. The increasing gap between slowness in the UNFCCC decision-making 
process and the request for intervention by the scientific data contained in the 
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Fifth IPCC 2013 Report imposes a more general effort for rethinking the best 
operational levels of intervention in order to address the challenges of climate 
change as quickly and effectively as possible. In this work, the horizon of 
investigation deals with the “politics of scale”, as selective method of framing 
and conceptualizing reality
506
. In this sense, while the «minilateral»
507
 scheme of 
the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC forum are still the center of global climate 
governance, it is important to recognize that the issue of the climate has also 
become subject of increasing debate into a variety of other political arenas such 
as Regional Organizations
508
, located midway between the national level and the 
global level represented by the United Nations system. 
7. Regional Organizations (such as the EU, Asean, Mercosur) are pieces of the 
composite and colorful mosaic that is the multilevel governance. At the same 
time,  they represent an interesting laboratory for environmental governance from 
which to start searching new and temporally more effective answers than those 
already experienced at global level
509
. As it often happens in international 
politics, the absence of a satisfactory global institutions tend to give rise to the 
development of regional structures
510
. The adoption of a regional solution made 
by Regional Organizations composed of economically similar States would 
minimize any inherent limits to the Kyoto global climate regime: this limit was 
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identified in the phenomenon of the so-called “affirmative multilateralism” based 
on strongly a-symmetrical obligations imposed between the Parties, so giving the 
way to a form of «reverse discrimination»
511
 against industrialized countries in 
the name of the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility
512
. The 
partial and not fully-balanced application of this principle in the field of climate 
change has allowed that the dimension of the differentiated responsibility prevails 
over the dimension of common responsibility
513
. This is due to two fundamental 
orders of factors: on the one hand, the insufficient level of cooperation provided 
by developing countries and emerging economies in the common fight against 
climate change; on the other hand, the insufficient degree of solidarity so far 
expressed by most of developed countries towards developing countries, with 
particular reference to the delay in the operationalization of the Climate Fund and 
other additional financial resources. Unsatisfactory cooperation by developing 
countries and lack of solidarity on the side of developed countries have, in fact, 
not only prevented an acceleration in international climate negotiation process, 
but have also contributed to weaken the effectiveness of the climate regime at the 
global level
514
. The second element of preference in favor for the regional-based 
scale appears to be visible in terms of decision-making and cost-reduction of 
transaction under negotiation due to classical advantages associated with the 
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“Small Number” of actors 515 . In particular, the prospects for successful 
cooperation would seem to be proportionally inverted to the number of actors 
involved in the process, due to the greater difficulty in identifying and 
sanctioning free-rider behaviors
516
. The argument in favor of a regional 
governance based on the principles of small number meets however a qualitative 
limit when it is applied to the specific case of environmental protection. The 
chances of success of regional action would be drastically reduced if the main 
polluters should or want  to stay out of the system. The objection to the above-
mentioned point is provided by Oye. He introduces a qualitative requirement in 
support of the thesis of “Small Number”: in order to ensure greater effectiveness 
to the scheme, it is not sufficient that the number of participants is reduced, but it 
is also necessary that the latter share common interests on specific issues
517
, such 
as the protection of the environment.  
The nature and the function of this issue introduces a third powerful element in 
favor of a system of regional governance: the practice of issue-linkage within 
regional Organizations. Described as a «simultaneous discussion of two or more 
issue to reach a joint solution»
518
, the technique of issue-linkage moves from the 
outset that if two parties are unable to conclude an agreement by negotiating on a 
single issue, the addition of a second issue may increase the chances of success of 
the final agreement.  Specifically, regional Organizations are an ideal space to 
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practice this technique of linking environmental issues to other shared interests 
within the Organization. Since regional organizations are often the political 
arenas of simultaneous discussions across multiple issues and given the fact that 
each of the Parties will have different levels of intensity of interest on a given 
question, it will be then easier within a regional Organization to link the issue 
"environment" with another issue, by mutual bargaining and logrolling
519
. 
In addition to the above-mentioned political reasons (possibility of overcoming of 
the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities as applied so far, 
economic and historical similarity between countries belonging to a Regional 
Organization; acceleration of the negotiation process by reducing the decision-
making costs; the role and potential of the issue-linkage within regional 
organizations), it is possible to single out further reasons in favor of the adoption 
of regional scale environmental governance. A fourth reason lies in the 
ontological and epistemological characteristics of the regions
520
. The latter appear 
not only an alternative mode of reshaping international relations, but also a new 
vector for structuring global governance itself
521
. In other words, regions are 
becoming increasingly important as disseminator of ideas and «change 
agents»
522
, mostly as reaction to the persistent deadlocks taking place globally. In 
other words, as concisely noted by Ken Conca, much of the impetus for the 
regional comes from global failure, or at least from its stagnation
523
. Examples of 
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such trend can be exactly found in the case of the climate regime:  it is 
experiencing a phase of regionalization through the spreading of over 43 regional 
and sub-regional of emissions trading systems (ETS)
 524
 around the world over 
the last decade
525
. 
A fifth element to be taken into account in the analysis relates to the so-called 
«vertical linkage» that Regional Organizations can play in strengthening the link 
between global and national dimension
526
. In fact, if natural resources cannot be 
managed and protected by a single level of governance, therefore it becomes 
crucial to develop institutional forms of connection between multiple levels. That 
is what is broadly called multi-level governance. Regional Organizations do offer 
this "bridge" between national and global scale. In this framework, the European 
Union constitutes one of the most advanced experiences of multilevel 
governance: it certainly is the most integrated and institutionally sophisticated 
regional entity of the world
527
. 
8. The EU policies on environmental issues have not only decided to «tidy her 
house up»
528
, but they have also accelerated the compliance of obligations 
committed at the international level through the activation of a “preferential 
community channel” based on direct applicability and the primacy of EU law 
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over domestic orders
529
. As  high Party to several international environmental 
treaties, the EU has accelerated the implementation of these international 
obligations within the national legal systems of the Member States through the 
adoption of binding acts, so favoring at the same time the harmonization and the 
gradual rapprochement between different national legislations among the 
Member States. Thus, the Union has become «a new arena»
530
 through which to 
implement environmental legislation arising from international obligations. 
Thus, the history of the EU fundamentally proves that the regional organization 
can represent an interesting laboratory for environmental governance from which 
to start looking for innovative and realistic responses to the challenge of climate 
change. 
9. The experience of the EU allows us to warmly welcome the emerging process 
of «regionalization of environmental protection»
531
. As pointed out by Krämer, 
the supranational level is the one to prefer by exclusion: on the one hand, the 
State level proves to be inadequate and insufficient alone
532
, on the other hand 
there is the global level, whose effectiveness will mostly depend on the outcome 
of the Paris Conference in December 2015. More generally, the progressive 
consolidation of regional territorial units is encouraging the formation of a «third 
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level of governance»
533
, between local fragmentation and global level, «between 
the cosmopolitan rhetoric and power politics»
534
 now applied also to climate 
change as a full-fledged foreign policy’s issue535.  
10. Given all the arguments and the findings so far, the proposed conclusion of 
this work can be best summarized as being “Regionalists in the short run, 
Universalists in the long”. In doing this, regional-scale policy shall be conceived 
not as an alternative, but as parallel, «cumulative»
536
,  catalytic line alongside to 
still existing environmental policies undertaken at national and international 
level. Furthermore, a regional environmental governance would also better meet 
the specific needs of each region of the world, each one different in economic and 
socio-cultural structures, more similar internally, but profoundly different from 
region to region. The better knowledge of regional communities towards 
environmental problems that mostly affect them would also improve the 
community capacity-building  «to custom-cut the policies of mitigation more 
suitable for the region»
537
 compared to solutions taken at universal scale. During 
our work, the EU (PART I and II) Asean and Mercosur (PART III) have been 
practical examples of this diversity according to which every regional laboratory 
tends to follow different paths towards sustainability as a common goal. 
However, the term of regionalization must neither mislead nor expose what we 
are writing in open contradiction with the concept of uniqueness, universality and 
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indivisibility of the object of protection: to regionalize environmental protection 
doesn’t means to regionalize the environment. This would turn into an artificial 
legal fiction operation completely out of reality: it is impossible to fragment and 
compartmentalize something which by itself inherently indivisible
538
.  
The proposal to regionalize environmental protection is certainly a second-best 
approach
539
. However, at the present writing it appears the best solution if the 
next UNFCCC Climate Conference in Paris will be not able to fulfill its 
expectations and to overcome the current gridlock at global level due to the 
divergent positions among the Parties (in particular the EU, the US, China and 
India) which could make the goal of global UN negotiating process extremely 
difficult to achieve within the time estimated as useful according to the Fifth 
IPCC 2013 Report.  
11. In parallel, the EU proposes a third way between ecological cosmopolitism 
and ecological regionalism. Such European third way can be Kantian or 
Rousseauian oriented. According to the political perspective of Rousseau as early 
modern French “pre-environmentalist” 540 , the EU would be seen as a green 
island, a green Fortress, a regional bunker
541
. The entire EU environmental acquis 
would be similar to a European Social Contract which has to be protected from 
ecological anarchy running outside Europe. Since third States do not come all at 
the same time to agree on a social contract similar to the advanced European one, 
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the perspective of a global agreement on climate change would be so far from 
being achieved. As a consequence, the EU reaction would consist of the 
unilateral way of closure and protectionism both in economic, political and 
environmental terms.  On the contrary, a Kantian view of the greening Europe is 
utterly different: Europe would be not a green island, but the continent of eco-
citizenship, here intended as specific articulation of cosmopolitanism
542
. So that, 
it would come up an idea of Europe as a civilization open to the wider world and 
ready to propose a world order where contentious environmental issues are 
peacefully addressed, natural resources conflicts resolved through the 
establishment of empowered global structures of governance. 
While the Rousseauian view doesn’t call for the employ of communication with 
what is outside (the non-European world), the Kantian view would strongly 
require the instrument of climate diplomacy to communicate, to promote and 
propose or simply showcase its message of sustainable development to the rest of 
the world.  
12. When it comes to the matter of spreading the EU message of sustainable 
development to the wider world through climate diplomacy, one can meet the 
pessimists, the optimists, the pragmatists, the idealists, the stone-wallers, the 
progressive realists, the progressive internationalists, the liberals or the 
conservatives.
543
 But there is also a further category of man: as observed by the 
Italian scholar Antonio Cassese in quoting the British writer Aldous Huxley,  we 
can first draw a distinction between two categories of social scientists: 
Technicians v. Utopians. One category is that of the Technicians. They are 
inclined to accept too complacently the main framework of the structure whose 
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details they are trying to improve and accept things as they are, but too 
uncritically. The other category is made up of the Utopians who are too much 
preoccupied with what ought to be to pay any serious attention to what is. 
Outward reality disgusts them. Huxley was aware these two extreme mindsets 
were both ineffective and unhelpful to another category of scholars that he called 
«Judicious Reformers»
544
.  
13. Here, with the intellectual effort to think and to act as Judicious Reformers, 
we are aware that there are several grounds for doubting that the future of EU 
Climate Diplomacy will be bright in the compelling challenge of spreading the 
European message of sustainable development to the outside world . However, 
despite all the current limits and gridlocks of the UNFCCC CoPs, global 
multilateral cooperation on climate change still remains of crucial importance. 
Again, this is because climate change is a global problem; as Gupta notes,  
multilateral cooperation helps «to bring together the best of global science and 
knowledge to address the problem and help determine global thresholds»
545
; then, 
global cooperation can also contribute to burden-share responsibilities and to 
allocate rights between countries in a legitimate manner, so as to promote the 
common good. In addition to this, global cooperation can improve the 
institutionalization of specific mechanisms (such as the CDM) otherwise 
impossible without a proper room for cooperation; finally, global multilateral 
cooperation provides the only possible place for countries such as the Small 
                                                          
544
 Cassese A., Realizing Utopia. The future of International Law, Oxford University 
Press, 2012 
545
 Gupta J., Climate Change and Developing Countries: From Leadership to Liability, 
in Di Paola M., Pellegrino G., Canned Heat, Routledge, 2014 
179 
 
Island Developing States
546
 (also rather unhappily called “Sinking States”547)  to 
have a voice at global UN fora. Such room for global multilateral cooperation 
still has a name: it is called Climate Diplomacy. 
14. After two-decades of fascinating, if disappointing, exercise of climate 
diplomacy,  why should it be different this time in Paris? First, the EU will have a 
“home court advantage” for the first time after the Copenhagen Climate Summit 
in 2009. Second, this time the EU will be able to learn from its previous 
shortcomings in Copenhagen, to incorporate timely remedial actions and to 
improve on its shortcomings as a climate negotiator. Indeed, when the world 
physically and virtually came to Copenhagen in 2009 (or “Hopenhagen” as many 
NG s’activists used to say) expecting the achievement of a global agreement to 
combat climate change, the COP15 provided a sobering demonstration of the 
European disarray
548
. With this regard, the Chair of the CoP15 Connie Hedegaard 
frankly recognized that the EU spoke with many voices and was virtually unable 
to negotiate. Quoting Hedegaard during her job hearing in the European 
Parliament in January 2010, «there are very important lessons from Copenhagen. 
In the last hours, China, India, Russia, Japan each spoke with one voice, while 
Europe spoke with many different voices. […] A lot of Europeans in the room is 
not a problem, but there is only an advantage if we sing from the same hymn 
sheet. We need to think about this and reflect on it very seriously, or we will lose 
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our leadership role in the world […]. The EU leaders never expected the climate 
talks to be easy, but expected at least to win some kudos for having unilaterally 
committed to binding carbon emissions reductions of 20 percent by 2020. On the 
final day in Copenhagen, they were shocked as they found themselves sidelined 
when the US, Brazil, China, India and South Africa sat down to bash out a deal - 
what became known as the "Copenhagen Accord" - without any European 
powers in the room»
549
.  
So, on that occasion, the Union found itself marginalized and too busy into its 
“EU bunker” (see PART IV), while the US took over the initiative and reportedly 
struck a deal directly with China, India, Brazil and South Africa and a handful of 
other major developing countries, without any European leader present
550
. This 
dynamics has also been denounced by Anthony Giddens who has noticed that, as 
a consequence of the EU age-old problem that it does not speak with one voice, 
the Union did not deliver the very rapid decision-making that had to take place 
late on in the negotiations to get anything from them at all.
551
  The Conference of 
Copenhagen also showed the cultural limits of a unilateral and Eurocentric 
understanding of “binding measures” which lack communication with other 
global players
552
, while the directly “putting money on the table” in the form of 
7.2 billion euro of fast start funding failed its original purpose to induce G77 
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countries to accept a new climate agreement
553
. One of the fundamental lessons 
to be drawn from Copenhagen 2009 is that any future climate agreement can no 
longer be seen as purely EU-styled, but as the outcome of a mutual engagement 
between Europe and the wider non-European world, based on a mature, reliable, 
flexible and respectful dialogue with it. There is the possibility of a third way 
between the pure EU-styled and the merely instrumental multilateral cooperation: 
it deals with a compromise between the EU supranational multilateralism and the 
other partners’ contingent, ad hoc, functional or even short-term types of 
multilateralism
554
. Such compromise must be realistically ambitious. It will 
require responsibility and pragmatism, based on the realistic awareness that we 
are more and more surrounded by a changing, a-symmetric, multi-polar, hotter 
non-European world. 
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ANNEXES 
 
Climate change: EU shows leadership ahead of Paris with 23% emissions cut
 
Brussels, 20 October 2015 
European Commission - Press release
Joint press release: European Commission - European Environment Agency on the "Trends
and projections in Europe 2015" report
  
The European Union is on track towards meeting and overachieving its 2020 target for
reducing greenhouse emissions by 20%, according to a report published today by the
European Environment Agency (EEA).
The "Trends and projections in Europe 2015" report reveals that greenhouse gas emissions
in Europe decreased by 23% between 1990 and 2014 and reached the lowest levels on
record.
Latest projections by Member States show that the EU is heading for a 24% reduction by
2020 with current measures in place, and a 25% reduction with additional measures already
being planned in Member States. The EU is already working towards its 2030 goal of an
emissions reduction target of at least 40% —the EU's contribution towards the new global
climate change agreement in Paris in December.
 EU Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete said: "These results speak for
themselves: Europe succeeded in cutting emissions by 23% between 1990 and 2014 while the
European economy grew by 46% over the same period. We have shown consistently that climate
protection and economic growth go hand in hand. This is a strong signal ahead of the Paris climate
conference that Europe stands by its commitments and that our climate and energy policies work. And
we have already taken the first steps towards implementing our Paris pledge with new proposals
presented earlier this year."
EEA Executive Director Hans Bruyninckx said: "Europe's efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions and
invest in energy efficiency and renewable energy have resulted in concrete gains. Our report shows
that the EU is on track towards its 2020 climate targets. The report also shows that to achieve our
longer-term goals for 2030 and 2050, a fundamental change is needed in the way we produce and use
energy in Europe."
On track towards 2020 greenhouse gas target
The EEA report reveals that according to approximated (‘proxy’) estimates for 2014 greenhouse gas,
emissions fell by 4% in 2014 compared to 2013. This was partly due to an unusually warm year, which
lowered energy demand. This means the EU’s domestic greenhouse gas emissions were 23% below
1990 levels in 2014.
Latest projections by Member States[1] show the EU is heading for a 24% reduction by 2020 with
current measures in place, and a 25% reduction with additional measures already being planned in
Member States. The EU is therefore also on track towards its Kyoto Protocol target for the second
commitment period from 2013 to 2020.
Progress towards 2030 greenhouse gas target
Reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are projected to continue beyond 2020 but at a slower pace.
According to projections submitted by Member States, planned reductions are estimated to bring
emissions between 27% (with current measures) and 30% (with additional measures already being
planned by Member States) below 1990 levels by 2030. New policies will therefore need to be put in
place to meet the 40% reduction target by 2030. As President Juncker stated in his State of the
European Union speech, European Commission has already taken the first legislative step towards
IP/15/5868 
implementing the EU's 2030 targets with its proposal to revise the EU Emissions Trading System
(ETS). 
How is the EU doing with regards to its greenhouse gas emissions targets for 2020 and
2030?
Progress to targets GHG emissionsEmissions compared to 1990 levels
2020 targets – 20%
2013 levels – 19.8%
2014 levels (approximate) – 23%
Member States’ 2020 projections – 24% to – 25%
Number of Member States ‘on track’ 24
Member States’ 2030 projections – 27% to – 30%
Link to EEA reports:
EEA report 04/2015 “Trends and projections in Europe 2015”:
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trends-and-projections-in-europe-2015
EEA technical report 14/2015 “Trends and projections in the EU ETS in 2015”:
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/trends-and-projections-eu-ets-2015/
EEA technical report 15/2015 “Approximated EU GHG inventory: proxy GHG estimates for 2014”:
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/approximated-eu-ghg-inventory-2014/
About the report and the EEA
This EEA annual report provides an updated assessment of the progress of the European Union and
European countries towards their climate mitigation and energy targets.
The European Environment Agency (EEA) is an agency of the European Union. It aims to support
sustainable development and to help achieve significant and measurable improvement in Europe's
environment by providing timely, targeted, relevant and reliable information to policymaking agents
and the public. It is supported in its work by the European environment information and observation
network (Eionet), a network of 39 European countries.
For media enquiries, please contact:
Anna-Kaisa Itkonen
European Commission - Spokesperson for Climate Action and Energy
Tel: +32 (0)2 29 56186, Mobile: +32 (0)460 764 328
Email: anna-kaisa.itkonen@ec.europa.eu
Gülçin Karadeniz
European Environment Agency
Tel: +45 33 36 71 72, Mobile: +45 23 68 36 53
Email: gulcin.karadeniz@eea.europa.eu
[1] Projections were made before 2014 estimates were available
Press contacts:
Anna-Kaisa ITKONEN (+32 2 29 56186)
Nicole BOCKSTALLER (+32 2 295 25 89)
General public inquiries: Europe Direct by phone 00 800 67 89 10 11 or by email
Attachments
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Preparations for the 21th session of the Conference of
the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 11th
session of the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto
Protocol (CMP 11), Paris 2015
The Council of the European Union,
1.           UNDERLINES the critical importance of the 2015 Paris Conference as a historic milestone for enhancing global
collective action and accelerating the global transformation to a low-carbon and climate-resilient society. 
Urgency and need for global action
2.           NOTES with concern the findings contained in the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC); UNDERLINES that global warming is unequivocal and that it is extremely likely that human influence has been
the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. 
3.           STRESSES that, consistent with recent IPCC findings, in order to stay below 2°C, global greenhouse gas emissions
need to peak by 2020 at the latest, be reduced by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 1990[1] and be near zero or below by
2100; in this context, WELCOMES the Leaders' declaration at the G7 Summit in June 2015 and EMPHASISES that all Parties
should pursue transformative pathways towards a long-term vision of global and sustainable climate neutrality and climate
resilience in the second half of this century; RECALLS the EU objective, in the context of necessary reductions according to the
IPCC by developed countries as a group, to reduce emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990.
Paris outcome
4.           EMPHASISES the importance of agreeing at the Paris Conference: i) an ambitious and durable legally-binding
agreement under the UNFCCC ("the Paris Agreement") applicable to all Parties and addressing in a balanced and cost-
effective manner mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, capacity building and transparency of
action and support and containing ambitious nationally determined mitigation commitments; ii) a comprehensive package of
decisions to enable the implementation of the Paris Agreement and to outline interim arrangements before its entry into force;
and iii) a decision on enhancing global pre-2020 mitigation ambition, supported by the Lima Paris Action Agenda. 
5.           UNDERLINES that the Paris outcome should send a strong signal on finance in order to support poor and vulnerable
countries and enable the transition to resilient, low greenhouse gas economies.  
Further process in 2015
6.           NOTES the considerable amount of work still ahead in order to reach the Paris outcome; CONCERNED about the lack
of substantial progress on the negotiating text up to now; ENCOURAGES the co-Chairs of the Ad hoc Working Group on the
Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) to prepare a revised and concise negotiating text containing the main options, on
the basis of the views expressed by Parties, with a view to a fruitful early ministerial engagement before the Paris Conference. 
Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)
7.           WELCOMES the submission of INDCs so far; UNDERLINES that the EU and its Member States have submitted their
INDC on 6 March 2015, which is a binding target of an at least 40% domestic reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030
compared to 1990; URGES all Parties which have not yet done so to come forward with fair and ambitious INDCs as soon as
possible in the coming few weeks; in this context, WELCOMES opportunities for facilitative exchanges of views on the level of
the aggregate effort towards the below 2°C objective, including through the forthcoming UNFCCC synthesis report and the INDC
Forum in Rabat, Morocco, on 12-13 October 2015. 
Paris Agreement
8.           NOTES the Commission communication “The Paris Protocol - a blueprint for tackling global climate change beyond
2020” as a contribution for articulating a vision by the EU and its Member States in view of the Paris Conference. 
9.           PROPOSES that the internationally legally-binding Paris Agreement: 
-        provide a long-term vision of the needed transformation towards low-emission and climate-resilient economies over the
course of this century; 
-        enable the participation of all Parties and engagement of non-state actors; 
-        be in the form of a protocol in order to enshrine the strongest expression of political will and provide predictability and
durability; 
-   enter into force after ratification by a significant number of Parties representing a significant level of emissions so as to ensure
that the Paris Agreement is truly global and effective.
        
Mitigation
10.        PROPOSES that the Paris Agreement: 
-   set out a long-term global mitigation goal in line with the below 2°C objective; 
-   contain fair, ambitious and quantifiable mitigation commitments by all Parties, consistent with the UNFCCC's principles
applied in light of different national circumstances and evolving economic realities and capabilities; 
-   provide that all Parties must have, maintain and implement such a mitigation commitment; 
-   contain a dynamic five-yearly mitigation ambition mechanism in which all Parties should be required to either submit new or
updated commitments, without falling behind previous levels of commitment, or resubmit the existing ones; 
-   contain simplified procedures for the renewal and upward adjustment of mitigation commitments; 
-   include a compliance regime which promotes timely and effective implementation; 
-   provide flexibility for those countries with least capabilities. 
            Adaptation
11.        PROPOSES that adaptation must be a central part of a balanced Paris Agreement that: 
-        commits all Parties to plan, prepare for and respond to the adverse impacts of climate change, to integrate adaptation into
national development processes and to communicate experiences in order to achieve climate-resilient sustainable
development; 
-      calls on all Parties to strengthen monitoring, reporting, information-sharing and cooperation in order to increase
effectiveness of adaptation actions; 
-      contains an iterative and dynamic approach to continuously enhance the effectiveness of adaptation measures and their
implementation; 
-   contributes to assisting all countries, especially the poorest and particularly vulnerable ones, to achieve climate-resilient
sustainable development; 
-   underlines that both ambitious action on mitigation and adaptation, including efficient disaster risk reduction, are essential to
manage and reduce the risk of adverse impacts of climate change, including addressing the risk of loss and damage.   
12.        RECALLS the submission by the EU and its Member States on "European Union undertakings in adaptation planning". 
Use of markets
13.        STRESSES that the Paris Agreement should allow for the international use of markets, subject to the application of
robust common accounting rules which ensure that the environmental integrity and the integrity of the mitigation commitments are
maintained and double counting is avoided; and provide for market mechanisms which promote scaled-up and cost-effective
mitigation action entailing a net contribution to global mitigation efforts and contributing to sustainable development. 
            
Finance
14.        REAFFIRMS that the EU and its Member States have and remain committed to scaling up the mobilisation of climate
finance in the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation, in order to contribute their share of
the developed countries' goal to jointly mobilise USD 100 billion per year by 2020 from a wide variety of sources public and
private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance; in this context, RECALLS its conclusions on climate
finance of 7 November 2014; REITERATES its strong support for the Green Climate Fund and LOOKS FORWARD to early
allocation of initial funding; UNDERLINES that the Paris Agreement's provisions on climate finance need to be dynamic and
able to adapt to changing realities and needs by reflecting Parties' evolving capabilities and responsibilities; furthermore,
REFERS to its forthcoming conclusions on climate finance.            
Transparency and accountability
15.        UNDERLINES that the Paris Agreement must provide for a robust common rules-based regime, including transparency
and accountability rules applicable to all Parties, while recognising that their application will differ according to commitment
types which reflect Parties' capabilities and national circumstances; STRESSES that this regime should provide for the use of
common metrics, respect the most recent IPCC guidelines and build on experience gained under the UNFCCC. 
16.        HIGHLIGHTS that the Paris Agreement should provide for a transparent accounting and reporting framework for
emissions and removals for the land-use sector for all Parties, which promote sustainable land management, building on existing
relevant decisions under the UNFCCC. 
            Joint fulfilment
17.        CONFIRMS that the EU and its Member States intend to fulfil their commitments jointly under the Paris Agreement;
WELCOMES Norway's and Iceland's intention to participate in this joint fulfilment.  
            Other issues
18.        STRESSES the importance of human rights, gender equality, a gender-sensitive approach, a just transition of the work
force, decent jobs, education and awareness raising as well as ensuring food security in the context of climate action. 
Implementation of the Paris Agreement
19.        PROPOSES the adoption of a comprehensive package of substantive decisions, in addition to a technical work
programme, at the Paris Conference to further develop rules, modalities and procedures on 
inter alia
 transparency and accountability of mitigation commitments, including for the land-use sector, and on the international use of
markets, to be completed by 2017, in order to enable the implementation of the Paris Agreement. 
Enhancing global
 
pre-2020 ambition
20.        REITERATES that the EU and its Member States are already applying the Doha amendment to the Kyoto Protocol;
STRESSES the determination of the EU and its Member States to complete the process of ratification of the Doha amendment
in the third quarter of 2015; and INVITES other Parties to do likewise in order to ensure its prompt entry into force; in this context,
UNDERLINES the need for adopting at the Paris Conference the implementation rules for the second commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol as agreed in Warsaw and Lima. 
21.        STRESSES that all Parties need to act in order to close the pre-2020 mitigation gap; RECALLS the progress made
under the ADP in identifying opportunities to enhance pre 2020 mitigation ambition in areas of high mitigation potential, in
particular energy efficiency, renewable energy, REDD+, short-lived climate pollutants, upstream methane emissions, HFCs,
export credits and fossil fuel subsidy reform; UNDERLINES the importance of multilateral cooperation, in particular through the
Lima Paris Action Agenda, aimed at identifying and accelerating actions in these areas; in this context, STRESSES the
importance of involvement of and cooperation with non-State actors; UNDERLINES the importance to continue and intensify
work on enhancing pre-2020 mitigation ambition beyond the Paris Conference, and to ensure continuity in the political attention
for high mitigation potential options by linking the technical examination of mitigation options with regular high-level events
building on the Lima Paris Action Agenda.  
22.        EMPHASISES that the examination of opportunities with high mitigation potential continues to be relevant beyond 2020
and can serve as an input to the process to raise global ambition under the Paris Agreement over time. 
23.        RECOGNISES the need to foster the continuing implementation of existing decisions under the UNFCCC; in this
context, WELCOMES the completion of the REDD+ negotiations.  
Other processes
24.        While noting that the Paris Agreement should address emissions across all sectors subject to regular review and that
emissions accounting and reporting should remain under the UNFCCC, UNDERLINES that IMO, ICAO, and the Montreal
Protocol should regulate as soon as possible in an effective manner and in line with the below 2°C objective greenhouse gas
emissions from international shipping and aviation and the production and consumption of HFCs respectively. 
25.        WELCOMES the outcome of the Addis Ababa Conference that strengthens the framework to finance sustainable
development and the means of implementation for the universal 2030 agenda for sustainable development; LOOKS FORWARD
to the upcoming UN Summit that will adopt the agenda “Transforming our world: The 2030 agenda for sustainable development”
in order to address the universal challenge of poverty eradication and sustainable development and that confirms the importance
of tackling climate change as a key element in confronting that challenge.
 
[1]           See for example 14790/09 (paragraph 7) and 14747/14 (paragraph 2).
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